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This piece of work is an attempt to assess the difficulties encountered by the 
American China watchers in understanding Mainland China after 1949. My 
articulation is that such difficulties have not only maintained at the level of coming 
to terms with the Chinese, but they have also not fully apprehended even in the 
evaluative exercise done by the watchers themselves. I maintain that most of the 
members of the American academia have overlooked the relationship between the 
value judgment of a people with the cultural threads that have sustained the 
emergence of such judgment of that people, and so their attempts in analyzing the 
values and behaviors of the Chinese people are fulfilling their own perception of 
what Chinese should be instead of knowing what Chinese are. The reflection here is 
the issue of empathetic understanding in this kind of cross-cultural study: one is 
always 'culture bound', but so long as one is well aware of this limitation, and knows 
the significance of the relationship described above, one may capture a more genuine 
picture rather than maintaining a possible distorted myth of the studied culture. 
To articulate the above complex, the study will first outline the importance of 
American academic attempts to China study and the development of the 
paradigmatic disputes among the scholars themselves. The study will then be 
narrowed down to important academic work concerning values and behaviors of 
post-1949 Chinese peasants done by some of these scholars. Such illustrations are to 
ii 
show how a required deeper understanding on the Chinese values and social fabrics 
has been misplaced by some secondary concerns like timing of research and 
availability or not of on-the-spot fieldwork. In the end, it has resulted in a perception 
that, the further away the research would be from the re-opening of China and more 
opportunities for the researchers to have first-person presence in the field, the better. 
Furthermore, in the course of their study, they have adopted a certain framework of 
understanding to depict the Chinese, without noticing that such an understanding has 
its own cultural formation. What has been overlooked, then, is a self-evaluation on 
the predisposition the researchers have used to understand the attitudinal and 
behavioral patterns of the Chinese. I will use counter examples to show how some 
American scholars could overcome this limitation because of their awareness on 
their own bound values and the respect they have on that of the Chinese. They will 
be further supported by discussions offered by Chinese scholars in studying the 
American and Chinese cultures in the 1940s and 1950s, thus not only highlighting 
the misplaced attention by the American China watchers as mentioned above, but 
also reflecting the weight of empathetic comprehension in this kind of study. 
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This piece of work is touching on the difficulties or limitations as encountered by 
American China watchers when they try to come to terms with Mainland China after 
1949. Despite of the merits these American scholars have established in depicting the 
Chinese society, I maintain that they, with little awareness of it, have been constrained 
by a lack of deep understanding on the values and behaviors of the Chinese. More 
precisely put, I am trying to address the following issue: the American scholars in 
general rely on their own perceptions of understanding society and people so much that 
when they try to delineate the Chinese society, they have given insufficient attention to 
Chinese cultural values that could help to explain a lot of Chinese behavioral and 
attitudinal patterns. As a consequence of this inattention, their effort in trying to capture 
the dynamics of the Chinese society has been hampered. When revealing the 
problematic of American historians in the process of understanding China over this 
century, Cohen (1984) interprets this difficulty by the word 'ethnocentrism' (or by the 
phrase 'ethnocentric attitude'), where he defines it as an intellectual bias which “ ... 
equated modern with Western and Western with important ... ,, (ibid, p.2; own 
emphases). In fact, a more precise meaning that I observe asjumping along the lines of 
his critic of the American academic circle is the conceited psychology of 'westem as 
American and American as important'. In this discussion, I am echoing the idea of 
ethnocentric attitude as illustrated by Cohen, but in a mild tone. That is to say, I am not 
so much of stressing the American scholars as having a strong sense of exclusion on 
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Chinese culture; instead, I am pinpointing the difficulties encountered by them when 
they have a lack of empathetic understanding to Chinese culture, and how such 
difficulties have misled them to a partial or distorted capturing of the Chinese society. 
Of geographical interest here is ‘why America'; of substantive concem here is ‘what is 
wrong’. 
No qualm, any understanding of a foreign society may be faced with lots of 
structural constraints. Language barrier, availability of entering into the study field in a 
first-person manner, and openness of the informants in revealing the concerned topic of 
the researchers are but a few of such handy examples. Li his classic study on Yen Fu, 
Schwartz pinpointed a limitation of this kind, "No one can pretend to stand outside of 
any given culture [because] we are all 'culture-bound'" (Schwartz, 1964, p.2). The 
reflection here is that we are, to some extent, prisoners of our environment. For 
instance, the sort of learning environment that one has been situated in during the 
student years, the socio-political situation as well as the overall theoretical foci of the 
time when one is producing the work, and the availability or not of materials and 
information that will be meaningful to the analyses, can all be factors that may have 
influenced the quality and standpoint of one's study. This is not the problem. Only 
when one is not aware of the assumptions buried inside one's academic quest, and 
from there, imposes a 'tmth' defined by the researcher's own innermost reality instead 
of acquiring the 'truth' derived from the studied context, that makes such 
understanding problematic.^ If this is the case, even when the time comes where an 
1 This view is borrowed from a concluding remark given by Cohen to American historians. For 
Cohen, the historical academia of America should have this sort of awareness when trying to study 
China; see Cohen, 1984, p.l98. 
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awareness of obtaining the truth arrives, the quest can still hardly reach a deeper level, 
as the assumption is still sinking deep in the researcher's mind, konically, as I am 
going to show below, this is almost an exact outline of American studies on China in 
general, and this piece of work is an attempt to capture the scenario of this academic 
misfortune. 
Against such a backdrop, this discussion is focusing on two related issues. Firstly, 
， 
it tries to figure out how the development of different paradigms in viewing People's 
Republic of China (PRC) by post-war American social scientists^ have been meddling 
a genuine understanding of the society. Secondly, as an illustration of the first issue, the 
focus is ftu*ther narrowed down to investigate some of the studies concerning the life of 
rural Chinese after 1949. I want to show the extent of research achievement in 
understanding the values and behaviors of the Chinese peasants will depend on the 
awareness or not of the researchers in minimizing their own presumptions on 
understanding people when applying it to understand people of another culture (in this 
case, the Chinese), and their ability to maintain empathetic understanding on that 
culture. For sure, I reckon that there has been a series of publications since the tum of 
2 The word ‘paradigm’ is being used in a most general manner here, that is, as a set of 
assumptions much taken-for-granted in the process of inquiry or analysis. In fact, the term is being 
used almost interchangeably with the word 'approach' by the involved scholars in discussing this 
matter (Cohen, 1984; Kuo and Myers, 1986; Mosher, 1990; Myers and Metzger, 1980). Under the 
current context, the word is used to outline different assumptions in coming to terms with China rather 
than different research methodologies in conducting social science researches (see, for instance, Guba 
and Lincohi, 1994, p.l09, who regard there are four alternative inquiry paradigms, namely, positivist, 
post-positivist, critical theory, constructivist). Thus, I will not draw into the debate concerning the 
latter issue in this discussion. 
3 By 'American social scientists', I do not necessarily mean that the concerned scholars - be they 
historians, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists and economists alike - must have an 
American nationality. Rather, I agree with the view of Cohen (1984) who stresses that those who are 
“...heavily involved in an American professional milieu …” should also be included in this typology 
even though they themselves are not Americans (p.xvi). 
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1980 onwards which have tried to serve the purpose of either evaluating the established 
views or capturing the research effort of American scholars on China studies.^ Yet, as I 
am going to pinpoint, I perceive that quite a majority of them is not treating the impact 
of ethnocentric attitude with the required level of attention.^ I contend that if one does 
not reckon the importance of the relationship between value judgment of a people and 
the cultural threads in help formulating suchjudgment of this people, butjust use one's 
own perception on individuals to interpret the attitudinal and behavioral pattem of this 
people, then, to a large extent, one may produce distorted understanding on others even 
without the original intention of doing so. 
Obviously, the above outline requires certain legitimate grounds to make it a 
sound study. The first question that may be asked is why America. And given the size 
and diversity of China study, the subsequent question to raise is why limited to 
American studies concerning Chinese peasants as an illustration. By and by, to make 
such a discussion convincing, the availability and suitability of American studies fitting 
the second consideration becomes the third concem of the day. Until these puzzles 
4 Regarding to this kind of evaluative exercises, they include, in order of appearance, Harding, 
1980; Myers and Metzger, 1980; Thurston and Parker, 1980; Goldman, 1981; Harding, 1982; 
Johnson, 1982; Prewitt, 1982; Domes, 1983; Thurston and Pasteraak, 1983; Cohen, 1984; Harding, 
1984a, 1984b; Kuo and Myers, 1986; Kallgren and Simon, 1987; Mosher, 1989, 1990; Huang, 1991; 
Shambaugh, 1993; Madsen, 1995. For sure, this list is not bound to be exclusive, and that some of the 
records above, such as Thurston and Parker (1980), Prewitt (1982), Thurston and Pastemak (1983)， 
Kallgren and Simon (1987), Shambaugh (1993) are publications consisting of collected essays 
surrounding the impression and assessment of the field of China study. In this sense, the materials 
available can hardly be claimed as lacking. 
5 Here, I mean that the publications as recorded in the above footnote, except for the cases of 
Cohen (1984), Madsen in Kallgren and Simon (1987)，Madsen in Shambaugh (1993) and Madsen 
(1995), are on the whole quite insufficient when responding to the matter concerning ethnocentrism. 
The reality is that either the reflection is not deep enough, or simply that there is a kind of total 
negligence of the importance of such an impact. More on this will be handled in the section of 
"Analyzing the Paradigms" of the second chapter. 
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have been resolved, this discussion may not claim for owning a sound methodological 
ground. 
The Weight of the American China-Watchers 
An opinion poll in 1942 revealed that sixty percent of a national sample in United 
States could not locate China in the world map (Isaacs, 1958, p.37). Cynically though, 
the history of America's emergence as a major world power had been its ability in 
giving decisive opinion in world events, of which the first one of such in foreign affairs 
was the Open Door initiative of 1899 relating to China (ibid, p.38). Since then, 
according to Issacs^, the image on China by the West moved from one of ‘Age of 
Respect, to 'Age of Contempt,.? The forced opening of China led to the boosting up of 
the missionary activities in the country to move further inward from the coastal ports, 
and before long, the dominance of the American and British scene on China affairs was 
obvious.8 But soon after 1922, American influence and activity in China began to 
outstrip Britain (Fairbank, 1983[1948], p.314). This was not only due to the 
international recognition that America had gained via the Open Door Policy, but also 
6 Issacs (1958, p.71) crudely establishes a chronology of images on China into six phrases, 
namely, the Age of Respect (18th Century), the Age of Contempt (1840-1905), the Age of 
Benevolence (1905-1937), the Age of Admiration (1937-1944)，the Age of Disenchantment (1944-
1949) and the Age ofHostility (1949 - ). In fact, the analysis in the following chapter is going to show 
that his last few phrases are capturing quite vividly the academic directions of American scholars on 
understanding China. 
7 Mosher (1990) provides a similar point of analysis here. According to him, in the early 
encounters (at the tum of the 17th century) with China by Jesuit missionaries and important 
Enlightenment philosophers like Leibniz and Voltaire, the country had a record of admiring the 
westerners ofthe time (p.36). However, after the defeat of the Chinese Empire in the Opium War, in 
both America and Europe, there was a spreading impression that “ ... China was decadent, dying, 
fallen greatly from her glorious past" (p.40). 
8 By 1905, there were 3,445 missionaries in China, of which over ninety percent were American 
and British (Cohen, 1978, p.555). For details relating to the missionary activities in China since the 
late Qing Dynasty, see Cohen, 1978. 
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the active involvement of the private sectors of the country in the social affairs of 
China.9 Lideed, all sorts of correspondence and speeches these middlemen passed to 
their public just helped in popularizing China. In sum, the moral dignity of the 
American politics^^, the dominating figures of the American missionaries with their all-
edged participation of missionary activities" in the social life of China (churches, 
schools, clinics), and the heading of the new National Government in China by a 
Christian couple had all become factors which helped producing a view of an almost 
proprietary interest of Americans on China (Mosher, 1990, p.43; Fairbank, 1982， 
p.334). 
American missionary dominance soon gave way to her journalists when the 
political atmosphere between China and Japan started deteriorating from late 1920s 
onwards. The leading role of American reporters was especially marked by the special 
treatment towards Edgar Snow, an American reporter who was also the first one to be 
invited by the Communists to visit their base in Yenan. For sure, the left-leaning 
attitude of Snow^^ was an advantage in the Communist view to win for a sympathetic 
9 An example was the American private aid, the Rockefeller Foundation investment, in the Peking 
Union Medical College. Between 1915 to 1947, a total of $33 million was spent to get started and 
upkept its functioning, ending up in the training of three hundred doctors over the period; see 
Fairbank, 1983[1948],p.328. 
10 This could be reflected by the agitation of the Open Door Policy by the US government. As 
recalled by Fairbank (1983[1948]), the Policy was not so much of a guarantee of American's share of 
interest in China, which was less than one tenth of the total foreign stake by then and in there (p.324); 
rather, the independence of China had appealed to Americans as a matter of political justice: "... it 
fitted the doctrine of the self-determination and sovereignty of weaker nations, which constituted one 
of our major political sentiment" (pp.322-323). 
11 Fairbank (1983[1948]) once said, "Missionary constituencies have been the seedbed of our 
humanitarianism toward China, a sentiment that sometimes set policy and sometimes ran into 
frustration" (p.312). 
12 As the biography of Snow (Hamilton, 1988，p.55) stresses, Snow was a dedicated socialist who 
regarded capitalism would eventually lead to fascism. When he reached Yenan and came across the 
collective ownership and communal life practiced there, his ideal was much answered and his 
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r e p o r t " which was, as recalled by reporters of the war-time crew in a gathering in 1982, 
not so welcomed in that period.^^ But the American Government had Hobson,s Choice: 
the then Secretary of State, Kellogg, was determined to deal only with a Chinese 
government that represented a unified country (Fairbank, 1983[1948], p.325) because 
America was by then fighting against the Japanese in the Pacific on the one hand, and 
the Nationalist government had been the American ally for quite some time already on 
the other (Fairbank, 1982, p.316). The American Government just could not offer the 
time and manpower to work with a new polity, but in the end she lost her influence on 
this huge piece ofhinterland. 
The loss of China agitated the urgency to ask for a ‘why，question among the 
American academics and politicians. This inquiry led to the emergence of various 
paradigms in understanding China, which I will discuss in details in the following 
chapter. But an important point of clarification is needed here. By that time, the all-out 
political, journalistic, religious, as well as private sector involvement of America in 
admiration towards the Communist practices there was aroused (p.55). If we consider the issue of the 
wide circulation of his book Red Star Over China (27,000 copies sold in a period of eight years), the 
influence of such to the audience could be very telling. In fact, as one reviewer notes, an impression of 
the time was that the Chinese Communists were austere, dedicated patriots as contrasted to the heavy-
handed, corrupt, and unreliable Nationalist Government (Issacs, 1958, p.l63). 
13 Snow (1973[1937]) describes the Soviet in the North-west as ‘rural egalitarianism' and regarded 
the Chinese Communists were nothing but 'agrarian reformers' (p.253). 
14 Steele, generally regarded as the ‘Dean of American reporters in China，(MacKinon and Friesen, 
1987，p.ix), recalls the complex feels of the war-time reporters of the time: communism as known by 
the west of that period made them difficult to talk of it favorably, and so in order to praise the 
Communists they saw without producing a pro-Communist image, the reporters just denied the 
Communists of the time as ‘real communists' (ibid, pp.154-155). For instance, as the correspondent of 
New York Herald Tribune and London Times in China, Forman maintained that the Chinese 
Communists were “ ... not [Communists] according to the Russian definition of the term" (Forman, 
1945, p.l77). Brooks Atkinson o f the New York Times, after visiting Yenan, wrote that the political 
system there should best describe as “…agrarian or peasant democracy, or as a farm labor party:, and 
so Chinese Communist Party was Communist in name only (New York Times, November 26，1944， 
quoted in Mosher, p.61). 
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China had outstripped other westem nations in such an extent that the leading role of 
American China study program in the post-war period was established. Here, I am 
talking about a strong American desire to understand China on the one hand^^, as 
contrasted with the comparatively less enthusiastic attitude in non-English speaking 
European countries on China studies and the weakening British effort on the other. 
Based on late reviews of China studies in the West, evidences in supporting the claim 
of the outstripping of American China studies as against those of other non-English 
speakingi6 and English speaking" (implying United Kingdom here) worlds of Europe 
15 In Chapter Two, I am going to outline the post-war American quest on an understanding of 
China as a reflection of this kind of American desire. As for the reason for such a desire, and the 
implication of it, I will make use of Madsen's brilliant discussion (1995) for further elaboration under 
the section "Understanding Americans" of Chapter Five. 
16 For instance, in discussing about contemporary China studies since the post-war period in 
Northern Europe, Saich (1994) straightly points out that the research interests in these places, 
including Netherlands, Germany, France, Denmark and Sweden alike, have been chiefly remained on 
sinology rather than contemporary China (p. l l5) . Furthermore, until now, Asia in general is not taken 
very seriously in Europe, because Europeans see the future very much in European terms (p.l24). This 
stand is supported by a similar view from Bianco (1994), who claims that, until 1966, still the great 
majority of French sinologists were “HamuejicT, whose research and teaching were concentrated on 
philology, philosophy, classical literature, ancient history and the like (p.l29). Even though the 
interest on contemporary China has been rising, it was a slow move until quite recently (ibid), and that 
most scholarly works of this new interest are published in French, and so not known outside of France 
(p.l35). Saich gives the reason of this phenomenon: as there is already a large domestic audience in 
France for information on China, “ ... the compulsion to publish in English, the international academic 
language for the field, ... is similarly reduced …”（Saich, p.l24). In another latest reflection by Bianco 
(1995), he concludes that the China watchers in France “ ... are in fact peripheral members of the 
United states-dominated, English-speaking Westem community of China specialist" (p.519). All in all, 
the European academic concem on China has not been so encouraging. 
17 After the Second World War, it was already evident that Britain's role in international events in 
general, and Asia in particular, was replaced by America (Hook, 1994, p.l64). The Hayter Report of 
1961 represented a formal attempt to figure out the future British orientation towards China studies. 
The Sub-Committee responsible for the report referred to the overall development of Oriental studies 
as disappointing, and a section within the report titled "Lessons from America" called for radical 
changes to China study from then onwards closer to the American model (p.l67; see also Barrett, 
1989，p.l09). Also, the period was marked by an increasing influence of American grants to the 
British counterparts: the Ford Foundation in 1967 made a grant ofUS$325,000 to SOAS ofLondon in 
order to allow it to set up the Contemporary China Institute (Barrett, p.l09; Wu, 1970, p.l43). In fact, 
a feeling of dependency of Britain on American China study was witnessed when British university 
members preferred to send British students interested in China studies straight to America as a 
solution to settle her falling-behind standard (Barrett, p.llO; my emphasis). Even the renowned 
scholarly journal, China Quarterly, was established by funding from America (Harding, 1993, p.l8), 
and on average, it was the American scholars that occupied the largest number of articles over the two 
decades since its first publication in 1960 (Wu, p.l43). 
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are not lacking. The impact of John King Fairbank, well known as the 'Dean of 
Sinology’ of America, was particularly strong, as he had been educating thousands of 
undergraduate at Harvard and sending his doctoral students to more than one hundred 
universities within the country and abroad (Evans, 1988, p.2).^^ For sure, Fairbank's 
career was accompanied by the best academic timing. As Linbeck^^ remarked, the 
growth of modem and contemporary China study in the United States during 1960s had 
in 
been regarded as a 'developing decade, , and that two of the most generous 
foundation in supporting China studies in United States, the Ford Foundation and the 
Rockefeller Foundation, had also been providing grants to major countries that had 
^ 1 
China programs (Linbeck, 1971, p.81, Table V). Against such a backdrop, we should 
have little reservation that the US attitude towards China, at least academically, could 
have been affecting the direction of others quite a lot. 
Diplomatic concerns took an important role by the tum of the 1960s. On the one 
hand, the relationship between the Soviet Union and Mainland China had reached such 
an ebb by the time that China had to look for a breakthrough for counterbalancing the 
18 Another influence originated from Fairbank is his inauguration of the Regional Studies program 
on China at Harvard in 1946. This approach was based on an understanding that the bulk of Chinese 
not only neglected but also rejected its past. In order to avoid the danger of reading the past into the 
present, one should put the contemporary China back to the fore (Lindbeck, 1971，p.59). 
19 Linbeck was associate director of the East Asian Research Center at Harvard from 1959 to 
1967, and from 1967 onwards until his sudden death in 1971, the director of the East Asian Institute at 
Columbia. This piece of information is from D. Bamett in the forward of Linbeck's book (Linbeck, 
1971). 
20 Between 1958 and 1970 nearly $41 million was poured into various institutions of higher 
education in United States in support of China studies (Myers and Metzger, 1980, p.87). 
21 Harding (1993) has recorded three important institutions being created by funding from 
America: the China Quarterly in England as noted in footnote 17 above, the Inter-University Program 
in Taipei, and the Universities Services Center in Hong Kong (pp.18-19). Oksenberg (1986) accounts 
for this decade of development as a consequence of the awareness of the American Government to 
start differentiating China from the then Soviet Union (pp.50-51). 
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Soviet threat. On the other hand, United States was well aware of the fact that, for the 
sake of political stability of Southeast Asia, keeping Mainland China as a fiiend rather 
than a foe had become a political prerequisite. At once, conditions which attracted both 
22 
countries towards each other for ending their loggerheads were set. This had direct 
impact on the academic quest on China by American scholars. As American China 
studies was taking a lead in the western world, once after the 1972 Shanghai 
communique, scholarly delegations between the two countries began to build shape. 
Following the formation of the Chinese Academy of Social Science (CASS) ofPRC in 
197723，the normalization of diplomatic relations in January 1979 (Chu, 1984, p.3), and 
the inauguration of Sino-American academic exchanges in the fall of 1979, hopes ofa 
new age of access for extended fieldwork on the mainland for American social 
scientists started raising (Gold, 1993, p.46). Once again, American social science field 
researchers were allowed to be placed in China after a hiatus of over thirty years 
(Thurston and Pastemak, 1983，p.v). The numerous delegation reports and panel 
meeting reports published by United States at the tum of the decade reflected the 
significance of American researches in PRC (for instance, see Prewitt, 1982; Thurston 
and Parker, 1980; Thurston and Pastemak, 1983; Rossi, 1985). Li all such work, there 
was always a stress on how the political situation of PRC had hampered the academic 
development in the field of social science there, in particular sociology and 
22 This general picture has been captured by quite a number of international relation studies 
between America and China over the last decade. Examples of such a discussion can be found in the 
chapters of the following pieces of work: 'Nixon Breaks the Deadlock' in Alexander, 1992, pp.213-
228; The Rapprochement with the United States' in Gregor, 1986, pp.75-97; 'Establishing 
Cooperation: First Contacts and First Compromises' in Ross, 1995, pp.17-54; and 'The Politics of 
Normalization' in Schaller, 1990, pp.195-214. 
23 Before 1977, the CCAS was only an institute under the Chinese Academy of Science. The fact 
that it became an independent institution of its own marked the revival of the importance of social 
science in PRC; see Thurston and Parker, 1980, p.4. 
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a n t h r o p o l o g y . 2 4 Thus, one of the important functions of the members of various 
delegations or panels were recommendations to the China watchers on how to re-start 
fieldwork in PRC. The implication of such suggestions could have been of great 
importance to a new era of China studies, but I would argue that the end-product was 
not so promising. 
The 1979 Delegation told the academics interested in China study that, besides the 
importance of formal affiliation, the necessity of assessing the right personal 
relationship and the fluency in Chinese of the researchers were crucial (Thurston and 
Parker, 1980, p.l7). In a submitted report in 1982 to the funders of scholarly exchanges 
with the PRC (Prewitt, 1982), the American academic community was informed on the 
criteria that might facilitate research projects in there.^^ In another case, the 1984 
delegation recommended exchange of published materials, of students and teachers, 
joint conference and workshops of various topics (Rossi, 1985, pp.132-140). Li a 
different setting, Pastemak (1983) raised out some concrete suggestions to future 
fieldworkers: to look for a project that would focus on one site rather than on several, 
to provide straight forward research specification, to receive squarely with all on-site 
24 Sociology was banned as a taught subject in the Universities ofPRC in 1952, and anthropology 
did survive, but in the form of ethnology, physical anthropology and archeology. It was only by 1979 
that both subjects were given back recognition after twenty-seven years of banishment; see Rossi, 
1985, p.ix. For an account of such ‘Twenty Years ofDarkness' (Thurston and Parker, 1980, p.3) see 
King and Wang, 1978; Pastemak, 1983，pp.37-41; Thurston, 1983, pp.14-16. For a description of the 
difficult situation of social scientists in PRC over the period, see McGough, 1979. An illustration of 
such difficult situation experienced by the social scientists of those days is on Xiao-tong Fei, where he 
was assigned to be responsible for cleaning all the toilets of a building during the Cultural Revolution; 
see Arkush, 1981，p.228; Pastemak, 1988, p.650. 
25 They were, namely, conformity to Chinese bureaucratic and scholarly practice, the isolation of 
the research from daily lives of the Chinese people, the inclusiveness of Chinese colleagues in the 
research process, the usefiilness of the research to China, the disencroachment to China's national 
security, and the reputation of the initiating scholars; see Prewitt, 1982, pp.37-42. 
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constraints, and the like (pp.53-58). As one of those pilot scholars who did stay six 
months in a commune to assess the impact of economic development on a local 
administrative structure, Butler (1983) declared in his return that “ ... successful 
fleldwork in China is possible ..." (p.99) when proposals were written in a crystal clear 
manner (p.l01), when the researcher was friendly (p.l04), and that the researcher had 
to be humble and hardworking, as well as be sensitive to the rank and file nature of the 
Chinese society ¢).120). 
As these delegations have mostly been funded or appointed by the Committee on 
Scholarly Communication with the People's Republic of China (CSCPRC), and this 
Committee has been responsible for sending advanced graduate students and research 
scholars to China every year since 1979, the implication of this kind of orientation -
which is mostly concentrated on the practical, physical, and administrative issues of 
doing fieldwork research in China - is telling. As we are going into more details in the 
next chapter, by the tum of 1970s, the dispute among American China watchers on the 
right approach in coming to terms with China was no longer a non-issue. Yet, these 
delegation reports seemed to be adopting quite a muddy, if not totally disregarding, 
attitude towards this kind of internal reflection. But how could one have the intention 
to reflect if one had not been aware of the necessity of doing so? Further evidence of 
this paradox may be unfolded if we looked into the paradigmatic debates of this period. 
As I am going to argue in the next chapter, the fierce attack by the revolutionary 
paradigm advocates on the modernization paradigm scholars between late 1960s to mid 
1970s was a dispute concerning which should be the right paradigm to capture China 
rather than an evaluation of the intact assumptions on China behind all these paradigms. 
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By virtue of this understanding, the attention of the delegation reports was talking 
about the availability or not of the chance to do research in China, and once given the 
opportunity, how to hold it. Is this not a concem which is even one more level lower 
than the paradigmatic dispute? I would like to make myself clear here: I am not saying 
that doing field research in China has no significant importance. Instead, I am 
pinpointing that if the influential body in itself just put all emphases on how to 
implement field research at the expense of sabotaging the danger - if not completely 
ignoring the existence - of 'culture bound’ nature of the researchers, would this be too 
much a price that one have to pay for? 
But the complexity of the issue does not stop here - there was another fuss of the 
day that downplayed the ethnocentric concem. Besides an anxiety on the availability of 
implementing research in China, the ‘methodology, of collecting research data for all 
such China studies independent of the nature on availability of research opportunity 
was also a focus of the day that outshone the 'culture bound，nature of the researchers. 
From the outlook, a methodological consideration of research is a much higher level of 
concem than the agenda of how to be nice and friendly in the field as suggested by 
various delegation reports. It could, however, commit the same process of misplaced 
attention from an evaluation on the understanding of the China watchers in studying 
China to an assessment of the best research method in capturing the Chinese situation. 
Whereas the former is attempting to clarify some meta-theoretical issue, the latter has 
somewhat taken-for-granted the theoretical justification and moved into the striving for 
the best methodological search (Oksenberg, 1969，pp.577-606; Parish and Whyte, 1978, 
pp.344-351; Siu, 1983, pp.143-145; Walder, 1986, pp.255-270; Whyte, 1977, pp.1-12; 
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1983, pp.63-82). Here, I am not trying to claim that the two issues are of a mutually 
exclusive nature. Instead, my message tends to be as follows: if an ethnocentric 
awareness is genuine, then the methodological concem can be the very next order that 
deserve the ensuing best effort to solve. I f , however, the methodological dispute is 
outshining the former, then the level of awareness can hardly be self-transcendent. It is 
of this awareness that I feel a focus on American China studies - particularly related 
with Chinese peasants - finds its ground. 
Peasant Studies - A Platform to understand the Chinese Society 
The picking up of rural studies as a discussing platform is having both historical 
X 
and theoretical rationales. Regarding to history, a chronological record shows that the 
first serious sociological production on China was Village Life in China: A Study in 
Sociology completed in 1899 by an American scholar Arthur H. Smith. As a study in 
revealing the life in a traditional village (Foster, 1967, p.4), this effort not only marked 
the adoption of a series of social surveys and community studies as the chief research 
methodology before the Chinese Communist came into power (Freedman, 1962, p.l67; 
Fried, 1954)2?, ^^^ also highlighted two unique characteristics of social studies in 
China: the weaving of the development of anthropology, sociology and the study on 
Chinese rural life until the liberation of China on the one hand, and the dominating of 
26 See the section "Chronology of Chinese Sociology, 1895-1989" in Chinese Sociology and 
Anthropology, Vol. 22, No. 2, Winter 1989-1990, pp.88-103. 
27 The series include Peking: A Social Survey by Gamble and Burgess in 1921, Country Life in 
South China by Kulp II in 1925, as well as a fieldwork that was conducted in 1938 by Osgood, but 
only produced a book in 1963 under the title Village Life in Old China: A Community Study ofKao 
Yao, Yunnan. They were all conducted by American scholars of the day. 
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98 American influence within this process on the other. Freedman (1962) captured the 
first characteristic by differentiating the pattem of historical development between 
westem and Chinese social science: whereas the former was marked by a late marriage 
between sociology and anthropology, in China, “ ... almost as soon as the social 
sciences were established, anthropology and sociology were intertwined" (p.l66). The 
cause of such could be regarded as an amplification of the national salvation concem of 
the Chinese intellectuals of the day: sociology and anthropology alike were identified 
as ‘science，，and that they might offer them with apparatuses or perspectives that could 
map out a diagnosis of the root problems of Chinese society (King and Wang, 1978, 
p.40).29 As for the second characteristic, an official view of Mainland China sustains 
that “ ... most sociological surveys [1913-1930] were conducted by Americans in China, 
or by Chinese students instructed by American teachers ... ”（Ming, 1989, p.5).^^ This 
kind of American influence was of course a consequence of the direct participation of 
28 For sure, as far as the narrowly-defmed field of anthropology is concerned, Radcliffe-Brown did 
lecture in Beijing and Malinowski was the mentor of Xiao-tong Fei. But as Guldin (1988) contends, 
when it was the name of Franz Boas more than anyone else that the remaining first-generation Chinese 
ethnologists and sociologists by late 1980s would regard as having the most important impact on their 
anthropological development in their early years, the strong American influence over that period could 
hardly be flawed upon (p.8). After all, even though Fei got his doctoral degree in United Kingdom, 
still, his primary training in Yanjing University was heavily influenced by American sociologist 
Robert Park, who stimulated Fei to tum his attention from library research and reading about westem 
theories to actual observation of Chinese society (Hamilton and Wang, 1992, p.5), and thus laying 
down the methodological framework that Fei employed in his Xiangtu Zhongguo published in 1947 
(p.8). 
29 On this matter, one good illustration is from a claim by the renowned Chinese sociologist Xiao-
tong Fei in the ‘Forward，ofhis Earthbound China: A Study of Rural Economy in Yunnan; see Fei and 
Chang, 1945, p.ix. In another occasion, he maintains that Chinese sociology has combined itself with 
social realities through “ ... engaging in social work and undertaking social surveys and research from 
a view of social pathology" (quoted in King and Wang, 1978’ p.42). This practice of intertwining 
various disciplines for the sake of dealing with the pathological society illustrates the stand of Fried 
(1954), who regards the Chinese intellectuals of the day always viewed sociology, social work and 
social reform as synonymous (p.l4). 
30 A similar view of this kind can also be found in Siu-lun Wong's work (1979), who claims that 
between the two decades of 1910-1930，“ ... the study of sociology developed such distinct foreign 
and religious features that it might be named American missionary sociology" (p. 11). 
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American academics like Daniel Kulp II，who taught sociology in St. John's University 
of Shanghai - the first university that launched a sociology course - from 1914 onwards 
to 1923, and produced Country Life in South China: The Sociology of Familism in 
1925 (Freedman, 1975, p.l95; see also Rossi, 1985, p.3). 
Even though most of the publications of the day were written by Americans and 
that the study focus surrounding them were rural communities, this could only provide 
the explanation of picking up peasant studies with historical convenience. I maintain 
that the theoretical rationales accompanying this background help legitimizing this 
choice. Simply put, my claim is that the significance of rural studies should not be 
limited to the fact that they were being studied first, but rather to the fact that peasant 
life in itself, most succinctly revealed by the values and behaviors of the peasants, 
could capture the cultural essence of the Chinese (Fei, 1980[1939]; Osgood, 1963; 
Yang, 1945). At once, this brings out the importance of 'chineseness' in front of the 
issue of westem ethnocentrism. 
There should not be much debate on the issue that Confucian values as a core part 
of Chinese culture has been playing a predominant role in molding Chinese character 
and behavior. Due to this feature, in their early attempts, Fei (Fei，1991[1947], 
p.26[English version 1992, pp.64-65]) and Yang (Yang, 1959, p.l72) already spelt out 
that westem understanding on an individual could not be directly applied to the 
Chinese，because the latter lived in a different cultural schema.^ ^ The highest goal in 
31 Ofthese two figures, the theoretical framework of Fei is having a far-reaching impact on studies 
of Chinese society (Hamilton and Wang, 1992). On this issue, it is going to be further elaborated in 
the fmal chapter. 
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Confucianism is harmony (he). To achieve harmony, every individual should act 
towards others in a proper way, and this explains the importance of propriety (//)• Li 
requires everyone to be socially situated, defined, and shaped according to a relational 
context, or to say, one is a relational being (King and Bond, 1985, p.32; King, 1985, 
p.63). Such a relational structure forms the basis of the Five Cardinal Relation {wu lun) 
which not only has a strong sense of familistic tone (King, 1985，p.58), but also 
represents the core of moral and social training of an individual (Yang, 1959, p.7). Wu 
lun in fact unfolds the issue of differentiation among role relations {bie), and such 
maintenance is through the practice of li. Where there is "，there is he, which then 
thrives and prospers the family. In a nutshell, family with its related kinship system in 
the Chinese society is far from only an unit of production and consumption, but also a 
center for social life. This illustrates why Yang (1959) maintains that, in the Chinese 
community, particularly in the rural areas, there have been few social organizations or 
associations outside the family that have such a wide and deep scale to serve the 
individual's social need (p.5). 
The paradox was that, soon after the Chinese Communist Party came to power in 
1949, she started reshaping the direction of academic exploration in both sociology and 
anthropology^^ in such a way that the academic effort on the study of the Chinese rural 
life by western-trained Chinese scholars (Chen, 1973[1936]; Fei, 1947，1980[1939]; 
32 Once the CCP came into power, a high priority was to establish order in the schools and to take 
control of educational institutions away from foreigners. As sociology and anthropology were being 
viewed as 'bourgeois sciences', so in just three years, sociology was banished and anthropology could 
no longer appeared in the form of 'social anthropology'; see Guldin, 1994, p.5; Hamilton and Wang, 
1992, pp.10-11; King and Wang, 1978, p.45; Rossi, 1985, p.ix. See also footnote 24 above for related 
references. 
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Fei and Chang, 1945; Hsu, 1971a[1948]; Yang, 1945, 1959>", in particular the effort 
by Fei and Hsu, had to come to a standstill before the search could reach a fascinating 
intellectual plateau. This is one of my important claims of this piece of work: I am 
going to argue that two main themes of studying the values and behaviors of Chinese 
had been captured by the concepts of ‘the differential mode of association，{chaxugeju) 
as raised out by Fei, and the ‘father-son identification' as well as the 'situation-
centered' characteristics of the Chinese by Hsu respectively in their early studies (Fei, 
1947; Hsu, 1971[1948], 1981[1953]). The drastic political change scattered the then-
achieved academic effort in a two-fold manner: on the soil of Mainland China, 
western-linked academics - Chinese and foreign alike - had to face a halt in 
implementing fleldwork on studies concerning rural life.^^ Secondly, which will be 
further discussed in the subsequent chapter, American political desire and academic 
concem had since then went into an ethnocentric trap that they were firmly captured 
into in the years to come. 
Albeit such a discouraging period ofhistory, the reopening of China could mean a 
realignment of former academic effort. After all, when fleldwork in China was once 
33 One should not downplay the efforts of this group of Chinese scholars in unfolding the socio-
cultural picture of the then China. A piece of evidence can be found from a summary by Fried (1954):“... 
there are three separate traditions involved in the description of Chinese socio-cultural units [from late 
19th century to the liberation of China]: early non-scientific works produced aknost without exception by 
westerners, social surveys which were done jointly by Chinese and westem scholars, and community 
studies which have been done for the most part by Chinese anthropologists" (p.l2). 
34 Two most outstanding examples in demonstrating the termination of fieldwork could be found in 
Osgood's study in 1938 and Yang's study from 1948-1951. For Osgood (1963), he used wordings 
such as ‘sadness’ and ‘humility’ to describe the sudden disruption and then forever termination ofhis 
fieldwork in a Yunnan village in that year, and his final giving up of completing this adventure after 
25 years (p.v). As for Yang (1959), he experienced how a fieldwork starting in 1948 soon found itself 
under hazardous and difficult supervision of another government in a year's time, and then further 
facing a force retreat under the condition of leaving down the entire written record of the field 
investigation in 1951 (p.vii). 
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more open up to foreign scholars, the study of values and behaviors of the Chinese 
oc 
peasants as a way of reflecting the dynamics of the Chinese society became a good 
point of continuation, especially when the work ofParish and Whyte (1978) was given 
K 
a high profile by the academic circle of the day. But it was here that another 
overlooking of the values and fabrics of the Chinese setting crept in. It is widely agreed 
that the work of Scott (1976) and Popkin (1979) has aroused much attention on, and 
very often become the basis of, the discussion of peasant behaviors of Southeast Asia 
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since the emergence of their framework. Daniel Little even goes further to illustrate 
that both scholars could indeed be well-anchored into the rational-choice model (Little, 
1989, especially Chapter 2; Little, 1991), and that this model has been proved to be 
^o 
well adopted by a series of work in China studies. Whether Little is exaggerating the 
applicability of the model is going to be discussed in the third chapter. In a sense, it is 
an undeniable fact that most of the renowned studies on peasants of post-revolutionary 
China are involving, in a different extent, the two models for explanations of peasants' 
35 Because of this focus, those post-1949 studies on China which are more concerned with peasant 
wars (for instance, Huang, 1985; Johnson, 1989[1962]; Marks, 1984; Perry, 1980) will have to be 
excluded in the course of this analysis. 
36 Although the book was published in 1978, it was based on semistructured interviews conducted 
in Hong Kong in 1973-74 with the aim of teasing out the pattem of continuity and change in village 
and family life in rural China (Parish and Whyte, 1978, pp.2-3). Before long, it became ahnost a core 
reference for all studies of related nature (Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1984, 1992; Madsen, 1984; Oi, 
1989; Potter and Potter, 1990; Siu, 1989; Wolf, 1985). 
37 Of course, it is understood that the ‘moral economy' and 'rational peasant' debate is not 
originated only after the emergence of these two books. Rather, the debate has its roots in a long-
standing disagreement between 'substantivists' and 'formalists' involved in studies of peasant 
societies and agrarian relations (see Keyes, 1983，p.753, note 1 and 2; Little, 1989，p.274, note 1); but 
it is Scott and Popkin that help formulating the debate in a clear manner (Little, 1989, p.29). A first 
illustration can be traced back to a symposium held by the Journal of Asian Studies titled "Peasant 
Strategies in Asian Societies: Moral and Rational Economic Approaches", and the publication ofthe 
papers ofthe symposium in the joumal (Vol. 42 No. 4, August 1983). Another piece of evidence can 
be found in a collection of essays under a special issue titled "Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance 
in South-East Asia" published by the Journal of Peasant Studies (Vol. 13, No.2, January 1986). 
38 The volumes that Little regards as adopting the rational-choice model in varying degrees of 
enthusiasm to discuss peasant behaviors on Mainland China include Chao, 1986; Myers, 1970; Oi, 
1989; Perdue, 1987; Perry, 1980 and Skinner, 1964-65; see Little, 1991, pp.35-36, note 4. 
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values and behaviors (Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1992[1984]; Parish and Whyte, 1978; 
Shue, 1980; Madsen, 1984; Oi，1989; Potter and Potter, 1990; Siu，1989a).^ ^ This is 
where I am trying to tease out the 'culture bound’ nature of the process. Can the 
behavioral patterns of the Chinese peasants be rightly captured within the framework of 
Scott, Popkin and the rational choice model? More bluntly put, when Americans are 
‘individual-centered' whereas the Chinese are ‘situation-centered, (Hsu, 1981[1953], 
p.l2), is there no difference in coming to terms with what is meant by 'rational choice’？ 
Is the return to pre-liberation expressive culture in post-Mao rural China - a 
phenomenon that no one single China-watcher on contemporary Chinese peasants 
denies - a revival of traditional culture, a product of new cultural forms, or a hybrid of 
structural and cultural factors? And is there a part today for Chinese culture to play in 
explaining the day-to-day interaction among the peasants on the one hand, and the 
relationship between the peasants and the state on the other? I maintain that, the 
awareness or not of the 'culture bound, nature on the side of the researchers is going to 
witness a signified difference on the research finding. 
By now, a full skeleton of this discussion is gathering shape. Roughly put, the 
American desire to come to terms with China has been experiencing a complicated 
internal process of intellectual development. A key to understand the dynamics of the 
Chinese society is to comprehend the meaning as well as implication of drastic political 
39 Here, I am well aware of the fact that drawing into the discussion of the models of Scott and 
Popkin are being found in some other studies on Chinese peasants as well (e.g. Bernhardt, 1992; 
Duara, 1988; Friedman, Pickowicz, Selden and Johnson, 1991; Huang, 1985; Thaxton, 1983). But as 
these studies are focusing their attention on Chinese peasants of mainly the pre-revolutionary period, I 
have to leave them aside so as to bound my attention with those that aim at discussing the socio-
cultural life of the Chinese peasants after the liberation of China. 
20 
change on the socio-cultural life of the Chinese people, in particular the Chinese 
peasants. Such a focus has a strong rationale, because most of the Chinese population, 
and thus most of the daily interaction, is to be found in rural China. Jn fact, this also 
explains why the attention of research in China before the country turned red had been 
given to rural communities. The reopening of China, followed by her normalization of 
relationship with the West, thus marked a golden opportunity to regrasp this sudden 
termination of intellectual pursuit. Yet, if the re-emerging of field opportunity, which 
would imply a much closer encounter with the Chinese by the researchers, could not 
eventually lead to a better analysis on them, would this be quite a warning signal that 
the issue lay elsewhere? The crucial factor that really counts is whether there exits, 
consciously or not, any sense of ethnocentric attitude which is strong enough to 
produce a misreading of the socio-cultural dynamics over the years. 
After this general introduction of the issue, the flow of discussion of the 
remaining chapters is as follows. In the second Chapter, the development of the 
internal disputes of the American academics concerning China studies since the post-
war period will be traced and analyzed. Entering into the decade of 1980, there is an 
articulation of the importance of ‘china-centered, awareness for researchers to bear in 
mind when conducting research on China. Apparently, with the availability of research 
opportunities in China, one should have much confidence in knowing about the 
genuine happenings of new China. In Chapter Three then, I will outline some key 
studies (Parish and Whyte, 1978; Shue, 1980: Oi, 1989: Siu, 1989a) on rural Chinese 
from mid 1970s to the tum of 1980s so as to assess the possible improvement in 
understanding the Chinese peasants in the lapse of time. Against this sketch, I want to 
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argue that what is of crucial importance should not be the timing of research, but the 
presence or not ofempathetic understanding of the concerned researchers on the people 
studied. Li this way, I cast doubt on the linear argument of 'the more lapse of time the 
better it will be in understanding the Chinese'. I maintain that the cases have 
committed themselves in regarding certain conceptual framework (the 'rational 
peasant' model) as universally applicable to capture the phenomena of most scenarios 
(and in this case the values and behaviors of the Chinese peasants). This is quite a risky 
assumption, as the cultural component, which should be taken into consideration when 
coming to terms with the normative aspects of people, is easily downplayed, if not 
overlooked, in the process. This point is then counter-supported by the illustration of 
other case studies on Chinese peasants (Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1984, 1992; Madsen, 
1984; Potter and Potter, 1990广 in the Fourth Chapter. I want to show how, even 
though these studies have been committed in an earlier period^^ their awareness of the 
cultural backdrop of the Chinese and their sensibility to avoid a presupposed 
40 As far as Potter and Potter's work is concerned, a major reference is being given to the ninth 
chapter of the book titles "The Cultural Construction of Emotion in Rural Chinese Social Life", which 
was based largely on the version of an article published by S.H. Potter in 1986; see Potter and Potter, 
1990，p.xiii. In that discussion, the cultural sensitivity and empathetic understanding of the two 
authors to another culture is fully demonstrated. This study, together with the series of publications 
produced under the 'Chen Village Research Project' (further elaboration in footnote 158 of page 105 
below), are products of the mid 1980s. This is a challenge to the emphasis on research timing as 
discussed above. 
41 In an outline of the development of China studies, Harding does regard that the studies of Chan, 
Madsen and Unger (1984) and Madsen (1984) as academic endeavors of an earlier period than that of 
Oi (1989) and Siu (1989) (Harding, 1993, p.38, note 23; p.39, note 37). I see that this is giving further 
legitimacy to my categorization of cases for discussion. Yet, in the same piece of work, Harding has 
also provided the following sweeping comment: “ ... anthropologists, sociologists, and political 
sociologists studied in greater detail than was previously possible [about] particular groups in Chinese 
society, including peasants ...，，(ibid, p.28). From what I am going to illustrate in Chapter Three and 
Four, I can hardly agree with such a view that timing is an a priori facilitating factor. Bearing in mind 
that Harding himself has been committing himself quite a lot in this kind of critical reflection 
(Harding, 1980, 1982，1984a, 1984b)，yet he maintains that this latest outline is based on his previous 
essays in capturing the conditions of Chinese studies in America (Harding, 1993，p.35), one may more 
easily to come to terms with why I have argued above that there is still much room for desire regarding 
to the series of evaluative articles on development of China studies; see footnote 4 and 5 of this 
chapter. 
22 
assumption of what the Chinese are have been chief contributing factors to allow them 
a more genuine capturing of the Chinese peasants. Based on the counter argument, in 
the concluding Chapter, I maintain that the effort ofFei (1947)42 and Hsu (1971[1948]) 
as important insights to help one to capture the essence of Chinese values and behavior, 
and that their contribution is producing good intruding point of handling the notion of 
ethnocentrism. 
42 The English version ofFei ' s book appears in 1992 (Fei, 1992), with an important introduction 
given by Hamilton and Wang (Hamilton and Wang in Fei, 1992) on the theoretical significance of 
chaxugeju in understanding the values and behaviors ofthe Chinese. 
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Chapter Two 
Scholars in Dispute 
"Attempts to understand Communist China have resulted in confusion 
and frustration ..." (Kuo and Myers, 1986, p.ix) 
"The supreme problem for American students of Chinese history ... has 
been one of ethnocentric distortion" (Cohen, 1984, p.l) 
“Has the investment [nearly $41 million between 1958 and 1970] paid 
off to produce high quality scholarship and a crops of reliable China 
expert?" (Myers and Metzger, 1980, p.87) 
Li one sense, the above allegations may capture a nature within the academic field 
of China study in America - its disharmony. Were such accusations valid claims? And 
if such divulge was forceful enough, should we be expecting a better orientation of 
China studies from then onwards? Here, I see the importance of differentiating the 
external and internal factors that could have help constructing such a scenario first. For 
the former, which is quite beyond the scope of concem here, I mean the politicization 
of the academia.43 The discussion in the following few chapters, however, is on the 
internal factors that caused China study turning into such a disputing academic field. 
By 'intemal factors,, I mean the critique generated by some members of the American 
43 By politicization of the academia, I am talking about the extent to which the academics can 
influence the policy-making decision of the state on the one hand, and under what circumstances 
academic research - rather than influencing - is serving or under the manipulation of the political 
interest of the statesmen on the other. An example of this complicated relationship between the 
academics and the state can be shown by the membership list of the Committee on U.S.-China Policy 
of January 1995 (Lampton and Wilhelm, 1995, pp.xvii-xxiii), a body highly associated with the 
Clinton Administration and U.S. Congress regarding U.S.-China policy. To name just a few renowned 
academics, A.D. Bamett, R.N. Clough, J.A. Cohen, H. Harding, Jr., K. Lieberthal, M. Oksenberg, 
D.H. Perkins and L.W. Pye are all members of the Committee. My point is that different political 
wings within the state apparatus may be affecting scholars of different political inclinations to favor or 
disfavor certain policies or views on China; and vice versa. It is obviously then this is quite a different 
agenda to explore this issue in this piece of work, and so I am not going to handle it here in any direct 
manner. An interesting grasp of this type of discussion is provided by Oksenberg (1986). 
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academia against others of the same field on how China should be understood, and 
more important, the problematic reflected exactly from this process of explication.^^ 
This focus is itself a convoluted attempt, as it requests a good grasp of the 
following aspects. The first is the identification of various paradigmatic views on 
China by scholars of different cohorts, and a capturing of the assessment of the later 
generation on the views of the earlier; the second is the tracing of academic 
developments thereafter, and the articulation of the assumptions behind the minds of 
these scholars in constructing certain understanding of the Chinese society; the third is 
the pinpointing of how ethnocentrism is still being committed in some of the later 
academic developments, thus answering why the impact of ethnocentrism on China 
study is still a core concem of the day. After all, such an attention has been confused by 
the fact that American China watchers of the later cohort did show signs of deliberation 
toward their earlier counterparts in analyzing China by the late 1970s, and this 
atmosphere was coincided with the re-emerging of chance to conduct on-the-spot 
investigations there; against this backdrop, the China field should be directed to a 
healthy development from then onwards. My concem is the willingness and awareness 
to reflect will not necessarily bring about a better understanding, unless the reflection is 
deep enough. 
This chapter is going to handle the grasp of the first aspect. I am going to discuss 
44 I understand that such a definition of ‘internal factors' is itself reflecting a kind of 
methodological disputes among members of the same field. But in order to contrast with the 
politicization of the academia as outlined above, which I have regarded as something external to the 
intellectual arguments of the scholars concerned, I am using this classification so as to contrast the 
difference between the two. 
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the depth of this reflection by capturing the development of the paradigmatic disputes 
and assessing the evaluation gone through by the scholars themselves until field trips to 
China started re-emerging once more. I hope to clarify the following points in this 
section: the causes to make certain paradigmatic account so dominating in the China 
field within a certain period, the views of each of these paradigms being evaluated by 
its successive alternative, and to what extent this series of evaluation have brought the 
China watchers a step closer to the understanding of the Chinese society. 
Grasping the Paradigms 
The direct response of America towards the formation of the PRC in 1949 was a 
mixture of shock and self-defense. As Fairbank (1983[1948], p.455) noted, when Mao 
announced the Chinese Government as one of a 'people's democratic dictatorship’，it 
could only leave the Americans with a Hobson,s logic in explaining the situation: it 
was impossible for one-fourth of the mankind to go a non-American way by choosing 
communism, and the only conclusion derived from this stand would be that the 
emergence of the red China in 1949 was a result of coercion and manipulation by the 
Chinese Communist Party in the form of a totalitarian rule. As noted by some 
reviewers, the description of China as existing under the 'totalitarian paradigm, just 
reflected the anti-Communist temper of the time and the fear that Beijing would 
replicate the Soviet model (Mosher, 1990, p.88; Kuo and Myers, 1986, p.lO, p.l8; 
Harding, 1993, p.l8). We have Walker (1955) characterizing the first five years of 
Chinese communist rule as “ ... a totalitarian dictatorship" (p24), MacFarquhar (1958) 
contending the Chinese leaders as adopting “ …the Stalinist form of totalitarianism ..." 
¢).18), and Bamett (1962) maintaining PRC as becoming ‘‘ ... the first effective 
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totalitarian regime ... in Chinese history" (p.28). The point here is that how much of 
such an attitude-formation was little more than a sentimental expression of the loss of 
an anti-Communist China,5 Simply put, there was a scapegoating process to locate for 
“Communist sympathizers" (Harding, 1993, p.l6) to answer the question of 'whose 
fault was this mess?' (Oksenberg, 1986, p.49).^^ As some scholars tended to believe 
that it was more important to understand the causation of China becoming so rather 
than accusing her ofbecoming s o , this gave birth t o the 'impact-response' p a r a d i g m ， ？ 
The impact-response paradigm was generated under two assumptions: first, the 
confrontation with the West was the most significant influence on events in China in 
the 19th century; second, the West played an active role and China a reactive part over 
this period (Cohen, 1984, p.9). The main theme of the ‘impact-response‘ approach 
could be quite succinctly summarized by the following questions: 
“ ...the thesis that China was victimized by the foreign powers ... 
leaves unanswered the basic and prior question - why did China 
not respond to foreign encroachment earlier and more vigorously? 
Where were those Chinese revolutionaries who could have 
responded to Westem aggression by modernizing the traditional 
Chinese state and expelling the imperialists? In the twentieth 
century such leaders appear. But where were they in the nineteenth 
45 Fairbank (1982) recalls that the early 1950s was a period when "it became second nature to 
indicate at the beginning of an article, by some word or phase, that one was safely anti-Communist" 
(p.338). In a sense, there was a mental taboo in the post-war decade to show any sort of understanding 
attitude towards PRC. See further elaboration in the consecutive footnote. 
46 Oksenberg (1986) maintains that China studies in America have been deeply affected by four 
different waves of political influence, of which the totalitarian paradigm is to be fallen into the first 
wave, 'McCarthy era，. Senator Joseph McCarthy charged a lot of China specialists in and out of the 
government had, wittingly or unwittingly, helped bring the communists to power (pp.49-50). 
47 The landmark studies representing this approach include, among others, The Far East: A 
History of the Western Impact and the Eastern Response (Clyde and Beers, 1948)，China's Response 
to the West (Teng and Fairbank, 1954), A History of East Asian Civilization Volume One: East Asia -
The Great Tradition (Reischauer and Fairbank, 1960), A History of East Asian Civilization Volume 
Two: East Asia - The Modern Transformation (Fairbank, Reischauer and Craig, 1965); see Cohen, 
1984, pp.9-11. 
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century?" (Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 1965, p. 4 0 4 f 
For sure, the growth of commerce and industry did generate intellectual and 
cultural innovation, but: 
“[if] we look at such new developments as the modem post office, 
the press, and the training of students abroad, we see a common 
pattern: in each case China's modernization was inspired by 
Westem examples and yet had to be superimposed upon old 
indigenous institutions, which persisted so strongly as to slow 
down the need or demand for innovation." (p.35S/^ 
Why did two opposing forces - ideas of change on the one hand, and slow speed 
of change in reality on the other - exist together? The answer: 
“It was the overall cohesion and structural stability of Chinese 
civilization that basically inhibited its rapid response to the 
Westem menace.” ¢).404) ... ‘‘The Chinese people, in short, were 
in the grip of their past... [and] China was under the spell ofher 
own great tradition …” ¢).405)^^ 
The impact-response paradigm, in a way, appeared to mark the first trial in 
48 This quotation is excerpted from A History of East Asian Civilization as highlighted in the above 
footnote. A reworked, condensed, and updated version of this Volume Two together with its Volume 
One (Reischauer and Fairbank, 1960) by the same three authors of the second volume appeared in 
1978 under the title 'East Asia: Tradition and Transformation'-, and a further revised edition of the 
1978 version appeared in 1989. The interesting issue is that exact wordings of the same quest can be 
found in the 1989 revised edition; see Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 1989, p.643. The implication 
of such will be discussed below. 
49 This quotation also appears in exact wording in the 1989 edition, see Fairbank Reischauer, and 
Craig, 1989, p.591. 
5G Again, this paragraph appears ahnost in exact wordings in the 1989 edition, see Fairbank 
Reischauer, and Craig, 1989, pp.644-645. Indeed, if we are sensitive enough, these three successive 
footnotes indicate that such a sweeping comment on the ‘slow response' of China to westem influence 
has been maintained even the publication date of the two versions has a time lag of more than two 
decades. According to Cohen's arguments, the emerging importance of the 'China-centered' approach 
by the tum of 1970s, which is also the chief component that his book wants to introduce, has marked 
the beginning of an improving situation. But I want to argue that, from the persistence of the 'impact-
response' intonation in this kind of key introductory work, is it too much of a wishful thinking in 
anticipating the fading away of such understanding on China as assumed by Cohen? I contend that 
Cohen perhaps has a too optimistic view on the increasing awareness of ways of approaching China, 
because he himself has not got deep enough in reflecting what 'China-centered' would mean; see 
discussion below of page 52-53. 
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America to produce a framework of analysis on China with information of China: the 
scholars wanted to illustrate that there were historical dimension, intellectual 
orientation and cultural tradition to help producing a certain social reality of China 
when the West started approaching it, and that a better capturing of the then 
developmental stage of China and the prediction of its future trend should be anchored 
against such a background. This feel of a need of understanding (Reischauer and 
Fairbank, 1960, p.5; see also the same tone in Fairbank, Reischauer, and Craig, 1989， 
p.2) was a breakthrough toward a pure political dislike against the Communist ideology. 
The approach tried to use events of the 19th century China to illustrate the ‘responsive， 
nature of China against the 'stimulus' of the Westem presence. But this responsiveness 
did not bring about much fortune to China, as the reforming attitude of the Chinese 
intelligentsia, as noted by Fairbank (1983[1948]), only maintained in a superficial 
level.5i 
Having said so, how should the fact ofWestem presence in China bejudged? And 
this brings out the relationship between the modernization paradigm (or sometimes 
known as the 'tradition-modemity' paradigm) with the 'impact-response' paradigm. 
Cohen (1984) maintains that whereas the ‘impact-response’ paradigm depicts China as 
passive and the West as active, the 'modernization paradigm, portrays China as a 
51 This line of interpretation can be found in Fairbank's renowned book The United States and 
China, which was first published in 1948. In the 1983 fourth enlarged edition, the following sentences 
written thirty-five years ago commenting on the Tung-chih Restoration leaders has been maintained, 
“ . . .[the] leaders were conscientiously reviving the past instead of facing China's new future 
creatively ... In spite of the influx of Westem trade and the evident commercial power of the 
foreigners, [they] clung conservatively to the economic principle of the pre-eminence of agriculture as 
the basis of state revenue and popular livelihood ... The very strength of their conservative and 
restorative effort inhibited China's responding to Westem contact in a revolutionary sense." 
(Fairbank, 1983 [1948],p.l93) 
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‘traditional’ society stuck in time until the coming of a life-giving and dynamic 
'modem' West (p.l51). At once, the latter becomes an amplification of the former, and 
the focus moved from a concem on how China responded to the outside world to an 
explanation ofWestem presence - the liberating of the obsolete nation-state. 
“It was the West that invaded China, ... and the chief lesson the 
Chinese learned from the Westem invasion was that China had to 
be strong in self-defense ... [so] if we acknowledge that the West 
brought modem ways to China, we must accept the Great Chinese 
revolution of the twentieth century as something we helped to 
start." (Fairbank, 1983 [1948],p.451) 
But the modernization paradigm advocates want to go further. Every nation 
started from its own cultural basis in this learning process. Thus, any view of regarding 
r^ 
China as complementary to Soviet Union is missing the point. For sure, what the 
Communist regime tried to do after 1949 was to modernize itself. But throughout this 
process, Mao showed that he was a radical utopian in himself rather than as an 
orthodox Marxist. So Schwartz (1960) reminded his audience that the feature of 
‘thought reform, and ‘remolding, was significant characteristics to differentiate the 
Soviet Communists with that of the Chinese ones ^).20). Johnson (1989 [1962]) ftoher 
dated back to the rectification movements that took place in Yenan in 1942, which he 
saw as "... peculiar to the Chinese Party in that they are not purges but, rather, intensive 
indoctrination sessions”，and "the first concrete manifestation of the ... thought reform" 
(p.l81). The stress here was the understanding of the hybrid nature of the political 
situation of PRC, and from there, the necessity for a special treatment of PRC as 
52 In fact, one may associate the development of the 'modernization' paradigm with the increasing 
feel of the American Government to increase her competence about China, especially after the Soviet 
launching of Sputnik in 1958 which showed that Soviet Russia and China were two quite different 
political entity, and that “ ... China was a looming factor in world affairs about which more must be 
known ...，，(Oksenberg, 1986，p.50); see also discussion in footnote 21 of page 9. 
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against other Communist states, especially the Soviet Union.�� As Mosher (1990) 
maintains, the message from the modernization paradigm advocates was clear: China's 
history was the consequence of its destiny and that its political culture qua culture 
should be understood as an unique one (p.l03, own emphasis). And when one regarded 
the Communist state as a police state which was notorious for its persecution of 
intellectuals, purges of class enemies, and the denial of religious freedom, the 
modernization advocates would remind that it was China's history and culture rather 
than the communist ideology and organization alone that had resulted in such 
phenomena ¢).102; my emphasis). All in all, the modernization paradigm advocates 
seemed to have finally achieved the scholastic grasp of the fluctuating China. With the 
coming of the West, China was ultimately awakened to launch the march towards 
modernization. But it was her misfortune to capture the idea of communism as a way 
out in the process, and so an unnecessary hostility against the West which was 
supposed, and would continue, to help her. In the lapse of time, she would merge into 
the international modem world, as modernization is a process that would only lead to 
this final end. 
Cynically though, the 'modernization paradigm，，which was once being cherished 
as a scholarly attempt to look into the developmental dynamics of China rather than an 
emotional accusation of Communist ideology, soon found itselfhQm% charged with the 
following offense: it was analyzing China in name, but serving the American 
53 One of such views may be captured by an early comment from Fairbank (1957), "In looking at 
Peking today, of course, we will be in error if we see only a repetition of the motifs of Chinese history, 
such as reunification under a new dynasty which merely ‘happens' to be Communist. On the contrary, the 
age-old patterns have been disrupted and mixed into a new amalgam which is both Chinese and 
Communist" (p.37). 
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imperialist in reality injeopardizing the Third Worlds - in particular Mainland China. 
The US involvement in Vietnam in 1968 not only led to a terrible experience on 
the American soldiers and citizens, but also brought forward the emergence of the 
'revolution' paradigm, or sometimes known as the 'imperialist' paradigm. The 
organizational and theoretical base^^ of the ‘revolution，paradigm was the Committee 
of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS). The body was formed by a group of young 
academics regarding themselves as “ ... [representing] a new generation of China 
scholars" (Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, 1972, p.l) who had to stand out 
against other China scholars in America. For them, over the past two decades, the 
scholars of the other camps had been using a theory of modernization ‘‘ ... to counter 
conceptions of American imperialism and to justify the post-war role of the United 
States in East Asia" (Peck, 1969, p.59). In light of this, the CCAS was designed to 
fimction as, among other things, a community for the development of anti-imperialist 
research in order to unfold the hitherto misinformation on China.^^ 
The unfolding of the hypocrisy of the modernization paradigm advocates by the 
54 My using of the phase 'organizational base' to describe the CCAS is not without reason. In its 
founding statement, the CCAS demanded a policy of peace toward China, which implied an end to 
American's twenty-years intervention in China's internal affairs, highlighted by "... [the immediate 
withdrawal] of American forces [from] and military aid [to] the dictatorship of the [Guomindang] 
Government ... [and] diplomatic recognition of the People's Republic of China" (Committee of 
Concerned Asian Scholars, 1969, p.9). Moreover, as a group of scholars, they paid a visit to Mainland 
China in 1971 and wrote a detail after-trip report in the name of the organization (Committee of 
Concerned Asian Scholars, 1972). As for the early theoretical base of this group of scholars, numerous 
articles could be located in the Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars in the whole decade of 1970s, of 
which some ofthem is going to be more thoroughly discussed in the text. 
55 See "Purpose and Policy Statements", Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 2, No.l, 
October 1969, p.8. 
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revolution paradigm advocates goes like this^^: all traditional cultures, west or east, 
were subject to the corrosive influences of the new culture of science (Peck, 1969, 
P-60), but not every country had the same capacity when facing such challenges, no 
matter one wanted to resist or absorb. In other words, external stimuli being held 
constant, it was the internal cultural heritage that provided the main key to explain a 
successive or disastrous case. Li the case of China, her traditional civilization was not 
fitting the evolutionary process in a harmonious manner?? Once understood, then one 
should know that it was not westem imperialism per se, but the evolutionary 
circumstances in reality, that produced China with the first-class case of frustration and 
C Q 
the sense of worst accident case in history. So what the Chinese referred as 'westem 
imperialism' was in fact, to the westem understanding, nothing but “ ... modem 
world's dynamic expansion" (Fairbank, 1967, p.l07). 
Accordingly, if these nations were left to work out their own fortunes, sooner or 
later they would come to realize that the accusation of the westem influence as 
56 The discussion that follows heavily relies on two articles by Peck (1969; 1975), which, I 
maintain, is a legitimate choice. My aim is to outline how the scholars of the two paradigms are 
different from one another, and Peck in his articles openly revealed his intention of accusing how the 
modernization theorists were helping the imperialistic deeds of the US politicians, with Fairbank as a 
main target of attack. Interestingly, Fairbank did reply to Peck's 1969 article in a remarkably mild 
manner (Mosher, 1990, p.l34), saying that Peck presented "a vigorous argument" and he "would not 
quarrel with his critical spirit". Fairbank further elaborated that, as long as the use of paradigm to 
explain the situation is concerned, "American scholars on the whole are not fundamentally doctrinaire 
or true-believers and they tend to pick up whatever concepts seem useful to understanding' (Fairbank 
and Peck, 1970, p.51-52; my emphases). Yet, the result was disastrous. Peck in his rejoinder gave an 
even more severe criticism on Fairbank, accusing him of trying to muddle through the matter (ibid, 
pp.54-67). 
57 In Wright's word (1966, p.9), “ ... the requirements of modernization ran counter to the 
requirements ofConfucian stability". Obviously, Peck is labeling Wright as a defender of the views of 
the modernization paradigm. 
58 This view was voiced out by Fairbank during his presence in the Hearings before the Committee 
of Foreign Relations, United States Senate, under the session on "United States Policy With Respect 
to Mainland China". See Committee on Foreign Relations, 1966, pp.101-2. 
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‘imperialism’ was nothing but misread and emotional explanations. From this 
perspective, this implied that there would be a growing maturity for all these East Asia 
nations. The role of America in the eyes of these modernization paradigm advocates, 
Peck (1969) observes, was therefore to allow these nations to follow their independent 
ways under her protection without that degree of tension that might harm the course of 
development (p.62; my emphasis). In the process, obstacles to independent 
development in these countries should not be charged against the American actions or 
the international system that the US government promoted. After all, China was not 
victimized by America; rather, it was surrounded by circumstances of history of which 
a spreading around world civilization came across this last remaining, separate, and 
distant country, “ ... [forming] the background of real cultural conflict" (Fairbank in 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 1966, p.l09). The Chinese, however, could not face 
such a fact squarely. Thus, in the eyes of the modernization paradigm advocates, the 
anti-American and anti-imperialist sentiment of the Chinese was, though 
understandable, nonetheless “ ... a most regrettable and extremely dangerous flight 
from reality into emotionalism and xenophobic nationalism" (Peck, 1975, p.65). It was 
in the midst of such a psychological suffering that Communism could find its intruding 
point: by discrediting the modem society as the disguise of an imperial act rather than 
an evolutionary process from its traditional form, the intelligentsia could keep their 
spirit up by denying such a developmental explanation on the one hand, but accepting 
the developmental process on the other (Peck, 1969, p.63). Pitifully though, 
communism in this sense became a heroin to hide the Chinese patriots from the cruel 
reality of their backwardness in front of the global development! By such an outline of 
'theory of history，(ibid), Peck (1975) maintains later, American Government made 
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herselfbecoming the innocent ‘victim，of Chinese psychological projections (p.74). 
The viewpoints of revolutionary paradigm advocates were entirely different. If the 
modernization approach concentrated on the 'creative destruction' of westem 
investment to the lagging-behind contemporaries, from a revolutionary perspective, this 
was just the developing of one part of the world at the expense of others. While the 
advocates of the former saw the role of the elite as the driving force of change, the 
revolutionary advocates regarded the peasantry and the urban proletariat as the chief 
agent of changes, and the mass support as the main group of actors. If the 
modernization believers maintained that orderly and nonviolent change should be the 
agenda of the day, the revolutionary favorites inclined to regard such a stress as nothing 
but an attempt to protect the vested interests of the powerful ones. In fact, the 
modernization advocates could never agree with the views of the revolution paradigm 
because, ifso, "... they [will] find it difficult to describe and evaluate the Chinese 
revolution" other than the residual use of “ ... psychological understandable 
explanations" in concluding Chinese reactions towards the West in general, and the 
American Government in particular (Peck, 1969, p.66). So, one should be clear that the 
core mistake of the modernization paradigm was to compare China with a theory (of 
bureaucratic rationality, of modernization) rather than with its historical reality (Peck, 
1975, p.81). Any transformative attempt, such as the Great Leap Forward and the 
Cultural Revolution, had to be assessed as irrational by the modernization paradigm, 
because only by so claimed that the stand of ‘‘ ... the modem American ways are 
rational" could be maintained (ibid, p.65)! Mao's theory of 'uninterrupted revolution', 
Chinese efforts to raise living standards through group activity, to achieve material 
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improvements through cooperative effort, could hardly escape from the American 
judgment as utopian, ideological and abstract - because they all challenged the 
modernization theorists' insistence of a historical essence of rationalization and the 
division of labor (ibid, pp.85-87). 
On what ground did the revolution paradigm advocates gain the confidence to 
launch such a full-scale theoretical attack on the opposing camp? They reckoned the 
importance of first-person encounter, and their confidence came from proofs of the 
field. For four weeks they traveled in the PRC, and from “ ... the enthusiasm, the humor, 
and the tremendous commitment of her people to this new China" (Committee of 
Concerned Asian Scholars, 1972, p.2), they could not but confirm their beliefs - the 
Chinese revolutionary socialist regime, strongly influenced by Maoist thought and 
policies, initiated revolutionary strategies that not only greatly improved the welfare of 
the Chinese people and created a more egalitarian society, but in the process of this 
development, only came across with little difficulties (Kuo and Myers, ^ 2 9 ) P For 
instance, there were some flies in China, but not very many, and certainly far fewer 
than elsewhere in Asia, just because of the success of the ‘four-pest’ mass campaign.^^ 
If one asked who took the lead and who were those followers, it was a regret that one 
59 As a matter of fact, the impression on the PRC as constructed by the CCAS was a result of far 
more than one visit. For instance, Berger (1974) wrote another article in that period after his visit to 
PRC a couple of months later than the currently discussed one. His description illustrated his 
appreciation on the improving welfare and selflessness of the people there. This was particularly the 
case as far as the economic development of the country was concerned. He stressed that the 
production there "... is for use, not profit". But this never made the state factories less responding to 
the consumers, as these Chinese factories would "... go out of their way to discover the buyers' likes 
and dislikes" (p.l9). The implicit meaning was clear: the capitalist mentality of profit calculation was 
a shame in front of this high morality of serve-for-all attitude. 
6° The CCAS was recorded to have such a capturing, “ …to attack the flies, everyone was urged to 
swat ten a day - and soon China's people, 700 million strong, defeated its flies" (Committee of 
Concerned Asian Scholars, 1972, p.55). 
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had posed a wrong question. In the structure of the Chinese government, "... there is no 
division into things 'political' and ‘nonpolitical，.... everyone is a politician and no one 
is only a politician" (Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, 1972, p.50; own 
emphasis). The mass was, and would be, the master of things, and they would defend 
the revolutionary goals and support those who defend their way ofbeing the real master. 
Against such a backdrop, the reason for the Cultural Revolution to come up when there 
was no room of discontent^^ in the mid 1960s became more understandable: the people 
were aware of "... the loss of the revolutionary goals in the material success of 
modernization and death of the Yenan spirit in the birth of a new class hierarchy" 
03.72).^^ 
In the view of these revolution paradigm advocates, as far as the study of the 
economic performance of China was concerned, there was firstly a wrong use of 
analytical tool to evaluate China's economic growth at the empirical level (Riskin, 
1970, p.l9; Gurley, 1970, p.43), and an a priori assumption of "capitalist superiority" 
over Maoist way of economic development on the theoretical level (Gurley, p.34). As 
61 To them, the evidences of no room of discontent included a halted inflation and a falling price 
for fifteen years, adequate housing and clothing for everybody, exemption from income tax, right of 
education for every person with rapid decreasing rate of illiteracy, full employment and non-existence 
of any national debt; see Committee of Concerned Scholars, 1972, pp.71-72. 
62 Another case to demonstrate the sympathetic understanding of this group of scholars on the 
Cultural Revolution is from a book review article done by Bastid (1970). In the long review essay, 
Bastid points out that the three books he reviews have all done a goodjob to make the revolution more 
understandable to Westerners (p.83). Bastid concludes that, among other factors, the meaning of the 
event had its doctrinal and pragmatic level: in the former case, it was a logical and necessary stage in 
the implementation of revolutionary theory; in the latter case, affairs in certain field, such as the basic 
options of economic development, was not running fast enough that policies had to be changed. And 
the result ofthis drastic change has proved to have little effect on the economy. So Bastid fully agrees 
with one of his reviewing author's argument that the revolution "... did not wreck the economy as 
many Westem analysts predicted", but rather "... led to a reorganization and new orientation of the 
economy" (p.86). 
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argued by Riskin (1970), by manipulating growth rates in such a way without regarding 
the slim volume of economic figures that China had released, this kind of study could 
hardly capture the genuine situation of the economy (p.21). The research that would 
make sense should be any that could take Maoism seriously as a model of economic 
development (Gurley, p.46). The Maoist way of economic development never talked 
only about the development of labor productivity; instead, it emphasized the 
development of human beings - how men, in an industrial society, should relate to 
machines and to each other in seeking happiness and real meaning in life (p.47). 
Whereas capitalist development would always be a trickle-down development (p37), 
the Maoist held a proletarian world view (p.39) - to build on 'the worst'^^ - not for the 
sake of lowering economic efficiency, but rather to involve everyone in the 
development process ^).41). This explained why the Great Leap could find "... crucial 
sources of support within Chinese industry, both from amongst the leading cadres at 
the enterprise level as well as some economic planners" (Andors, 1976, p.38): they 
were annoyed by the Soviet-type one-man management system that totally downplayed 
the involvement of foremen and workers. Furthermore, as a means of including 
everyone in the development process, the Great Leap rapidly increased the involvement 
of women in both the rural and industrial sector as a means of including everyone in 
the development process, thus greatly improved their socio-economic status (Andors, 
1975; Diamond, 1975). When one thus accused Maoism of sacrificing efficiency for 
equity, one just missed the more important aspect ofMaoist ideology: creating a society 
oftruly free men (Gurley, p.42; my emphases). This was why Mao should not only be 
63 ‘The worst，here means the pushing of experts aside in favor of decision-making by the masses, 
the establishing of new industries in new areas, the discouraging of expertise, the making of steel by 
everyone, and the like; see Gurley, 1970, p.41. 
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regarded as a great political and military strategist, but also be seen as one that could 
construct a far-reaching and comprehensive strategy for China's economic 
development G^ee, 1978，p.52). “[The Great Leap Forward]…was not madness ... 
Despite the many failures ... the essential features of its strategy and programs have 
become fixtures of Chinese rural development." (p.53). For sure, "Chinese socialism is 
no paradise on earth", but the Maoist economic strategy had propelled the Chinese 
from desperate poverty and backwardness that "the Chinese who are now [1978； 
preparing for a new leap forward in economic development, are not likely to jettison 
these] basic principles" (p.56). 
If the revolution paradigm advocates had been accusing the modernization 
paradigm advocates of serving the American imperialists intentionally or 
unintentionally, they soon had the chance of being accused of introducing a biased 
view. The death of Mao, the quick arrest of ‘Gang of Four', the dramatic rise and fall 
ofHua, and the reopening of the country not only indicated the need for a pace-keeping 
scholastic understanding of the situation, but also embarrassed most of the China-
watchers with the continuous release of more and more social and economic data. For 
instance, when Meisner (1977) claims that China's grain situation in the countryside "... 
has achieved a remarkably high degree of self-sufficiency" ¢).345), soon numerous 
reports revealed that there were people and livestock that died from starvation in 
various places, there were grave unemployment problems, there was catastrophic 
situation of public hygiene, even in the capital, and the well-known Dazhai had 
committed ultraleftist adventurism.^^ What about the Cultural Revolution? When 
64 The information is from various sources of local newspaper of PRC; for details, see Domes, 
1983,pp. 72-76. 
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Friedman (1977) maintains that the goal of the Cultural Revolution was to undercut 
bureaucratic power, and Mao, "... by the examples of his struggle, communicates the 
vigor of hope, the vitality of possibility, the vision of justice" ¢).320), a group of 
Japanese journalists were told from official channels in 1978 that four hundred 
thousand party members had been killed or committed suicide between 1967 and 
1968.65 
The chronological development of the American paradigms on China studies can 
by now be briefly captured as follows: the 'totalitarian' paradigm earmarked a 
transitional period of American's uneasy feeling when China went communist, and 
then followed by the ‘impact-response' paradigm which characterized a start of 
attempting to provide a contextual analysis of the Chinese society. When the 
emergence of the 'modernization' paradigm, by all means, indicated a successful 
theoretical expansion of the 'impact-response' framework, before long, in an 
unanticipated manner, it was turned upside down by the 'revolution' paradigm into an 
imperialist disguise of American politicians. Well before the argument was settled, 
they all - especially the last two paradigms - were subjected to fatal blows when 
Chinese officials started revealing facts about China^^ which then set most, if not all, of 
the previous views on China on fire. Alarmed by such a discrepancy in capturing even 
the 'factual China,, one could not but start asking the following questions: why, when 
65 See Domes, 1983,p. 77. 
66 An example of this self-criticizing process by China officials is as follows, "One of the major 
crimes of the ‘Gang of Four' in their stereotyped scribbling was to tell lies. They were dishonest in 
words and actions. They issued false reports, trumped up falsified typical cases, they handed out 
forged experiences, fabricated false stories ...’，； Jiefangjunbao, Beijing, October 18, 1977; quoted in 
Domes, 1983，p.70. 
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both the modernization and revolution paradigms were supposed to search for an up-to-
date understanding of Communist China, could they end up in a different 
comprehension even though the same socio-historical development was laying in front 
ofthem? What had been committed by both sides, if not all American-watchers of the 
period, that led them to have perceptions of one kind or another? 
Analyzing the Paradigms 
The effort to diagnose such a chaotic understanding has not been lacking since 
then. To be fair, the source of information and the exposure from field observation did 
work together as important factors in shaping the American assessment on China. 
From 1930s onwards, the Westem field observers could be regarded as playing a losing 
war in front of the Chinese domination of the observed e n v i r o n m e n t " No matter it 
was the 'cultural diplomacy' in the 1950s and the 'revolutionary tourism, in the 1970s, 
the Communists were using their 'techniques of hospitality' to win the upper hand 
(Harding, 1982, p.947).^^ But if one turned back to the American borders to look for 
further reasons, one could not deny that one way of explaining the over-enthusiastic 
67 Here, there is no intention to put any blame on the early generation of China analysts in the field 
who were mostlyjoumalists and had to face the limitation of language barrier. As they could not speak 
the language, selected visits or briefings as well as one-sided interpreters provided for them could lead 
to the forming of a forum for Communist support even without their notice. What really worth-
regretting is, in Mosher's view (1990, particularly the third chapter), any intended distortion of facts 
for the sake of gaining the convenience to report the so-called most up-to-date Chinese information, 
thus maintaining one's status (and Mosher is referring particularly to Edgar Snow) as respectful 
figures on Sino matters. As this is an attack on the professional ethics of reporters, of which there is 
not enough evidence here and also seems to be beyond the scope of this discussion, this accusation has 
to be left aside. 
68 Whereas the 'revolutionary tourism’ has somewhat been captured by the trips as participated by 
those revolutionary paradigm advocates as described above, the 'cultural diplomacy' was a very 
important element of the foreign policy of Communist China towards the third world countries, in 
particular the Latin American countries, during the 1950s. For a good grasp of Chinese Communist 
cultural diplomacy toward Latin America over this period, see Ratliff，1969. 
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attitude towards the events of China could be related to the internal political situation 
of America. As Harding contends, the participation into the Vietnam War by United 
States had led many Americans to think about whether their own society did bring a 
better life to them, and, if so, at what cost ^).945). When China stood up internationally 
as an egalitarian state for every citizen, the 'who-are-we-to-lecture-others' attitude 
brought the American scholars, especially those anti-war ones, to a blind spot of 
praising China in an irrational manner.^^ This analysis perhaps reflects what Myers and 
Metzger (1980) understand as the ‘Lincoln Stiffens syndrome,, which made well-to-do 
Americans to seek communal utopias in foreign lands (p.88). For these Americans, 
there in China emerged a participatory model (Domes, 1983, p.79), which, although far 
from being a paradise, did try sincerely to avoid all shortcomings ¢).97). China, the 
scholars of the time would argue, could provide another developmental model (other 
than the capitalist one) for other developing countries to leam to cope with their own 
socioeconomic construct (ibid; Harding, 1982, p.940). 
For sure, to some reviewers, such an argument was largely based on the 
shallowness of this group of China watchers. Johnson (1982) terms those who had a 
bias of seeing the ruling group would succeed in what it attempted to do as committing 
the 'PlatoMachiavelli mirror-of-princes syndrome’ (p.922), whereas Domes (1983) 
regards those who never doubt the words of whoever that could dominate the Chinese 
political scene as locking themselves in an 'opportunist approach': they had such a 
69 In another article to summarize the idealism about Cultural Revolution of American scholars, 
Harding outlines that they saw Mao, who had engaged himself in preserving equality and commitment 
as well as combating elitism and bureaucracy, had almost every reason to justify such ends with all 
means (Harding, 1984a, p.299). 
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deep love of China that they easily assumed that its leader would not be wrong (pp.80-
81). hi an interview with some related personnel on China matters, Madsen (1987) is 
told by one ofhis interviewees that perhaps it was something to do with a ‘Pearl Buck 
syndrome，，that is, “ ... an abiding sense of wonder, lodged deep within the American 
psyche, about the infinite subtleties of Chinese culture and society ... ,’，that could 
perhaps explain why there was so much excitement and such a sense of urgency to the 
opportunity to do research in China (p.l99)7^ Nevertheless, some reviewers (Myers 
and Metzger, 1980) also unfold a haughty concem. To make it blunt, some China 
watchers did not want to offend the PRC government, which held keys to valuable 
research opportunities and field study (p.88). Goldman (1981) maintains that the 
normalization of Sino-American relation just forced a practical consideration of the 
China watchers to the surface - most did not want to jeopardize their chance to get a 
visa from the Chinese Government ¢).13), and so the result was either they turned blind 
eyes to the irrationalities of the chaotic decade of China, or that, as mentioned above, 
they lived under their romantic ideals and tended to see China not as what it was, but as 
what they would like it to be. 
Apart from the evaluation of this sort of personal narrow-mind constraints and/or 
academic political calculation, there should have enough reasons to believe that a better 
orientation would be unfolding. In fact, in depth academic reflections have not been 
70 This series of interviews were conducted by Madsen between 1983-84 as the first part of a 
larger project to look into Chinese scholars and government officials about their views on US-China 
cultural exchange. The interviewees, remained anonymous, were American scholars, foundation 
executives, and government officials who had played important roles in establishing and managing 
exchange programs with China; see Madsen, 1987, p.210, note 1. Apparently, another similar 
description of this type of 'Pearl Buck syndrome’ has been expressed by Myers and Metzger, who 
label those personnel with such a psychology as suffering from the ‘Marco Polo syndrome’，which 
could only be relieved from a walk on the Great Wall (Myers and Metzger, 1980, p.88)! 
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lacking (Myers and Metzger, 1980; Cohen, 1984). Myers and Metzger suggest the 
'Chinese Development paradigm’（1980, p.lll)，Cohen raises the importance of the 
'China-centered approach' (1984, p.l86). To what extent have these efforts succeeded 
in opening up a better understanding on China? 
The criticism from Myers and Metzger (1980) on the 'revolution paradigm，is 
particularly strong. For them, the theoretical bases of the 'revolution' paradigm - the 
intellectual, socio-political and economic level - in understanding the pre-1949 China 
are all unsound. Regarding to the intellectual level, they figure out a group of neo-
ConfUcians7i moving to Hong Kong after China's liberation had been trying to unfold 
how the humanistic values of Confucianism could remain meaningful for a society that 
77 
required modernization and an integrated spiritual and social life (p.91). Thus, any 
view on a vital Marxist faith in replacement of the dying Chinese traditional values 
could but only be a simplified capturing (p.93). Moving to the socio-political sphere, 
Myers and Metzger maintain that it is a mistake to explain the political motivations in 
China in terms of the Marxist theory of class, because the Chinese always adopted an 
ambivalent and fluid way of shifting allegiances and forming factional networks 
(p.95)P As for the economic aspect, the impression of regarding pre-1949 China being 
71 Among others, these group of neo-Confucians include Tang Jun-yi, Mou Zong-san and Xu Fu-
guan, all spending quite a long period in educating the Hong Kong Chinese since early 1950s onwards 
in the New Asia College, which later, in late 1960s, combined with two other colleges and formed 
what is now known as the Chinese University ofHong Kong. 
72 According to Myers and Metzger (1980), arguments and evidence of a similar kind may be 
found also in Wan-Qing zheng-zhi si-xiang shi-lun and Zhong-guo jin-dai si-xiang shi-lun by Wang 
Er-min (1969，1977), Liang Qichao and Intellectual Transition in China by Hao Chang (1971) and 
Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China 's Evolving Political Culture by Thomas 
Metzger (1977) (pp.90-93). 
73 Myers and Metzger (1980) regard Andrew Nathan's work Peking Politics, 1918-1923 (1976) as 
a good backing of this argument against Esherick's Reform and Revolution in China: The 1911 
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caught in the vise of economic crises and imperialist exploitation was, in their analysis, 
an unsound claim. This is because technological backwardness, population pressure, 
and situational factors such as wars, floods were probably more responsible for peasant 
misery than the institutional burden of taxes, rent, interest; also, commerce, industry, 
finance and transport remained mainly in Chinese hands rather than that of imperialists 
0)p.97-99).74 
The scholarly activities surrounding the 'revolution' paradigm in describing the 
post-1949 socio-political China are in no better sense as well. The emphases have been 
given to the transformative policies of Mao's faction, including the launching of the 
land reforms, the break with the Soviet organizational style, organizational changes in 
industry associated with the Cultural Revolution, and educational changes; but the 
paradigm seriously overlooked the dysfunctional effects of Mao's policies ¢).101). 
This awareness is telling, for it involves a quest of whether China after 1949 had pulled 
herself out of an unbearable past. But was the pre-1949 situation of China really so 
unbearable? Was China really so backward before the coming of the West, and that 
once the latter entered into the vast piece of hinterland, she then experience a sharp 
discontinuity with her past? Myers and Metzger raise the importance of a balanced 
view of China's traditional organizational resources and the role they play in modem 
times (p.l06). One should capture not only the ‘temporal and spatial’ aspect of society 
Revolution in Hunan and Hubei (1976), of which the latter has been applying the Marxist concept of 
class analysis on China in a rigid sense (p.95). 
74 Here, Myers and Metzger are using different pieces of research work like by R.H. Myers’ The 
Chinese Peasant Economy (1970)，R. Murphey's The Outsiders (1977) and Mark Elvin's The Pattern 
of the Chinese Past (1973) to support their arguments against charges on the Government of the 
Republican China to be responsible for shattering the pre-1949 Chinese economy. 
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(i.e. physiographic and local peculiar pattems), but also the ‘mental currents and facts' 
(i.e. organizational life of the society, property structure, system of stratification, and 
structure of influence and power) (p.l08)7^ This framework, what they term as the 
'Chinese Development' paradigm, stresses not the crumbling of the Confucian order 
but the ability of the Chinese to resist the spread of the imperialists' economic and 
political power. When China fell into a period of 'military separatism' from 1911 to 
1949, the situation was not so much a consequence of the repression of the 
'revolutionary movements' or the persistence of traditional values lacking legitimacy, 
but a result of the crisis between the elite and a leadership that could not achieve a 
consensus on the ideological and political basis of modernization ¢).111). This 
consensus, or accommodation, has finally been achieved when Republic of China has 
moved to Taiwan, where “ ... she has done very well indeed ... ” in terms of reducing 
inequality in the distribution of power, broadening the legitimated scope of dissent, and 
flourishing economic growth with containment of the ills of growth (p.ll3). 
The emergence of such a stand ends up in Cohen's (1984) disclaimer of their 
work as “ ... written for frankly political ends ... ”，not only because of the pro-
Taiwanese nature of their article, but also of their positive attitude towards the impact 
of imperialism (p.216, note 48)7^ The meaning of such an accusation is that this is not 
too neutral an evaluation. For Cohen, no matter one is talking about the 'impact-
75 Myers and Metzger (1980) explicitly discredit the overemphasis of G.W. Skinner's work, 
Marketing and Social Structure in Rural China (1964-65) and his ‘Cities and the Hierarchy of Local 
Systems' in his edited piece of work The City in Late Imperial China (1977), which constructed China 
into nine 'physiographic macroregions' and used them to explain the manner in which the entire 
society was managed (pp.106-110). 
76 See discussion surrounding footnote 74 of page 45 above. For a mentioning of the criticism 
against Myers and Metzger on their pro-Guomindang view, see also Madsen, 1987，p.209. 
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response' paradigm, the 'modernization' paradigm, and even the 'imperialism' 
paradigm, “ ... they are all burdened by Western-inspired assumptions about how 
history should go and built-in questions ... about why it does or does not go as it 
should" (p.5; own e m p h a s i s ) . ” Under this line of thought, the key issue is the extent of 
which the historical role of the West in opening up the Chinese world has been blown 
out ofproportion in comparison with other factors ofher own. Cohen sees that all three 
paradigms have committed the mistake of giving disproportionate weight to the role of 
the West and downplaying the internal developments of China. 
At the surface, it seems that evidences from the ‘rebellion, and ‘reform’ aspects of 
the late Ching history are demonstrating well the applicability of the impact-response 
paradigm. Yet, using particularly the Taiping Rebellion as an illustration, Cohen tries 
to show that the movement was not an attempt to catapult China into the modem world 
(p.20). Rather, it was an internal struggle for control of China, a time when the Westem 
impact, confined still to the five ports on the south-eastern fringes of the Ching 
Q^ 
Dynasty, was still scarcely felt. Similarly, Chinese reform of this period should not be 
viewed simply as responses to the westem impact. In Cohen's analysis, the Tung-chih 
Restoration belonged more to part of a long-standing reformist tradition, which, in 
terms of its origins, style and even much of its content, owed little to foreign inspiration 
¢).21). After all, the Tung-chih Restoration, chung-hsing in its original Chinese phrase, 
77 This claim of Cohen (1984) is based on his analysis that both the 'impact-response' and 
'modernization' paradigms are focusing, by default, on those historical processes that either promote 
or retard ‘progress，，'development' and 'modemity'. As for the 'imperialism' paradigm, although it 
aims at discovering those factors that either promote or retard 'revolution', such an attention is given 
because, they are preconditions for ‘progress，，'development' and 'modemity' (p.5). 
78 This is a view that Cohen adopts straightly from Mary C. Wright's The Last Stand of Chinese 
Conservatism: The Tung-chih Restoration, 1862-1874, pp.viii-ix; see Cohen, 1984, p.20. 
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was restorative rather than innovative in character - 'talent' continued to be defined in 
the older sense of omnicompetence, and the economic reform was an aim to restore the 
ante-bellum economy (pp.24-25). But an even more interesting factor that has not been 
given a proportional attention was the gentry power at the local level. As far as local 
interests were concerned, reform initiatives were unlikely to be undertaken in response 
to the West (p.36); at least one should not overlook the chance of political calculation 
of regional leaders in the midst of internal power rivalries7^ Another popular claim of 
evidence of impact-response was the Boxer Movement, which seemed to be the last 
spasm of Chinese resistance to foreign encroachment. As Cohen stresses, equally 
pervasive views to capture the cause of the Boxer Rebellion was to see it as a 
consequence of a complex process of rural deterioration accompanied by a high level 
of popular turbulence (p.51). In fact, when one claims that the Boxer uprising had been 
a consequence of Westem economic aggression, one may be easily embarrassed to 
explain why the uprising was originated in the westem part of Shandong, where foreign 
8n _ 
economic activity was conspicuously absent ¢).52). Thus, when the 'impact-
response' paradigm pre-defines what is important and discourages inquiry into those 
facets that were unrelated to the Westem presence (for instance, power disputes among 
79 Cohen uses Stanley Spector's study of two great ‘regional, leaders, Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-
chang in 1964, Li Hung-chang and the Hwai Army: A Study in Nineteenth-Century Chinese 
Regionalism, to illustrate the subtle linkage between the national reform focus and provincial reform 
initiative. In the words of Spector (1964), “ ... while Tseng's protestations of loyalty to Confucian 
civilization ... seem to indicate that he strengthened his own forces in order that he might better serve 
his imperial masters, the same cannot be said for [Li]. When [Li] spoke of self-strengthening, he 
discussed generalities; when he engaged in self-strengthening, he was strengthening himself . . . “ 
(p.l53); quoted in Cohen, 1984, p.37. 
80 Here, Cohen is using the work by Marianne Bastid-Bruguiere ("Currents of Social Change" in 
The Cambridge History ofChina, Vol. 11, Late Ching, 1800-1911, Part 2, 1980) and Joseph Esherick 
C'lun I-cho-chuan yun-tung te she-hui cheng-yin [Social factors in the formation of the Boxer 
Movement] in the January 1981 issue of Wen-shih-che [Literature, History and Philosophy]) as points 
ofargument; see Cohen, 1984, p.205, note 59. 
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regional leaders, growing rural sub-proletariat, traditional reformist practice), of course 
it can provide circular evidence, but this is hardly a realistic grasp. 
What about the modernization paradigm then? The main theme of its advocates is 
that the lagging behind of China was due to her own immobilized nature towards 
change. But if major social and economic changes were already under way in China 
prior to the Westem onslaught, then this model will be discredited of its stand in trying 
to explain the Chinese situation. Methodologically speaking, tradition-modernity 
paradigm is a pattem of thinking that comers itself to view ‘modem’ and ‘traditional， 
in a bipolar manner, and so it has to identify a point where radical discontinuity 
between the two poles is observed. In this respect, it does not allow certain features of 
the past continue to be portrayed as antithetical to revolutionary change ¢).81). For 
Cohen, the work of Friedman shows that tradition appears not merely as a barrier to 
revolution, but also as a repository of assets for its facilitation, energizing, and 
legitimization.8i Such kind of connection between ‘traditional’ and ‘modem，could 
even be found amongst the supposedly most reform-minded intellectuals, with Liang 
Chi-chao as an example.^^ In the work of Metzger^^, in trying to tease out the 
81 Edward Friedman in his Backward Toward Revolution (1974) shows that the Chinese 
Revolution had been differently defined and experienced by radical urban intellectuals and poor rural 
peasants. Whereas the former regarded the past had to be overcome and destroyed, the latter group did 
not see their then misery as an inevitable consequence of the structure of the old society, but rather a 
consequence of its breakdown. So what the latter group wanted was less disruption, renewal and 
strengthening of former bonds and the used-to-be way of living; see Cohen, 1984, p.83, p.210, note 
55-56. In fact, this is one piece of evidence showing how revolutionary paradigm advocates like 
Friedman rebuts the stand of modernization paradigm advocates. 
82 See Hao Chang's Liang Chi-chao and Intellectual Transition in China: 1890-1907 (1971); 
quoted in Cohen, 1984, p.86. 
83 See Thomas A. Metzger's Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving 
Political Culture (1977); quoted in Cohen, 1984, p.87. 
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predicament of the Neo-Confucians, he observes that modernization, or even 
revolution, represents not the destruction of traditional Chinese society, but rather its 
fulfillment. 
Moving to the revolutionary paradigm advocates, the central theme of this line of 
thinking is that imperialism as the principal moving force of the Chinese history over 
the last century had distorted and restructured the Chinese economy into such an under-
developing condition that not until the coming of the Communist-led revolution the 
tide did start turning. As Cohen recapitulates, central to this 'negative effect’ 
hypothesis is the assumption that it was greatly due to foreign intrusion which then 
resulted in a sharp decline of the traditional sector of the Chinese economy (p.l27). But 
if one could show that the decline did not take place at all, or that it took place as a 
result of factors other than imperialism, the stand of this model also could hardly last. 
This kind of argument has been provided by Hou's research, Myers, study and 
Murphey's effort _ despite various degrees of shortfall, their studies have illustrated 
that the living standard of peasants, at least in the North China region, did not undergo 
a decline even when the figures of per capita foreign investment and per capita basis of 
84 
foreign trade of China in her port cities were low. 
The accusation on various paradigms by Cohen is now summarized as follows. 
Firstly, the ‘impact-response, paradigm deserves a two-fold doubt: it either misreads 
84 See Hou, Foreign Investment and Economic Development in China, 1840-1937 (1965), Myers, 
The Chinese Peasant Economy: Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shantung, 1890-1949 
(1970), and Murphey, The Outsiders: The Western Experience in India and China (Ann Arbor: 
University ofMichigan Press, 1977); all quoted in Cohen, 1984, pp.126-136. 
50 
Chinese thought and action as responses to the West when they were not, or it 
overlooks important developments altogetherjust because they were defined as not that 
related to the Westem presence ¢).151) - this is an act of determining rather than 
obtaining the truth of China. Secondly, the 'modernization' approach portrays China as 
a 'traditional' society that stuck in time and remained lock up forever until the release 
of its potential power for development by the West (pp.151-152) - this emphasis of 
westem importance then downplays the internal dynamics of China. Thirdly, the 
essence ofthe 'imperialism' model was portraying modernization qua industrialization 
as a positive good, and inevitably led to the subtle conclusion that China had to depend 
on the intrusion of the West (p.l52) _ this in tum witnesses a subconscious reflection of 
one's ethnocentric stand, hi light of this，has China been squarely and reflectively 
handled in her own terms? 
Under such a deliberate argument, Cohen articulates the ‘China-centered’ 
approach as a way out. In keeping with Chinese realities as much as possible, the 
approach has four features. Its first feature is to begin with Chinese problems set in a 
Chinese context, such as political and social problems as experienced by Chinese in 
China due to dynastic decline and unprecedented secular changes like the increasing 
commercialization of Chinese society ¢).155). By saying so, one is not arguing that the 
West was unimportant in having significant effect on Chinese reform thought and 
activity. Rather, on the one hand, the reformist tradition had already started its own 
engineering process; on the other hand, the internal dynamics of China, in terms of 
tension and conflict between a reforming dynasty and a conservative local gentry 
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98 class，would be too complicated a situation that might be captured by the phrase 
'westem excitement'. The second feature of this approach is to recognize the regional 
and local variation of China, and so the practice of breaking the Chinese world down 
into smaller, more manageable spatial units for study (p.l61). The implication of this 
awareness is that it allows space for different focuses of analysis on the one hand, and, 
if the concerned areas were in the same zone, there should be allowance for varying 
socio-cultural condition among different smaller districts on the other,6 The third 
feature is to see Chinese society as being arranged hierarchically in a number of 
different levels, and the attention should be given more to the under-researched lower 
strata of the Chinese society if one really wants to understand her dynamics from 
within (p.l72). At once, this unfolds the importance of intellectual, social, economic 
and institutional environment within which ordinary Chinese were really located in.^ ^ 
Last but not the least, the fourth facet of this approach, which is more a stand 
representing a concem of a historian, is a cry for members of the historical field to 
incorporate the techniques and strategies of other disciplines, in particular from that of 
social sciences, into their analysis (p.l80). It marks a sincere welcome of theories, 
methodologies, and techniques developed in mostly the social science discipline into 
85 On the analysis of the complicated relationship among the local gentry, the revolutionary 
radicals and the reforming dynasty, see Cohen, 1984, pp.156-161. 
86 For instance, Cohen sees that it is more constructive to think of Chinese history in the last 
century as being comprised of several district zones, the outermost zone encountered the most 
unambiguous consequence of the Westem presence whereas the innermost zone could find socio-
cultural facets that were not only non-products of the Westem presence, but were even largely 
undisturbed by such presence; see Cohen, 1984, pp.53-54. 
87 For instance, when it is generally agreed that the vast majority of Chinese in the late imperial 
period were illiterate, E.S. Rawski's study, Education and Popular Literacy in Ching China (1979) 
shows that the elementary education in the Ching period was extremely cheap for any male Chinese 
who wanted it badly, that two to ten percent of its women knew how to read and write, that the late 
Ching literacy level served as an invaluable asset in her efforts to modernize; see Cohen, 1984，p.l73-
175. 
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the discipline of historical analysis, and Cohen sees this as one of the prerequisites of 
opening a more realistic search of the Chinese world. 
For sure, the China-centered approach seems to be an impressive exercise in 
assessing the problematic of the China watchers within the historical field and 
attempting to figure out a direction for future trials. But I would like to point out, albeit 
his effort committed, Cohen is still remaining himself on the level of presenting an 
awareness of the limitations of westem ethnocentrism rather than informing his 
audience, why there is such ethnocentrism. The first three features of the China-
centered approach talk about where should be the right threshold to step into China 
study, but they are providing a better focus of methodological attention instead of 
supplying a concrete understanding on China - the attention seems to be deduced to a 
secondary-order academic awareness. And when the fourth feature of the approach is 
touching on the theoretical side of the issue, Cohen is not in the capacity to suggest a 
theory to the fore _ or this is never his intention. This is quite understandable if we 
know about the nature of this piece of work. It is an evaluation of the historical writings 
on China in the hope of suggesting to American historians on how to capture the 
historical reality of China, but never a theoretical attempt. My critique against Cohen is 
instead elsewhere. I maintain the limitations of Cohen is that he himself is also not 
touching deep enough regarding to the causes of such ethnocentric behaviors of 
American academia. Or to say, the academic reflection on various paradigmatic 
influences seems to remain at the level of, at most, identifying the wrongs of 
ethnocentrism, and that this identification is not deep enough.^ ^ If so, any desire on this 
88 As I am going to spell out in the final chapter, Madsen (1995) becomes the latest and by far the 
most comprehensive piece of work that I have come across in doing this kind of reflecting exercise. 
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level ofevaluation to pinpoint the spirit of entering into the analysis of the Chinese way 
oflife is unrealistic. What I want to argue is that further American academic encounter 
with China after her re-opening would not have leamt as much as expected just by this 
level of evaluation. In fact, there is another interesting issue behind. Most of the 
historical researches that we have revealed here have their foci on the Chinese peasant 
population. Apart from capturing the socio-political and socio-economic factors in a 
historical dimension, the seriousness of these researchers in handling the world view of 
the peasants - that is, how they perceive a society should be, and the way to achieve 
such an ideal - is on the whole shallow, if not entirely lacking. This perhaps highlights 
the importance of the fourth feature of Cohen's approach, the incorporation of 
techniques and strategies of social sciences into the analysis. At once, this marks a 
legitimate tum to analyze the studies of anthropologists and sociologists concerning 
Chinese peasants, especially when we recall the effort of those scholars in the early part 
of the century, which seemed to have captured the deep structure of the Chinese way of 
life so well. In light of this, it is logical to assume that, with the reopening of China, 
academic effort in getting closer to the Chinese reality or moving away from the notion 
and practice of ethnocentrism should be a natural expectation. Yet, the next chapter is 
going to unfold a much more complicated scene. 
He tries to analyze the ways of thinking as rooted in the American academia influenced by the 
American ideals, and how such ways of thinking lead to certain assumptions the academia has added 
on in understanding the Chinese society. This will be discussed in the section "Understanding 
Americans" in the fmal chapter, with particular attention given to discussion surrounding footnote 195 
and 196 of page 142 respectively. In fact, I see that this is not of any surprise for Madsen to be so 
reflective to the problematic behind, as he himself has been committed in producing a fascinating 
study on the values and behaviors of rural Chinese (Madsen, 1984)，a case that I am going to discuss 
further in Chapter Four. 
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Chapter Three 
Decoding the Cases 
Ln the last chapter, I have tried to figure out the development of the scholarly 
dispute among the American China watchers concerning which would be the 
appropriate approach to come to terms with China. Simply put, over the four post-war 
decades, the American academic pursuit on China has witnessed two rounds of 
evaluation. The first round of evaluation, running down from late 1940s to early 1970s, 
appears to be progressive in nature: the 'modernization paradigm’ intensifying the 
analysis of the 'impact-response paradigm, and the 'revolution paradigm, 
deconstructing the 'modernization paradigm'. The second round of evaluation, 
covering the decade from mid-70s onwards, turns out to be internal: a distorted or 
partial understanding on China followed by a series of suggestions of where and how to 
go next. 
Paradoxically, this latter round of soul-searching exercise came across with the 
chances for social science academic researches to re-enter into the China field. As I 
have captured in the first chapter, in a subtle mamier, there was an atmosphere that the 
understanding of the Chinese mind would arrive at a new page because of the 
availability of this new channel. Simply put, pre-1978 China studies by westem 
scholars were characterized by a deprivation of chance to conduct fieldwork social 
research because ofthe closing up of the then Chinese society. Documentary researches, 
primary or secondary, have been regarded as the best alternative for quite some time 
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(Boorman, 1960, p.590; Wong, 1967, p.l98).89 But with the passage oftime, diversity 
in sources in China research was acknowledged^, and by the tum of 1960s, with the 
increasing number of Mainland Chinese swimming across the border to Hong Kong, 
the discussion of the importance of interviewing these ex-residents from Mainland 
China became forcing to the forefront.^^ By mid 1970s, the concem became one of 
how strong this methodology could use as a supplement to documentary research.^^ 
The opening of China brought about further excitement to the China watchers of 
America, which seemed to add more advantages to this kind of research project - the 
direct presence of the researcher in the field, and thus the chance of interacting with the 
respondents in the field _ on top of interviewing ex-residents and archive researches. 
For sure, such an excitement does not in any terms exclude a genuine attempt to read 
the Chinese minds. My point of argument is that, the excitement derived from the 
availability of on-the-spot research possibility in Mainland China just obfuscated the 
awareness of the involved researchers ofhow ethnocentric attitude could still remain in 
a frame of reference in different manners. After all, ethnocentrism is an attitude about 
89 For instance, the seriousness of using documentary researches to capture the Chinese situation 
could be reflected by the concerns on how documentary materials could be transformed into research 
data for scientific investigation. Using examples from a 'content analysis project' launched by the 
University of California at Berkeley, Wong (1967) demonstrated how, with proper treatment, 
documents such as the People 's Daily could provide not only 'impressionistic evidence', but also 
meaningful and logical 'explanation' of empirical phenomena occurring in Communist China (p.l98, 
p.210). 
卯 As noted by Oksenberg (1969), until then, primary sources on China research could be 
classified, in broadest terms, into five categories, namely, mainland press and broadcasts, interviews 
with former Mainland Chinese residents, accounts by people who have visited the mainland, Chinese 
fictions, as well as secret Chinese documents obtained by agencies (p.577). 
91 One of such early examples was from the lengthy discussion of Cohen (1967), in which he 
shared his view on the indispensability of interviewing Chinese refugees for contributing to research in 
China. 
92 For a grasp of the characteristics of these ex-residents of China and their roles they have 
regarding to researches on Chinese peasants, see discussions ofParish and Whyte, 1978, pp.339-341; 
Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1992, pp.2-5, and Walder, 1986, pp.255-269. 
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how one group ofpeople is viewing or understanding people of another culture. If this 
is understood, it is possible that this attitude can be maintained regardless of settings of 
encountering - archival research, interviews of ex-residents or contemporary residents, 
on-the-spot observation. How sound is such a claim? This is what I am going to do in 
the following two chapters. In this chapter, I will first depict the following case 
studies93 in order to generate an argument: it is quite risky to believe that there is going 
to be a better understanding of post-1949 Chinese peasants with the availability of on-
the-spot fieldwork on the one hand, and the timing of carrying out the research on the 
other, hi the next chapter, I am going to provide case studies of similar nature which 
are counter with the above two beliefs. In this way, I hope to show that there is a 
difference in the process of understanding as well as the conclusion drawn on the 
values and behavior of the Chinese peasants, due to the having or not of the researchers 
of an empathetic understanding on the study target. 
Apparently, the few chosen studies in this chapter do allow certain ways of 
classification. The work by Parish and Whyte (1978) together with that ofShue (1980) 
should in fact be viewed as one grouping of peasant studies on China. Whereas the 
former has put heavy weight on interviewing migrants and the latter relies entirely on 
documentary research, the contents of both discussions are based on research work 
93 The cases that I have chosen in this chapter are, namely, Village and Family in Contemporary 
China by Parish and Whyte, Peasant China in transition: The Dynamics of Development Toward 
Socialism 1949-1956 by Shue, State and Peasant in Contemporary China: The Political Economy of 
Village Government by J. Oi, and Agents and Victims in South China: Accomplices in Rural 
Revolution by H. Siu respectively. Apparently, the reasons for a concentration on studies surrounding 
Chinese peasants so as to understand the American academic endeavors in capturing the post-war 
Chinese society have been discussed in Chapter One, and footnotes 35 and 39 of page 19-20 have 
explained the rationale why some studies by American scholars on Chinese peasants have been 
eliminated. In light ofthis, it is hoped that the choices ofthe work as adopted in this chapter becoming 
more convincing. 
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being done in Hong Kong between 1973-74. In other words, these two studies to some 
extent reflected the effort of China watchers in trying to come to terms with the 
Chinese rural life when direct field research was not available. Quite the contrary, my 
regarding of the work by Oi (1989) and Siu (1989a) as another grouping is based on the 
fact that both studies have the chances to carry out field research within China, even 
though the former is covering various parts of the hinterland whereas the latter is 
committed to a certain spot. In this case, these two pursuits witness the leaping forward 
of previous structural constraint in depicting rural life after 1949. In the process of 
discussing these four studies, I will first recapitulate their main themes so as to capture 
their directions in outlining the values and behaviors of the rural Chinese. By doing so, 
I hope that the assumptions these authors have on the Chinese peasants and the society 
of Maoist China can be forced to the surface. At the end of each discussion, I will then 
try to suggest the problematic of which that study has committed in.^ ^ My explication 
seems to conclude that, the achievements of the authors in revealing the deep dynamics 
of rural China are limited by their unfamiliarility in recognizing the impact of Chinese 
cultural mentality has on the values and behaviors of these Chinese counterparts. Apart 
from this critique, I see that there is an easy borrowing of paradigms of peasant 
behavior, in particular the ‘rational peasant' model, in labeling the Chinese peasants. 
Behind this borrowing, I will argue, is a sophisticated engineering of ethnocentric 
attitude of another kind, of which even the researchers may overlook that they have set 
in an a priori principle which should be handled in a much more cautious manner. 
94 I hope that the above reasons could explain why I still have to describe the main themes of these 
studies even though there has been quite a number of book reviews concerning them. Or to say, I am 
presenting an argument that is quite different form these reviewers, who often review each of the 
studies in its own terms. But still, on Shue's work, see, for instance, Nolan (1982) and Tang (1982); 
on Siu's work, see, for instance, Watson (1990), Croll (1991), Oi, (1991) and Edmonds (1993). 
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Continuity and Change - Where is the Boundary ofConcern? 
“If we are to achieve a better understanding of China, we need 
more systematic information about how that society operates and 
is changing" (Parish and Whyte, 1978, p.2). 
The significance of the work of Parish and Whyte is reflected by the fact that 
almost every important rural studies on China thereafter does make reference of it.^ ^ 
Both authors not only perceive rural China as an important component to understand 
the Chinese social world; in order to get the best comprehension of the rural world of 
China under Mao, they even make use of statistical techniques to analyze the data they 
have collected from the semi-structured interviews on Chinese migrants to Hong 
Kong.96 Briefly put, the two authors are interested in understanding and explaining the 
pattem of continuity and change in village and family life in China (p.2; my emphasis), 
and this interest is to be articulated by four major questions: which parts of past village 
and family life have changed whereas others have endured; the pattem of change in 
particular areas of village and family life over time; the sorts of individuals who are 
most likely to comply with official policies; and the sorts of villages that show the most 
evidence of change (p.317). To deal with the "what has changed?" question, they try to 
compare particular practices and customs with the situation in these places before and 
after 1949 (p.l5); and to deal with the question of "how and where" of change, they 
code their interview information for things they thought might affect the pace of 
95 Refer to information in footnote 36 of page 19 of Chapter One. 
96 Their analysis of the Chinese peasants was based on the interviewing of legal and illegal 
immigrants in Hong Kong from Mainland China during 1973-74 (Parish and Whyte, 1978, p.340). In 
fact, the value of Hong Kong for China scholars to get access to information have been noted among 
them over the post-war decades; for instance, see Boorman, 1960, p.598; Cohen, 1967, p.35; Whyte, 
Vogel and Parish, 1977, p.l83; Unger, 1987, p.29; Gold, 1993, p.45. 
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change (such as the proximity of the village to a major city) and for whether desired 
changes have occurred or not (for example, whether a cooperative health-care plan has 
been adopted or not), and then use simple statistical tests - Goodman and Kruskal's 
97 . 
gamma - to determine what sorts of villages have experienced more or less changes 
0x4) . 
There must be reasons for changes, and here the two authors articulate three major 
theoretical perspectives in analyzing changing process, namely, the official Chinese 
Marxist or Maoist view, totalitarianism and modernization theory (pp.9-12). The 
attempted breakthrough of the two writers is that, after recognizing the competitive 
QO 
nature of the three perspectives on how purposive change can penetrate village l i f e， 
they try to point out that the Chinese case has illustrated the situation of which 
mechanisms used to make changes possible are in fact involving a combination of the 
three perspectives. The mechanisms mentioned are, namely, 'structural transformation', 
'administrative sanctions', and 'normative influence' respectively. The first mechanism 
is indirective in nature, illustrated by means such as state investment, mass campaigns. 
97 For a description of how the Goodman and Kruskal's gamma works, see the section on "method 
ofanalysis" in Appendix I，(Parish and Whyte, 1978，pp.341-344). 
98 From the official Chinese point of view (the authors regard this as the Marxist perspective), the 
prerequisite of bringing in changes is the elimination of the exploitative nature in the economic 
structure; but there is no guarantee that a change in the economic base may be accompanied by a 
corresponding response from the social and cultural superstructure of the village, so the government 
has to adopt some forceful means to change the mentality as well (Parish and Whyte, 1978, pp.9-10). 
From the totalitarian standpoint, why should peasants give up the cherished customs and vested-
interest practices if there is no pressure or rewards? In this case, the whole issue is about the 
powerfulness ofthe official carrot and stick (p.ll). As for the modernization theory, the modernizing 
process of a place must bring about a new exposure to the concerned (in this case the peasants), who 
have the chance to engage in new activities or a force involvement to modem structures in the local 
setting (for instance, new education system). In either case, the result is a loss of confidence towards 
old practices and values, and the demand and necessity to change in order to come to terms with the 
new environment (p.l2). 
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The underlying assumption is that, once the structure has changed, peasants will adapt 
their behavior to it accordingly. In other words, when the government changes the 
social environment, it is anticipated that the peasants will respond accordingly. As for 
the latter two mechanisms, they are directive in nature, which imply that they are 
attempts from the side of the government to change peasant behavior and attitudes 
directly instead of waiting them to accommodate to a change environment. Activities 
under the title of 'administrative sanctions' include coercion and material sanctions, 
and means under the category of 'normative influence' comprises of communication, 
childhood socialization and mobilized social pressure ¢).13, p.317). Their encounters 
with the Chinese interviewees and the statistical running of their findings help them to 
formulate the following argument: 
‘‘ ...if one wants to understand which parts of village and family 
life have changed and which have persisted, one needs first to 
refer to the ways in which governmental pressure was translated 
into transformation of rural social structure in earlier years and the 
indirect consequences that this modified structure has for peasant 
behavior today" ¢).324). 
Here, it seems that the two authors have identified a scenario that sociologists 
would claim as intentional goal and unintentional consequence^^, and in the course of 
this process, the autonomy of the peasants could be maintained: 
“Peasants will consider their social environment and what kinds of 
behavior will be most rewarding within it ... In the process they 
will not particularly concem about whether their behavior is 
consistent or inconsistent, advanced or backward, modem or 
traditional, but about whether it contributes to a life that is secure 
and satisfying" 0p-344) 
99 On the sociological discussion of this sort of 'unintended consequences derived from intentional 
goals', Giddens provides a lively analysis of this kind in his inaugural lecture delivered in January 
1986; 'see Giddens, 1987，pp.8-9. 
61 
In the end, the two authors implicitly argue that the Chinese peasants could be 
categorized as having a rational character even under a Communist social setting: 
"ki the future gradual evolution of commune life, peasants [should: 
best be seen ... as family-oriented individuals striving to deal with 
the unique set of problems and opportunities existing in their local 
village environment in order to maximize the security and 
satisfaction that this environment can provide" (p.337; my 
emphases). 
It is perhaps the right moment to go beyond the observation of the two authors and 
try to study the logic of their intellectual construct. Broadly speaking, the 
transformation of the rural structure was successful at the start under the direct and 
indirect influences as carried forward by the state. But as time elapsed, a new social 
equilibrium was embedded in such a way that whether further state desires on the rural 
society could be operationalized or not would depend on the fitting of those desires 
with the interest groups and social solidarity as being shaped by the new social 
structure established during the first decade. In this way, the state was firstly active and 
then passive - active in the sense that she could make use of her initial monopoly of 
means of violence as well as control of resources to actualize her blueprints; passive in 
the sense that she had to rely on certain hierarchical structure to help implementing her 
policies, and eventually constrained by the limitation as set out by such hierarchy. On 
the other hand, the agents of the story - the peasants alike - seemed to be in the lower 
hand in front of the state apparatus at the start. But once they anchored themselves in 
various positions of the new social structure, they started regrouping their strength and 
became capable of launching a combat towards external forces that would destabilize 
their equipoise. In this way, the 'what-has-changed' issue has to be understood in two 
different periods - in the initial stage, what the state wanted to change did modify; in 
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the latter interval, any change would very much depend on the willingness of 
cooperation on the side of the peasants; the state might force her own way, but 
resistance was bound to be strong. 
Here, we must be aware of the fact that the detection of the authors is based on the 
process of coding the interview information and performing statistical tests to 
determine the reasons, nature, and directions of changes as well as persistence to 
changes (p.4). Thus, for instance, how far has the nature of ritual life been modified 
since the new Communist e ra?^ The role of rituals in promoting the status quo of 
social relationship such as obligations to families, kin groups, and the ancestors is one 
of the reasons for a revolutionary regime's opposition to traditional ceremonies (p.249). 
To the understanding of the two authors, what is advocated by the state is not the 
elimination of all rituals and celebrations, but the replacement of elaborate, expensive 
ceremonies by new, simplified and secularized forms ¢).251). Li light of this, life-cycle 
rituals like celebrating birth, wedding and funeral activities should have changed since 
1949. But it has been discovered that there is a considerable gap between rural practice 
and official ideals for some villages against others ¢).266). To give an answer to this 
pattem, the authors use the gamma test to run the concerned data (p.270, Table 41), and 
arrive at a remark that, “ ... stated very crudely, a village is most likely to have modem 
life-cycle activities if it is composed of Hakkas, has few people receiving overseas 
remittances, has more land per laborer than is commonly elsewhere, has small teams 
and brigades, and is exposed to influences from urban centers and official 
communications. Traditional forms predominate for the opposing terms of these 
100 See Chapter Thirteen, "Life-Cycle Ceremonies and Ritual Life", ofParish and Whyte, 1978. 
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dichotomies ... “ ^x271). If this remark is statistically scientific enough, is it not too 
acultural and acontextual? Nevertheless, this was already an attempt in trying to 
construct a more sophisticated picture to capture the rural dynamics of China in mid 
1970s, and so should be fully understood and reasonably appreciated rather than 
criticized. But there is a deeper concem on another level - what sort of perception the 
authors have on the Chinese peasants. 
No doubt, the pursuit of equality^^^ appeared to be a keyword that the Communist 
China would strive for in all sense. But there have always been conflicts between 
equality and equity on the one hand and equality and administrative efficiency on the 
other (p.ll7). After all, besides an egalitarian goal, the wish for increasing national 
agricultural production is no less a desire. The two authors would like very much to 
know how the state could introduce the former goal while simultaneously maintain the 
incentives of the peasants. For them, if this is clarified, both the ability to launch 
changes on the side of the state and the willingness to change on the side of the 
peasants could be reflected in this issue. But the authors have difficulties to collect the 
reactions of the peasants toward commune life, so they have set an assumption - if the 
collectivized system provides an acceptable set of incentives and satisfaction to 
peasants, they would work diligently within it ¢).118; my emphasis). According to the 
information of the informants, peasants did eagerly pursue private-plot farming and 
other cash income activities for the most part outside of the time required for regular 
participation in team labor. Thus, they come to the conclusion that “ ... the collective 
101 See Chapter Eight, titles "The Pursuit of Equality and Peasant Satisfaction", of Parish and 
Whyte, 1978. 
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sector does provide sufficient incentives to motivate peasants to meet their obligations 
there ... ” (p.l21) because “ ... those individuals, families, and production teams that 
devote the most effort to the collective sector have some assurance that it is they, rather 
the poorer peasants elsewhere or the state, that will receive the primary benefits" 
^).127). How could one be so sure that the involvement in private-plot farming only 
after participating in team labor work was a response to incentives and satisfaction but 
not a result of coercion? What is more, even if the above conclusion is affirmative, 
what stands behind the terms 'they' and 'elsewhere' in the minds of the peasants? The 
crucial point here is that there seemed to be a boundary working behind their minds. 
Within the zone, there appeared to be an atmosphere of mutual help and support, but 
this harmonious interpersonal relationship would stop at a point. What is working at 
the back of the stage? As I am going to argue later, a core issue behind is how much the 
rural structure has changed such that the traditional rural culture based on kinship and 
familism has given way to socialist collectives. After all, rural culture should not be 
regarded as simply reflected by ritual life alone. Even when ritual life has been replaced 
in form, there still needs much elaboration to come to terms with the thinking of the 
peasants. When the two authors conclude that the peasants should be seen as family-
oriented individuals seeking to maximize security and satisfaction ¢).337), a lot of 
threads still have to be clarified here. Without further elaboration, Chinese peasants 
will be easily fallen into the prey of being classified as calculative individuals working 
with a rational mind, and omitting the cultural impact which still needs to be grasped 
more clearly before the coming up of this conclusion. 
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Development toward Socialism - So Peasants must be Practical? 
Whereas Parish and Whyte depend on the information provided by their 
informants through interviews as the main component of their research data, the work 
of Shue (1980) is entirely relying on documentary research as the backbone of analysis. 
Yet, there is somewhat a linkage of research concerns between these two pieces of 
work. Parish and Whyte have shown interest in knowing, under the new rule, what and 
how some aspects ofrural life have changed and what and why some aspects have not. 
As for Shue, she wants to tease out "the reasons" for certain policy strategies of the 
1 no 
party-state in its early period of rural reform. Here lies the additional aspect of 
understanding: "the reasons" unequivocally signify the ability of the state to achieve 
her goals at a time when the demands of the peasants could be taken into account. 
For Shue, during the short years from 1949 to 1956, despite a certain degree of 
shortcomings and frustrations, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) did successfully 
1 ^o 
launch a series of major economic and social transformations in the countryside with 
popular support and little losses in agricultural production ¢).321). This scenario had 
brought forward significant meaning, as the CCP seemed to have overcome the general 
problems, namely, overall poverty of the country, stagnation of economic growth, and 
general discontent among the poor rural inhabitants, that most peasant societies would 
1犯 Here, one should bear in mind that there was no cross reference against one another between 
these two studies, as they did their research work almost in the same period. Yet, from another point of 
view, this might reflect the academic logic of the period, of which we will come to a discussion 
shortly. 
103 Among these, they included the early period of reduction of rents and interests, followed by the 
massive land reform and taxation based on ‘normal annual yield’，then proceeding into the Mutual Aid 
Teams, Unified Purchase and Supply Order, Credit Co-operatives, and then developed into 
Elementary Agricultural Production Co-operatives and Advanced Agricultural Production Co-
operatives respectively. 
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have been difficult to dealt with in the process of transformation (p.3). What were the 
causes ofsuch an unusual success? Based on the research data of the Province ofHupei 
and Hunani04 ^^ evidences, Shue signifies the Party's recognition of the importance of 
peasants' conformity in the process of various policy implementations. As peasants 
were "practical people" that would act in all matters out of rational self-interest ¢).236), 
the Party skillfully identified 'ways' in which their pursuit of private interest could be 
made to coincide with, and even advance, the revolutionary government's goals of 
socialist transformation (p.5). In the end, there was an intersection between the 
answering of the desires of the peasants on the one hand, and the achieving of the goals 
of the state on the other - and this explained for the success of the first few years in 
rapid rural transformation. 
To support the above view, Shue provides a detailed narrative of the state policies 
over this period, and sum up seven key elements, which were mutually reinforcing one 
another, to explain for the successful rapid rural transformation. Firstly, the Chinese 
leadership was seen to have the capability of providing sophisticated and specified 
guidelines in such details that main goals and purposes of each policy was to be 
followed accordingly.io5 Secondly, there was flexibility in basic-level policy 
implementation, which allowed deadlines, quotas, and even classifications subject to 
104 The data were collected from various provincial newspapers, the national press, journals, local 
handbooks and the like from the concerned two provinces (Shue, 1980, pp.8-9). 
105 To name just a few, Shue (1980) has mentioned about the differentiation of class labels (pp.48-
55), the comprehensive guidelines for Credit Co-op finance administration (pp.250-271), details of the 
Three Fix policy (pp.235-243), of which all of them, she maintains, display a degree ofknowledge and 
care in rural policy formulation uncommon among Marxist governments so newly come to power 
(p.322). 
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reviewi06, and this openness fostered the development of an administrative style that 
was experimental, self-critical and adaptive. Thirdly, the CCP leadership did not regard 
weak rural administrative capacity as a sufficient reason to postpone progressive 
development, and opted for doing as much as possible in the first thrust, and would 
rather allow for systematic rectification after each campaign. The main reason behind 
was the fear that any delay would give opposition forces the time to regroup themselves. 
For sure, this style of swift and bold assault followed by rectification made the Party 
vulnerable for criticism, but it also swept away the problems of ‘wait-and-see, attitude 
and 'much-planning-less-accomplishment' syndrome.^ ^^ Fourth, the Party adopted the 
policy of recruiting local people as activists and cadres of the administrative apparatus 
in the new areas. Although this group of people had little macro mentality and had lots 
of shortcomings in fulfilling central plan, their local roots made them more acceptable 
and accountable to the localities involved, and their arguments and objections against 
certain central views could help the Party knowing more about village views, which in 
tum reinforced a flexible administration and rapid attempts. Fifth, the Party had a good 
management of class struggle in such a way that peasants' perceptions of their personal 
106 This appears to be a strength of the Party to know about one of her own weaknesses: the Party 
might have grand planning, but local situations could vary in such a scale that any force 
implementation would result in back-off effect. So, for instance, land reform was executed 
comparatively quick in the Central South, but there were areas where it was still in progress and even 
hardly launched; so tax policy on different places had to be differentiated accordingly (Shue, 1980, 
pp.121-126). 
107 Here, Shue (1980) is trying to show the ability of the Party to solve the Catch-22 situation: if the 
Party wanted to have a transformation, the support of the landless peasants, who were the majority, 
was eminent. Yet, even poor peasants had been mobilized to take revolutionary action against the 
landlords (p.73), there was difficulty for them to give up ‘clan sentiment' for 'class consciousness' on 
the one hand, and the elimination of the fear that reform would be seen through to the end on the other 
(p.76). This anxiety would surely threaten the stability of agricultural output, and in order to preempt 
potential sabotage by landlords and to store a quick sense of normalcy in the countryside (p.92), the 
Party chose to act quick, and the existence as well as the functioning of the two elements mentioned 
could, in a sense, compensate for any cost or rescue for any default as caused by this sweeping 
approach. 
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interest would and could coincide with their assigned class interests^^^ in this way, it 
would be the natural, self-interested energies of peasants to commit in changes, and 
this accounts for the relatively rare resort to coercion in China to bring peasants toward 
socialism. The sixth factor, which was closely related with the preceding one, was the 
successful design and use of material incentives to draw peasants into cooperation 
toward village revolution and socialism in a step-by-step manner. Peasants, after all, 
were 'practical people, whose values and inclinations were by no means naturally 
socialist (p.327), and they were willing to cooperate with social and economic change 
only when they were convinced that change might benefit themselves. For sure, by no 
means direct and indirect coercion were never used, but Shue wants to stress that while 
fear and force were sometimes decisive and thus might account for some bursts of 
activity, the chief motivation force appealed before the peasants to move toward 
socialism was the element of material s e l f - i n t e r e s t " 0 9 Lastly, over this period of seven 
years, the central-local relationship that was intended to develop was one of 
cooperation and consultation, and the central would allow a certain degree of localist 
protectionism so as to exchange for the establishment of legitimacy of the new system 
in the eyes of the peasants on the one hand, and for the implementation as well as 
108 No matter it was the isolation of the small minority of landlords from the rest of the village 
population in the early land reform period, or the isolating of the rich and upper-middle peasants in 
opposition to the poorer peasant masses on the question of forming farming co-operatives, the 
message that any good fortune of the peasants could only be made by themselves only was clearly 
spelt out. 
109 Here, Shue is chiefly responding to the theory as suggested by Skinner and Winckler 
(1980[1969]) in analyzing how the leadership of Communist China could get policies carried out. For 
them, the leadership adopted a cyclical application of three kinds of pressures - namely, moral, 
remunerative, and coercive - to make sure that central planning could be implemented in the end. The 
arguments that Shue (1980) puts forward are twofold (pp.327-328): firstly, the three pressures were 
not functioning in a stage-by-stage manner, but rather acting out simultaneously in real setting; 
secondly, of these three forces, the heaviest of them was the force of material interests, because, the 
peasants are 'practical people, and “…act in all matter out of rational self-interest" (p.326). 
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testing the feasibility of the implemented policies on the other. 
Now, a careful reading of Shue's analysis could show that she is trying to 
demonstrate the feels of the peasants (particularly the landless and poor ones) as a 
decisive factor in shaping the consequences of this transformation. The issues involved 
here are complicated. Land reform was to be more than economic reform for the 
purpose of raising the standard of living of the peasants only: it was to be a 
revolutionary struggle, to lay the foundations of a new order in the villages so that 
economic, social and political relations within the villages would be altered 
accordingly (p.42, p.91). But this intention of the state had unfolded two levels of 
concerns of the rural inhabitants, one psychological and one materialistic, that the party 
state had to be dealt with. As far as the psychological level was concerned, a core 
anxiety of the rural inhabitants was how and when the CCP would ultimately 
expropriate most of the property of landlords and the wealthy peasants, and who would 
and would not be counted into these two categories (pp.18-19). This eventually cried 
for a clear-cut system of class labels, as without this categorization, the question of 
who should give and who should take could hardly solve. But a total eradication of the 
landlord class would surely bring forth profoundly emotional responses from nearly all 
classes of rural people^^ ,^ as all were involved to stand either to be hurt or helped by 
such reorganization of village life ^>.92). Here laid the deadlock: it was the landless, 
the poor peasants and the hired hands who were to have the first priority in the 
distribution, and so local cadres had to rely on them to carry through the reform. Yet, it 
110 The assignment of class labels on different rural inhabitants included landlords, rich peasants, 
middle peasants, small renters, as well as poor peasants and hired hands; for details of categorization 
of each class, see Shue, 1980, pp.47-56. 
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was difficult to convince them that ultimate victory in the struggle was sure enough to 
make it reasonable for them to take the risk of leading the movement (p.75). Even 
when a work team composed of cadres outside the village fulfilled all tasks of the 
preparatory stages (such as rectification of all mass organizations, propagandizing the 
reform policies, and investigation as well as classification of the villagers), still the 
poor peasants have to be mobilized to take earnest revolutionary action against the 
landlords. Despite the purposes of ‘speak bittemess' and ‘settling accounts' meetings 
as means to articulate the level of exploitation, still many could not, as mentioned 
above, give up ‘clan sentiment' for 'class consciousness，，let alone the fear of whether 
the reform would be seen through to the e n d � " In the end, the Party chose to carry on 
reforms at a faster speed so as to demonstrate that a striking-back of the previous 
dominating class would be impossible. 
But solving the psychology of the people was far from a completion. Why should 
the peasants act accordingly? Here brings out the second level of concem that the 
party-state had to handle: the discrepancy between the ‘self-interest’ orientation of the 
peasants and the ‘collective ideal’ mentality ofthe state, especially in the early period 
of land reform. As mentioned above, according to Shue, the CCP knew pretty well that 
peasants were "practical people" and that they were expected to act in all matters out of 
rational self-interest ¢).326). Simply put, a practical question was involved: what was 
the sense of feeding an ox in winter if it was going to be given to someone else for 
ploughing in spring ¢).45)? Shue seems to be in favor of the view that, in the process of 
policy development for socialist transformation, the state had given considerable 
111 Refer back to footnote 107 of page 68 for related discussion. 
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weight to incentive systems as a bridge to coincide the rational thinking of the peasant 
and the socialist ideal of the state. If we look back into the policy development of this 
period, we could observe that, the promise of ‘to settle down and get rich’ was quite an 
incentive filled with materialistic tone in itself. If the reform of the landholding system 
was to put an end to certain forms of exploitation, the rural taxation system, which 
outlined the amount of tax each household was to pay in the form of "normal annual 
yield", seemed to be a design for increasing total agricultural output.^ ^^ But in this way, 
peasants were more vulnerable to economic and natural fluctuations ever than before^^^, 
and so laid down the rationale of the central leadership to establish the Mutual Aid 
Teams (MATs) among poor and middle peasants]" Yet, when there seemed to be a 
manifestation of a rural small-capitalist, private accumulation syndrome appeared 
among some well-performed teams, which was quite an unintended effect of the 
original desires of the MATs^^ ,^ the state further launched out policies that could 
112 The core issue here was that the state's approach to taxing the peasantry was a tax on output or 
production rather than on possessions or property of the individual households. The "normal annual 
yield" was a figure representing the harvest that could be reasonably expected from the land occupied 
by the household, and the household was required to pay the tax on it, regardless of what the actual 
income from the land might be for that year. This would mean that if the household could raise the 
actual income above the normal annual yield estimate by its own hard work, innovation, or whatever 
method, they could retain the portion of their crop in excess of the normal annual yield figure in a tax-
free manner; on the contrary, if the harvest fell below the figure, they still had to pay the full tax 
(Shue, 1980，pp.108-110). 
113 As Shue (1980) maintains, before hand, in times of critical period, at least some rich households 
had accumulated capital resources for others to beg for. The launching of land reform eventually made 
a relatively few people (the landlords and the rich peasants) poorer, and a great many people 
somewhat better off; but it made no one rich (p.90). In times of difficulties, there would not be any 
comparatively wealthier households that peasants in need ofhelp could tum to. 
"4 Simply put, Mutual Aid Teams were small and relatively informal groupings of peasant 
households organized in such a manner so as to make up for some of their deficiencies in means of 
production by exchanging labor and sharing tools and oxen (Shue, 1980, p.l45). 
115 According to Shue (1980), the formation of MATs was a vital part of the early rural 
transformation and transition to socialism, as it not only could lead to a modest expansion of 
agricultural production, but also, hopefully, could strengthen the resistance to the revival of capitalism 
and the rich peasant economy. This was quite understandable, for if a poor family were distributed 
with a piece of land but found itself fall short of tools, animals, or even manpower to till the land, 
eventually, they might have to sell their land to someone with enough capital to buy, or to take a loan, 
72 
restrain petty-capitalist orientation (p.l95) on the one hand, and to provide with the 
peasants another round of incentive for the sake of smooth socialist transformation on 
the other.ii6 in this way, firstly, the central could control once more the pace and 
direction of rural transformation; secondly, the rural economy would move one step 
fbrther toward the collective scale; and thirdly, peasants incentive could be maintained, 
although it had been moved up to a more collective platform. All in all, had it not been 
the later erosions of the conditions of successful changes^^^, the CCP would not have 
encountered difficulties in maintaining the momentum of rural reforms. 
Until now, how are we going to weigh Shue's work? Methodologically speaking, 
Shue seems to be holding a vague stand. On the one hand, she stresses that the sources 
of the data were excellent in many respects, especially that the stories of the 
newspapers of the 1950s were far more lively and accessible than that of the 1960s and 
the 1970s. Yet, she also admits that the newspapers persistently ignored some 
important aspects of rural life, such as the kinship or clan alliance of peasants ^>p.lO-
or to hire one or more of its household members out for a living. If this was left unchecked, a tendency 
to recreate a rural class picture would be imminent. The appearance of MATs then, in its original 
belief, could make those lacking the means of production a chance to benefit from using it (p.l47). 
But the development of some of the MATs did embarrass the leadership. Some teams, due to better 
human or natural resources, just functioned so well that what these MATs were supposed to control 
was re-emerging from within; the state simply had to solve this paradox. 
H6 A case in point was the introduction of the "Unified Purchase and Supply order" by late 1953, 
which stated that peasants had to sell their surplus grain in amounts, kinds, and at prices set by the 
government, determined in accord with the needs of the country, the people, and the food situation in 
the village (Shue, 1980, p.215). This order, implemented side by side with the existence of state-led 
Supply and Marketing Co-operatives (SMCs), signified the importance of signing advance purchase 
contracts (p.230), and eventually pushed the MATs to commit themselves to do all trading with the 
SMCs (p.234). 
117 In the final section of the book, Shue (1980) has suggested four conditions that could provide 
the backbone for the continuous well-functioning of the seven elements of CCP's early success in 
rapid rural transformation, of which the party-state was not able to maintain (pp.337-344). They will 
not be dealt in details here, as they do not count for the key criticism of this discussion on Shue. 
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11). Surprisingly, once admitting that Chinese data collection and statistical systems of 
the period were still extremely weak, she believes that these limitations ‘‘... do not by 
any means always serve to minimize problems or to augment the Party's victories" 
(p.l2). This type of ‘all-embracing，claim puts any sort of criticism against the validity 
of data in a difficult position. But as mentioned before, the structural constraint over 
this period of academic research on rural China has been so far reaching that defects of 
this kind should be understood. After all, the core problematic lies elsewhere. 
Why must peasants be practical people that will act in all matters out of rational 
self-interest? Roughly put, Shue is telling us that, because the rural people act in such 
manner, they are such people. Here, Shue is not giving a theoretical ground followed by 
empirical support, but taking the ground for granted and using her evidences to 
reaffirm the claim. The point is，to what extent should the evidences be contributed to 
the rational thinking of the peasants? Put it the other way, would there be a chance that 
some of the behaviors of the peasants could hardly be explained by rational thinking 
alone? And if so, provided that the party-state always strategically - as Shue so clearly 
stresses - take the self-interest orientation of the peasants into account for policies 
design, what would be the implication of this consideration if it could only reflect part 
of the concerns of the peasants? Let us look at this puzzle in more detail. When talking 
about the difficulties in implementing local tax work, one of the thomy problems was 
cadres' complicity in concealing land and evading taxes (p.l39). The cadres were not 
only concealing their own land, but were quite prepared to help other villagers to do so, 
not entirely for the sake of gaining the goodwill of villagers, but also for the purpose of 
avoiding to make their village appearing to be more wealthy than others, which would 
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then bring about suffering to their people Q)p.l39-140). All in all, county and district 
cadres were not free of 'localist' sentiment themselves (p.l40). For sure, one could still 
stick to a self-interest rational model to interpret the above phenomena, but is it then 
fair to regard this type of localism, especially at the district level, as nothing to do with 
the feel of providing support to kinsmen or the like? But, as mentioned above, the news 
of some important aspects of rural life, kinship relationship and clan alliance of the 
peasants alike, were lacking. This is understandable, but does it then mean that 
unavailability of such data is a minor issue that one can overlook when one is 
providing an analysis on the values and behavior of the peasants? Apparently, when 
discussing about the categorization of rural people into various class backgrounds, 
Shue recognizes that some people with certain class background and supposed to be 
accorded special treatment during land reform were finally not being so treated. Li fact, 
what happened to them would depend more on how the local people and cadres judged 
their character, their personal connections, and their past behavior than on the 
consideration as recommended in policy papers ¢).55; my emphases). How, then, 
should we understand such behavioral types? To be fair, if one is not too sure to say at 
a stage that existing bonds of family relationship and friendship are affecting the 
peasants' behavior, is it equally true that one needs evidence to conclude that they are 
not influential factors then? Both sides need evidence, but in Shue's account, she 
stands for one side, omitting the other, andjust takes her stand for granted. 
Because ofher unconditional belief in the self-interest nature of the rural peasants, 
it would of course be a ‘very clear argument' that the whole mutual aid movement 
could offer peasants an opportunity to act in accord with government policy while 
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simultaneously pursuing their own interest and enhancing their own well-being (p.l89; 
my emphasis). And in this way, the government strategy was a success, and so 
sustaining the claim ofher thesis. Under this framework, the agents and the state could 
get what they wanted. But has this analysis omitted or simplified something crucial in 
capturing the dynamics of the two bodies? 
Communist Clientelism - Culture of Dependence? 
"Clientelist politics in the Chinese countryside are addenda to 
existing institutional arrangements that allow individuals to pursue 
private interests and to receive special consideration in distributing 
goods and rewards from those in positions of authority. The use of 
personal relationships may be considered as the 'operational code’ 
for how best to get things done in the countryside." (Oi, 1989, 
p.l32) 
It is against this backdrop that the work of Oi, which draws on published materials, 
emigre interviews, and visits to China (p. 237), is worth for a tum of attention. It is 
trying to articulate the subtle dynamics between the peasants and the state, in particular 
the rural cadres which are situating in between the two parties, and having the interests 
of both. For Oi, the Communist revolution has eradicated the traditional power 
structure, but not the basic issue of peasant politics: how the harvest shall be divided 
(p.l). This changing nature of power politics inevitably brought the state into the front-
line on the issue of how to divide the harvest with the peasants. Yet, the communist 
regime had been supported by the peasantry very much in the course of obtaining 
power, and so the regime had to maintain the impression that the state only procured 
the agricultural 'surplus', which, in Oi's view, is in fact exploiting rural areas to fund 
industrial growth (p2; my emphases). How should one analyze this type of state-
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peasant relationship? Here, Oi's investigation departs from both the 'totalitarian model' 
and the 'interest group model'^^^ and stresses that one should note the relative power 
ofeither party when both intersect. For sure, it seems that the state was in control of all 
means ofresources, but its representatives at the local level - what Oi terms as agents -
might have interests of their collective and even their own which were quite different 
from those of the center (p.3). If so, what sort of dynamics would result from this type 
of relationship? What is more, how could this happen and why could this be allowed in 
a communist system? Oi's response to the above quest is in fact the three major themes 
of her work. Firstly, communist system in itself - which is distinguished by scarcity of 
goods, a centralized distribution system, and unequal access to and personalized 
control over allocation of goods and opportunities - will outgrow clientelism. Secondly, 
because of the nature of communism, a different type of dependence, which is 
characterized by ‘interest-maximizing‘ rather than ‘risk-minimizing, strategies, will be 
derived in this kind of clientelism. And thirdly, any partial change of this economic 
structure is not enough to eradicate the characteristic of this system, thus implying that 
clientelism will be maintained in contemporary rural China (pp.9-10; my emphases). 
Understanding the above line of argument of Oi is in fact a continuation of the 
description of the political context of rural China where Shue terminates. The process 
of collectivization since mid 1950s onwards simply meant the losing control of the 
peasants over the distribution of their harvest. This process was made possible under a 
118 For Oi (1989), the 'totalitarian model，is recognizing the absolute power of the state over the 
people, and regarding the citizens are atomized, passive and politically ineffectual; for the 'interest 
group model', the state is regarded as an arena where different interest groups pursue their own 
benefits, and so mass groups such as peasants and workers do have the chances to participate in 
politics (p.2). 
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new administrative arrangement: every peasant was being situated in a production team 
{shengchan xiaodui) supervised by team leaders on activities relating to production and 
distribution, whereby production team leaders were then being supervised by 
production brigade {shengchan dadui) leaders, who in tum were overseen by commune 
{gongshe) leaders respectively. A key understanding to this arrangement centered 
around the grain-output classification^^^ being granted to each production team, as such 
category would determine whether a particular team would be liable to sell grain to the 
state or not ¢).46). To each grain-surplus team, besides fiilfilling the basic quota sales, 
for political and patriotic reasons, it would be expected to make overquota sales to the 
state at the same low basic quota price under an annual negotiation process (p.51). Now, 
under the administrative hierarchy, running down from communes to production teams, 
each level had a quota to fulfill, and this would mean that the brigade quota had to be 
shared among all the production teams within that brigade. Against such backdrop, 
every team leader thus witnessed oneself involving in a zero-sum game ¢).60) - each 
jin (catty) a team manager could manage to save from selling to the state for internal 
use will imply that the jin had to be fulfilled by another team. But the complexity of the 
issue did not stop here. To maintain as a low quota production team would imply that 
the concerned team leader was displaying poor leadership, and the defining of one as a 
‘backward element' {luohou fenzi) could bring the issue of face {minzi) to the forefront. 
To drive for a middle course in between these two negative poles became a skillful art 
that almost each team leader had to play with. This explains one of the two conditions 
that would encourage skillful manipulation. 
119 That is, whether the production team is a 'grain-surplus', ‘grain-deficit’ or a ‘grain-sufficient’ 
one; see Oi, 1989, p.46. 
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Another condition for skillful manipulation was the type of patron-client 
relationship as generated by the design of the state. Here, Oi outlines two levels of 
patron-client relationship. To minimize any kind of cheating, the state frequently 
adopted a divide-and-rule strategy by making use of other team leaders to ensure 
accurate estimates (p.57) on the one hand, and arranged for on-site inspections (p.85) 
or surprise inspections (p.91) by brigade cadres on the other. Simply put, the state just 
would not trust the production teams, and to some extent, it was making use of the self-
interest of team leaders to guarantee that each of them would try to make sure of the 
accurate reports by others, with higher officials that were usually not local people to 
oversee the whole situation (p.88). Yet, the administrative hierarchy was so designed 
that brigades had to rely on the production teams for a considerable portion of their 
1 on 
expenses. At once, as Oi contends, a brigade had an interest to allow teams some 
leeway to keep more than the legally allowed share of the harvest for its own sake, or 
else it would be cutting off a major source of its own funding ¢).125). This Oi terms as 
an 'economic necessity of collusion'.^^^ But one should not think that all teams were 
given equal weight in this treatment, because certain team leaders might have 
developed better connections {guami) and personal feelings of sympathy and 
friendship {qanqing) with the brigade cadres ¢).129), and this form the core of the first 
level of a patron-client tie in rural China between the brigade cadres and the production 
120 This includes reserve fund, investment fund, personnel salaries, welfare costs and most costs of 
local agricultural investments and construction; see Oi, 1989, p.l25. 
121 Oi (1989) so states, “ ... brigade cadres allowed team leaders certain breaks in estimating the 
harvest, keeping extra reserves, using these reserves, and enforcing higher-level policies in return for 
their cooperation in fulfilling the brigade's various demands for grain, free labor, and investment funds as 
well as in minimally satisfying the state's demands for grain …”（p.l26). 
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team leaders. 
And there is a second level of a patron-client tie - all team leaders had the 
potential to be patrons within their own production team (p.l31; my emphasis), hi a 
collectivized agriculture, a person would still be needed to arrange job assignment. Oi 
tries hard to show that piece-rates, time-rates and even the Dazhai work point system 
could not avoid the creeping in of 'favoritism', because the allocation of agricultural 
work and opportunities would eventually be the role of the team leaders. But a marked 
difference as stressed by Oi is that collective agriculture has one guarantee - peasants 
have the right to receive grain for avoiding starving as a kind of minimum 
1 )) 
subsistence , and an important conclusion of Oi: 
“ ...Chinese peasants pursued clientelist politics not so much out 
of fear for their subsistence but in order to live above the 
subsistence level... “ ¢).143; own emphasis). 
Oi believes that so long as the Chinese peasants do not need to pursue clientelist 
politics for the sake of safeguarding their subsistence, their position is much more 
secure than that of Scott's traditional peasants. Thus, she claims that one should 
understand the pursuit of clientelist politics by the Chinese peasants as an 'interest-
maximizing' clientelist strategy rather than a ‘risk-minimizing, one because, rather 
than for purpose of survival, it is a means of getting ahead and receiving special 
consideration in the process of resource and reward distribution. And here, Oi admits 
that this understanding eventually brings her much closer to Popkin,s view of 
clientelism (p.l53, especially footnote 46). The important point is that, such kind of 
122 Qj (1989) does add that the right of not to be starved does not necessarily mean that sufficient 
grain is always available to ensure the implementation of this right (p.l43, footnote 22). 
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clientelism did not resolve itself once the de-collectivization process took place by late 
1970s. After all, the issue of de-collectivization was not primarily how much each 
family received, but who got the rights to farm which piece of land (p.l84; own 
emphases). And as long as local cadres have not been removed from being 
intermediaries between the state and the peasants, the use of personal networks and 
evasion are always available (p.227). 
A summary is perhaps appropriate by now. The blueprint of the state was to build 
up a collective agriculture that could fund the industrial growth. The key issue was to 
generate a mechanism to collect harvest for state use. The state needed agents to 
implement the policy, but there was a concem of the loyalty of the cadres, thus an inter-
as well as an intra-level cross-checking exercise was imminent. When the downlines 
(say, the production team leaders) depended the uplines (say, the brigade cadres) to 
defend against external pressure and to provide the amount of leeway to maintain their 
well-being, whereas the uplines relied on the cooperation of the downlines to fulfill 
state requirement and to support the former with basic provisions, a patron-client tie 
highlighted by a ‘personalization of authority' ¢).103) between the brigade cadres and 
team leaders as well as between the team leaders and their subordinate peasants is 
strongly rooted. In Oi's view, as communism is identified with scarcity, clientelism 
becomes inevitable. But as communism guarantees basic provision, such kind of 
clientelism is not risk-aversive, but rather profit-maximizing - to get ahead of from the 
basic. This ‘getting ahead of exercise took place from an individual level to a 
production team level - all wanted to maximize rights but minimize responsibilities, 
and this picture would not improve so long as the state remained only semi-committed 
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to a market economy (p.226). 
Although Oi does not make explicit claim, in a sense, she seems to be quite eager 
to outline the 'culture of dependence' of rural China.^ ^^ What she terms as 'communist 
clientelism' is characterized by an ‘economic necessity of collusion' of both the 
brigade cadres and the production team leaders in the first level of patron-client tie, and 
'discretionary power’ of the production team leaders over the peasants in the second 
level of patron-client tie, and thus a 'personalization of authority' attached within the 
whole rural hierarchy on the whole. Does she then mean that the structure determines 
the agents to violate its very functioning? On one occasion, Oi contends that the 
making use of brigade and team leaders by the state to act as patrons controlling 
resource distribution just reinforced traditional ties of peasants to their local leaders, 
thus partly undermining the effectiveness of its control ¢).105, p.231). But in another 
occasion, she sees that it is a mistake to conclude the Chinese communist state as 
unable to exert its rule, as the flexibility of the patronage could guarantee that, at the 
end of the day, the otherwise harsh policies to be carried out ¢).130). After all, when 
the state chose to apply its controls and where work teams were sent, the team was 
impressively effective (p.229). As Oi has not covered any detail analysis on the 
dynamics between the work teams and the villages^^^, her regarding the work teams as 
123 Oi mentions that Andrew Walder's piece of work (1986) “ ... has already shown the culture of 
dependence in the Chinese urban workplace ... “ (Oi, 1989, p.232, footnote 16). As the structural 
circumstances that create clientelism in China are characteristics of most other communist states in 
different periods and to different degrees, she hopes that her conclusions could be apply to other 
communist states for testing this kind of communist clientelism (p.233). 
124 Here, the work of Madsen (1984) that I am going to discuss in the next chapter will be of great 
contrast against this claim of Oi. 
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'impressively effective' could hardly be taken seriously^^^ But a basic quest is behind 
here, did the state intend to allow this kind of clientelism to exist, or that it was an 
unintentional consequence of the administrative structure where the statejust happened 
to get from it what she originally desired? The descriptions that Oi has provided 
throughout the book arejust insufficient to take side with either claims. For sure, it may 
not be wise enough to locate an answer at either poles, but the desire of making up the 
best ofall worlds does require ground support of some sort. 
This brings us to an even greater hesitation to the analysis. According to Oi, 
communist clientelism is interest-maximizing because collective agriculture has 
guaranteed provision of basic necessities, and so peasants do not need to pursue 
clientelist politics for subsistence safeguarding (p.l53). Now, she does mention that, 
because there is not always sufficient grain to ensure this level, this guarantee is a 
matter of right but not a matter of reality ^3.143, footnote 22; my emphases). But is 
this difference not fatal enough then? A culture of dependence derived from a risk-
aversive interest against one derived from an interest-maximizing concem is a matter 
of a ‘living or dead’ business against a 'getting ahead’ issue, and any handling of this 
difference in a low-profile manner would easily mean a major shortfall of the 
theoretical meaning. If we bring along the issue of 'boundary drawing' as has been 
mentioned when discussing the limitations of Parish and Whyte (1978)，where one 
125 In fact, when comparing with the research work of early years like that of Parish and Whyte 
(1978) and Shue (1980)，that of Oi (1989) - seven field trips to China between 1980 and 1988, with 
the longest being four months in 1986 and three months in 1988 (p.238) - is already working with 
much academic space. But as we shall see, the fact that Oi's analysis on the values and behaviors of 
the Chinese peasants is far less complicated than that touched by the ‘Chen Village Project' seems to 
be informing us that factors other than the availability of field spots and the timing of launching the 
research are counting. 
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stops sacrificing and starts calculating is the core theme that one should look beyond 
this kind ofclientelist strategy.^^^ Rather than exploring what is behind the phenomena 
of guami, renqing and menzi in the process of constructing clientelism between 
brigade cadres and team leaders as well as team leaders and peasants (Oi，1989, 
pp.128-29), Oi seems to be satisfied with calculative concepts like 'minimal winning 
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coalitions' in capturing the reasons why team leaders have to maintain a certain 
degree offaimess even though one may have some kind of favoritism (p.l44). As I am 
going to show in the analysis of the next chapter, the deep impact of kinship ties and 
familism on the behaviors and norms of the Chinese peasants have been buried under 
this acultural and afamilistic interest-maximizing construct. 
Complicity and Compliance - A Strong Reach of the State? 
‘‘I became quite certain that the state was an entity that the 
villagers I had come to know had to cope with, and not always 
successfully ... Villages might have retained their physical 
boundaries [after 1976], but the social meaning of their existence 
was being changed from within by the Maoist paradigm" (Siu, 
1989a, p.3,p.6) 
Comparing with the previous three studies, the ethnographic nature of Siu's work 
-the attention given to a same spot, Huancheng Commune of Xinhui County, over a 
time frame of ten years since 1977 ¢).294) - enables her to illustrate an image of 'the 
personal encounter of an insider，，an element that is lacking in the previous three 
126 On the shortfall of Oi in neglecting the cultural aspect of the peasants when analyzing clientelist 
strategy among them, more will be articulated in the section "The Story: Three Paradoxical 
Developments of Rural China" in Chapter Four; see particularly discussions around footnote 174 of 
page 118. 
127 Here, Oi (1989) sees that this concept may help to explain how the team leader is trying to 
manipulate the situation to that extent that one may keep enough support to maintain production but 
not so much that rewards are too diluted (p.l44, footnote 25). 
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128 studies. Her research focus is to assess the ability of the central government in 
making use ofideological and organization powers to penetrate into the rural society so 
as to exact compliance as well as invoke commitment (p.l). But the ten-years period of 
which her research falls into witnesses the passing of the country from a moment of 
political tension to economic liberalization. As a result, Siu points out that some 
scholars regard the re-emergence of some cultural practices in the pre-liberated rural 
China an indication of the unsuccessful state's attempt in trying to transform the rural 
1 00 
community since 1949. However, subsequent acquaintances of Siu with her 
informants over this period brings her to the understanding that the influence of the 
socialist state is hardly superficial ¢).3). Putting the issue more succinctly, once China 
steps into the stage of de-collectivization, whereas one may easily conclude the re-
emergence of pre-liberated rural practices as a strong indicator of the limits of the reach 
of the state, Siu casts doubts on such an analysis. Firstly, she would like to ask, has one 
ever thought of the existing of any alternative for peasants to act otherwisel^^^ This 
touches on the issue of the degree of autonomy, if not free will, of the rural people -
peasants and cadres alike - in front of the "all-encompassing" Maoist form of 
organization.i3i Secondly, as a consequence of the all-encompassing effect, should one 
128 Examples of this kind of sentimental description of relationship between the author and the 
informants can be found in quite some places; for instance, see Siu, 1989a, p.290, p.301. 
129 Siu (1989a) summarizes the evidences of such views into four aspects. Firstly, communal 
boundaries of villages remain intact; secondly, Chinese family as a social unit within the community 
was never destroyed; thirdly, rural cadres have often been compared with those of the traditional 
gentry; finally, individual entrepreneurship and traditional popular beliefs have come back once the 
ideological lid is lifted (pp.2-3). In the following few pages, I am going to assess how strong is Siu to 
make such a sweeping summary. 
130 In Siu's (1989a) own words, “ ... Could the peasants have resisted the reforms even if they had 
wished to?" (p.3). 
131 Simply put, this implies a situation of which the party-state is the single source of authority and 
legitimacy where power and resources are derived from. Putting this structure into the fully 
collectivized rural China since late 1950s onwards, be it a peasant or a rural cadre, who could afford 
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take the so-called ‘revival’ of pre-liberated cultural practices at face value? Here, the 
argument is that the process of state-making has transformed the rural societies to such 
an extent that Siu believes the re-emerging of past cultural tissues during the Dengist 
era are mere fragments of tradition reconstituted for coping with contemporary 
existence (p.l). hi the end, the issue is not one of how much has been retained, but 
instead how much has been transformed ¢).11). How strong is Siu's argument? 
Siu never denies that patronage and clientage among the cadres and peasants are 
132 
facts , but they should be understood as exercising within an overarching structure of 
dependence which, in the end, all were incorporated into the state system, and 
dominated by it (p.211; my emphasis). The complexity that Siu unfolds is captured 
here. To start with, just as hardly any person would believe that the Communists could 
establish their power without mass complicity, no one would be so naive to assume 
that the majority of peasants would welcome the revolution with enthusiasm ¢).116). 
After all, revolution could mean different things to different people: peasant support to 
land reform could mean desires for material goals as well as expression of proletarian 
class sentiment. But Siu disagrees with a common view of seeing rural society as 
somewhat successful in cellularizing itself against state penetration ¢).4). Her counter 
proposal is that, the continuous collectivization process within the first decade of 
to stand against the threat of 'expulsion from the collective' when there were few other ways of 
making a living? In this sense, the structure has created a sort of dependence with little freedom. 
132 Here, the continuation as well as advancement of this study with that of the previous two, that is, 
by Oi and Shue, is clearly shown. Siu openly claims that, “ ... for discussion of patron-client politics, 
see Oi (1985) and Shue (1985, 1988) ..." (Siu, 1989a，pp.335-6, note 19). As the work ofOi (1985) is 
quite a basis leading to her later book (Oi, 1989), and that the two pieces of Shue's work (1985,1988) 
are in fact - as sustained by the review by Bums on Shue's 1988 publication (Bums, 1989, p.l46) - an 
elaboration of her earlier idea (Shue, 1980) surrounding the thesis of ‘the reach of the state，，the 
arrangement of analysis hitherto becomes even more understandable. 
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Communist China not only led to the formation of new administrative units in an 
organizational manner^^^ but, more importantly, resulted in the step-by-step 
destruction of the traditional networks in land tenure, marketing, and kinship and 
religious organizations. As Siu contends, such expansion of control brings forward two 
consequences _ reduced flexibility of local structures and the creation of a stratum of 
activists to assist the party-state in managing rural society (p.l67). The first 
consequence brought the peasants more and more to an "all-encompassing" structure 
that eventually shnmk the world outside this structure to a minimum (p.6). At the 
forefront of this structure is the second consequence, the emerging of a stratum of rural 
cadres to implement state policies. Against this backdrop, the role of rural cadres 
becomes significant: were they to be political brokers^^^ that could collude with the 
villagers to resist the demands of the state, or to act as state agents to conform to the 
policies of their superiors? 
Siu wants to pinpoint that these middle-men slowly monopolized the means to 
distribute material needs, thus increasingly determined the livelihood and fate of the 
peasants. Yet, the all-encompassing nature of the Maoist structure did not leave them 
unattended, as the party-state had also become the sole and unchallenged source of 
133 This new structure implies the tuming of the original cun (village), xiang (township) and qu 
(rural county) hierarchy into shengchan xiaodui (teams), shengchan dadui (brigades) and gongshe 
(communes). 
134 In discussing the socio-economic as well as socio-political dynamics of the pre-revolutionary era 
of the Huancheng area, Siu (1989a) wants to show that the local gentry around the time of the fall of 
Qing was able to act as a political broker between the state and the peasants. This was because both 
the gentry and the state needed each other's recognition to maintain their legitimacy in the local 
community and the mandate of heaven. This mutual interdependence thus resulted in certain 
bargaining power of the gentry in front of the state; for this discussion, see Chapter 4, in particular the 
section 'A Regional Nexus of Power，(pp.85-87). But Siu shortly points out that the rural cadres in 
post-revolutionary China could hardly find themselves in such a situation; see the sequential footnote. 
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authority. The cadres were held in a web of political obligations and benefits, which 
made them powerful in village matters but also vulnerable to the demands of party 
superiors. Eventually, the only way to sustain their own position was demonstrating 
signs of loyalty to the party (p.9)P^ This observation immediately deepens the analysis 
of Siu in capturing the patron-client relationship between the rural cadres and peasants. 
When one is seeing that the two parties are interdependent of one another, Siu contends 
that the ability of the former in granting political and economic favors to the latter 
depends largely on how solid the former could link up with the party organization first. 
Or to say, the power of the rural cadres over fellow villagers rests ironically on their 
own political dependence on the state authority (ibid), ]n the end, both cadres and 
peasants were the losers in the battle of fighting for room to maneuver: the reduction in 
alternative channels of mobility due to increasing confinement to collectivized units 
made peasant livelihood more dependent on cadre performance, whereas the cadres 
themselves were increasingly dependent on the party organization which had 
established an ideological monopoly by the late 1950s ¢).169, p.l88). 
To show how the situation of the peasants and rural cadres was at the mercy of the 
state, Siu leads her readers to revisit some historical events. Siu believes that, albeit the 
existence of ideological utopianism, structural reasons were not of lesser importance to 
understand why unrealistic policies were pushed to such extremes during the Great 
135 It is also here that Siu separates herself from views of some China scholars, in particular 
Schurmann (1968) and Shue (1985) in equating rural cadres with the traditional gentry. Unlike the 
rural cadres of post-1949 China who were tied to a single political source of legitimacy, those 
belonging to the gentry class of the late Qing period had their power laid in multiple, overlapping 
sources of authority such as kinship, community, popular religion and literati networks; see Siu, 
1989a, p.l95,p.294. 
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Leap Forward in 1958. Here, one could see how the process of structuring works^^^ -
peasants might have different reasons to motivate them to participate in collectivization, 
but their actions changed their situation as well as that of their communities which 
ended up in the power of a consolidated bureaucracy over its rural cadres and the 
power ofthe cadres over the peasants ¢).188). If the peasants suffered more directly 
during the Leap, the Siqing Movement between 1962-64 treated the rural cadres quite 
fairly in return. As Siu points out, the Movement revealed to them a clear message: the 
influence they had built up over years could be destroyed so easily by the same 
organization that had given it to them in the first place ^)p.202-03). The vulnerability 
of the cadres and the peasants was even more drastic during the chaotic decade of the 
Cultural Revolution. Because of the all-encompassing organizational structure, hardly 
anybody could escape from the impact of the political whirlpool of fractional struggle 
among senior superiors. In order to ensure one's livelihood being minimally disturbed, 
the best that the peasants could do was to take sides with whoever best served their 
economic interests and moral expectation (p.210). As for the cadres, the politics 
engaged by the cadres became more subjective and volatile - it was no longer one party 
line that one could follow, but the complying with their immediate or reachable 
patron(s)' ideological position that their own privileged positions could be mostly 
saved (p242). In the end, the life of everyone was politicized ¢).210). Then, all of a 
sudden, the party apparatus announced that China had closed the chapter of struggle 
136 Siu (1989a) brings out this idea in her introductory chapter, where she defines a 'structuring 
process' in social theory illustrates the paradox of how human agents are social products when the 
society is at the same time a product of human agents (p.l2). Yet, instead of giving a deeper analysis 
of how this sophisticated concept can be used as lights shed upon her study, she only mentions the 
names of a few sociologists - Abrams, Giddens and Bourdieu alike - that have been renowned of 
dealing with this idea (p.306, note 19), and gives no clear articulation of how this theoretical 
framework could be reflected in the rural context. I hope that the descriptions that I am now providing 
may help the reader to come closer to this understanding. 
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and started the new page of modernization. Sweeping rural reforms followed suit, and 
cadres and old peasants felt betrayed by the party they had served in the past decades 
(p.276). Siu cynically argues that, if one would appreciate the speed and determination 
ofreforms by the tum of the 1970s, is this just a demonstration of the usual imbalance 
of power between the rural society and the party state (p.3)? 
What is more, state intrusion has become the final gatekeeper of events for such a 
long period that even though the social cells of traditional society - in the form of 
popular beliefs, rituals and family enterprises - could re-emerge after China has entered 
into the post-Mao period, the social tissues - cultural understanding behind the 
practices - are never the same again. This is not only an issue of the ignorance of the 
younger generation in knowing the meaning of the rituals they participate in Q).289). It 
is something more - the practitioners are well aware of the fact that their acts are 
subject to any discretionary intervention of the state ¢).11). The deity as a supernatural 
power to exist for worship thus ironically rests on the granting to do so from a secular 
power base. In the end, the shrine talk of the 1980s was one of such: it would be all the 
better if the spirits bestow grace on them, but there was nothing to lose if not so, as one 
1 o^ 
could count on nothing these days ¢).289). State power has been internalized , and 
will always play a role in newly created cellular structures, and thus resulting in Siu's 
claim that popular rituals today reminds us “ ... not so much of what has been retained, 
but of how much rural society has been transformed ... ” ¢).11). This also help one to 
understand why, when Siu first went to China with Marxist hopes, she left there with 
137 In another piece of work, Siu (1989b) is even more explicit on this stand. She concludes that the 
life-cycle rituals have changed in both their content and meaning, revealing the extent to which “ ... the 
power of the socialist state has long been internalized ... “ (p.l34). 
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Max Weber's worst fears (p.xxii). 
How are we going to assess Siu's work? As mentioned above, Siu disagrees with 
the claim that the reach of the state as superficial. Here, we have to understand that a 
crucial point is whether the Chinese family as a social unit and familism as a living 
culture within the community has greatly reduced in its influential power, if not fully 
replaced by the collective identity (p.2). In light of this, it is reasonable to come across 
a different view from Siu on this aspect. Yet, Siu mentions that her data cannot treat 
family dynamics in any depthP^ If so, how can she be so confident in rounding offher 
views based on the impact of the all-encompassing effect? As I have pointed out earlier 
in the review on Parish and White (1978), how to draw the boundary of concem is an 
issue of crucial importance. More precisely, the boundary of kin is significant, as 
Chinese familism is never taking sense of family unit in a too micro sense”； i believe 
that one must be very careful to consider whether one is tackling a kin-relationship or a 
patron-client relationship when one wants to depict the dynamics among the people 
concerned. 
But let us take a step backward and look more in-depth into the evidence of Siu. 
After all, Siu illustrates in great pain that the so called revival of ritual activities in rural 
China only maintain in outlook; in essence, the cultural understanding by the people is 
138 In the discussion of function of families in rural China, Siu (1989a) is recorded to have said,“... 
I feel that family dynamics is an extremely important area of analysis for understanding cultural 
continuity and change during China's decades of social and political engineering. However, ... I 
cannot treat this level of analysis in any depth ... “ (p.304, note 4). 
139 In the forth-coming chapter, I will show how a demand of sensitivity to a broader definition of 
in-groups (zijia ren) is a core concem of the villagers. 
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no longer the same, as there is always the shadow of state intervention behind the ritual 
activities. Here, she is saying that there is a fundamental change in the world view of 
the peasants, as they know pretty well that the supernatural power of the deity is at the 
mercy of secular approval from the state. Precisely so, this is her argument of the 
success of the all-encompassing effect of the state on rural China. But I maintain that 
one should be cautious here. It seems that the presence and approval of party cadres in 
the rural level are prerequisites for ritual behaviors to take place openly, but it does not 
necessarily mean that the state has the upper hand. If one says that this is an evidence of 
the all-encompassing impact, one may also argue that this is a sign of showing how the 
state wants to maintain a gesture of still commanding the situation whereas in reality 
she is not so sure of its reach. After all, the cadres themselves have overlapping identity: 
serving the state and the lineage that they belong to. At once, we are brought to the 
realization of the complexity of the cultural meaning of Chinese familism. When one is 
talking about whether there is a revival of Chinese culture, one is not only talking about 
ritual activities and the shrine talks alone. The concem on the development of the 
lineage, the existence of the patriarchal influence over daily activities, and the 
boundary drawing of who belongs to the in-group (ziJia ren), are but different aspects 
of Chinese culture. This awareness at once brings us back to a theoretical concem of 
Siu. At the end of her study, she tries to rethink the approaches of Chinese 
anthropology in light of her findings. Regarding Skinner's regional analysis (1964, 
1965), Freedman's lineage paradigm (1958, 1966) and Wolfs studies in religion and 
rituals (1974) as "the major paradigms in Chinese anthropology" (Siu, 1989a, p.295), 
Siu tries to argue that one must combine the three approaches before the analytical 
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connections between the political economy and cultural change can be seen (p.300).^^^ 
Here, I wonder whether it is legitimate to ask why the two analyses ofFei and Hsu^^ ^ 
that have been mentioned in the first chapter can be totally neglected here when Siu is 
talking about a rethinking exercise of Chinese anthropology. Are they not the sort of 
approaches in the eyes of Siu? As I am going to illustrate later, the contributions ofFei 
and Hsu in understanding the values and behaviors of Chinese in general, and rural 
Chinese is particular, are still very significant even after almost half a century from the 
time their concepts were firstly mentioned. 
By now, a critical summary has to be provided. Running down from Parish and 
Whyte (1978) to Siu (1989a), a main thesis of these studies is surrounding on the 
exploration of the autonomy of the peasants to live a preferred life as against the drastic 
political change. Parish and Whyte (1978) outline a picture of which the state intrusion 
in rural China had to gain the consensus of the peasants as time elapsed; Shue (1980) 
argues that the state did have the awareness of the importance of coinciding, and the 
ability to coincide, with the peasants' rational concem in the early period; Oi (1989) 
maintains the existence of a 'culture of dependence' highlighted by a profit-
maximizing patron-client relationship in rural China is a by-product of communist 
system; Siu (1989a), however, argues that the state intrusion is all-encompassing and 
14° Regarding to the defects of Skinner, Siu (1989a) maintains that besides the logic of market 
exchange, one also needs to examine specific social institutions and cultural phenomena that embody 
relationships of dominance and subordination of a place (p.296). Moving to the limitations of 
Freedman, Siu believes that kin, class, community and state are all interwoven in the lineage 
organization that one should never concem the patrilineal descent alone as the most important social 
institution (p.299). As for the drawbacks of Wolf, the study of popular rituals and beliefs will be an 
incomplete effort if one does not ground these behaviors in the histories of the local communities and 
see who is entitled to compete for it and how they convey their claim (pp.299-300). 
141 Here, I am talking about the theme of 'the differential mode of association' by Fei (1947) and 
‘father-son identification' by Hsu (1971[1948]) respectively. 
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that the social meaning of the peasants have been changed from within. No matter the 
peasants alike, and thus including rural cadres, are at the upper hand or being regarded 
as victims, they are understood as self-interested rational thinking people that could put 
themselves in a give-and-take calculation. This message is particularly strong in the 
case of Shue and Oi. But as I have pleaded throughout this chapter, the arguments seem 
to be weighting on the political economy of the new China and neglecting the interplay 
between the culture and polity under the new regime. If Parish and Whyte are much 
limited by the contextual setting of the time, Oi and Siu are being situated in a much 
more advantageous position. But Oi, quite in line with Shue, is concentrating on the 
'operational code，of the peasants as if they only have a calculative mentality ofhow to 
get the best of the worlds; Siu does bring out the sophisticated issue of compliance and 
commitment, but she has surrendered in the end that the peasants are victims of the 
structure. I intend to argue that the case studies thus far have, firstly, reflected how 
some scholars have adopted the two paradigms on peasant behavior - the moral 
economy and the political economy approach - as something universal for 
understanding peasants, and so in assessing the Chinese peasants, they try to locate the 
Chinese counterparts in this explanatory framework. Secondly, in general, they cannot 
go deep enough to articulate the cultural complexity of the Chinese peasants, and that 
how this complexity live itself out even during the Communist reign such that an 
understanding of post-1949 rural China could be articulated in a much better scenario. 
hi the remaining part of this chapter, I am going to deal with the first question, and 
leave the second one to be answered in the penultimate chapter. 
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Rational Choice Approach - A Theory ofUniversal Application? 
As noted in the above discussion, there is an implicit as well as explicit intention 
of the mentioned scholars in giving credit to the idea of 'rational peasant' as an 
explanation of Chinese peasant behaviors. At once, there is a concem here of whether 
the term itself is far from a controversial concept in social science. Anyone who is not 
alien with peasant studies should know that the idea, as represented by the term 
'political economy approach', is an alternative view on peasants behavior set against 
the ‘moral economy approach' (Popkin, 1979, p.l). As mentioned in Chapter One, the 
debate has its roots in a long-standing disagreement between 'substantivists' and 
'formalists' involved in the studies of peasant societies and agrarian relations.^^^ But 
the complexity here is that, after a decade of heated debate on these two approaches as 
generated by the study of Scott (1976) and Popkin (1979), there is a strong intention, 
chiefly represented by Little (Little, 1989, 1991), to argue that both approaches could 
be well-anchored into the 'rational-choice model' for explaining peasant values and 
behaviors, with no exception of the Chinese case. The stress on the stand of Little is 
important here, because he maintains that “ ... the notion of goal-directed rationality is 
not an ethnocentric concept, and that the rational-choice approach can be legitimately 
applied to non-Westem cultures" (Little, 1991, p.36; own emphasis). How sound is this 
argument? And what is the meaning of this argument on the ethnocentric issue that we 
have been discussing above? A brief background on the debate may facilitate a critical 
reflection here.^ 
142 See footnote 37 ofpage 19. 
143 I must maintain here the outlining of the two approaches has to be very brief, as my intention is 
to show whether these two approaches, and even the 'rational-choice paradigm' as agitated by Little, 
can shed lights on understanding the values and behaviors of the Chinese peasants. For more in-depth 
discussion on the theoretical concem of the two approaches, please refer to the Chapter One of Popkin 
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As Keyes (1983) succinctly puts, the impact of the integration of peasant villages 
in the third world countries into a global economy organized according to a market 
principle on rural peasants have been a focus of attention by social scientists (p.753). 
Both Scott and Popkin make use of peasant involvement in rebellions in Vietnam in 
the 1930s to outline their understanding on peasant activities (Scott, p.3; Popkin, p.), 
but they have their own empirical story to tell (Little, 1989, p.29). Briefly put, the 
moral economy approach argues that, due to the lived experience of the peasants living 
so close to the margin, a fundamental value in a peasant society is the 'subsistence 
ethic, (Scott, p.2). What is treasured under this mentality is a ‘safety-first, principle, 
which means a preference of the cultivator to minimize the probability of having a 
disaster rather than maximizing one's average return ¢).18). The patron-client 
relationship embedded in this type of social context is bounded by two moral principles, 
‘right to subsistence' of the poor peasants and ‘norm of reciprocity' of the poor towards 
the rich landlords that have helped them (p.l67). The norm is one in which the respect 
of the peasants for their elite and the payments made to those elite are supposed to be 
balanced by a return flow ofjustice, protection, and subsistence insurance.^^^ ki the end, 
what is created and maintained is a conservative village egalitarianism: not that all 
should be equal, but that all should have a place and a living ¢).40; my emphases). 
Thus, the village becomes a collectivity that operates to assure a 'minimum income, to 
(1979), Chapter Two of Little (1989), and the papers published in Joumal of Asian Studies (Vol.42, 
No.4, August 1983) after the holding of the symposium titled "Peasant Strategies in Asian Societies: 
Moral and Rational Economic Approaches" by thejoumal. 
144 In Scott's (1976) words, “ ... a general rule [on] the patron is expected [one] to protect his client 
and provide for his material needs whereas the client reciprocates with his labor and his loyalty" 
(p.l69). 
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its inhabitants (ibid, p.5). But the incorporation of Asian societies into a Westem-
dominated global economy and the development of centralized bureaucratic states led 
to a radical transformation of the worlds of most Asian peasants to such an extent that, 
eventually, the communal morality of the village was destroyed, thus explaining the 
inevitability of peasant rebellions ^).7). 
Popkin (1979)，however, would like to ask: how are norms derived? What 
determines the ‘subsistence level'? How are village resources allocated? And how are 
needs ranked ¢).16)? It is against this backdrop that he sees the usefulness of the 
'political economy approach’，which views the peasant as a rational problem-solving 
person, with a sense both of one's own interests and of the need to bargain with others 
to achieve mutually acceptable outcomes ^>.ix). Simply put, as individual is a ‘rational 
actor,, given the situations in which one finds oneself, one will calculate how to 
maintain, if not to improve, one's well being. By rationality he means that “ ... 
individuals evaluate the possible outcomes associated with their choices in accordance 
with their preferences and values ... ,, ¢).31). In this sense, the emphasis is on 
individual decision making and strategic interaction ¢).30). Popkin believes that 
problems of collective action are central to peasant life, and according to the data 
obtained from his case studies, he concludes that any attempt to organize for group 
action must recognize the distinction between individual and group, and that effective 
leadership and sufficient incentives must be provided to overcome individual resistance 
-such as ‘free-riders problem’^ - to collective action ¢).252). All in all, relationships 
145 By ‘free riders problem', this means a situation of which individuals involved would not 
contribute to the provision of goods because they believe they will receive the gain or security even if 
they do not participate (Popkin, 1979, p.25). 
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with other peoples are not predicated on some general moral principles, let alone the 
‘romantic，notion of ‘communal man’ as Scott maintains, but on the calculation of 
whether such relationships will benefit the peasant and one's family. 
In his two attempts in dealing with the debate, Little tries to demonstrate that the 
two theories are complementary rather than contradictory.^^^ In his 1989 discussion, 
Little (1989) contends that whereas Popkin assumes individual motivation and action is 
marked by a narrow calculus of cost and benefit, Scott sees individual acts are bounded 
by cultural values to offset pure self-interest. In this sense, Scott is providing a general 
picture, and Popkin is an effort to specify one component of the full theory of the 
former's account (p.66). On the other hand, Scott's account depends, in the very end, a 
theory of individual motivation to allow social perceptions and values to transform into 
individual and collective behavior, and a theory of organizational behavior to facilitate 
the process of politics through which individual behavior is aggregated or dissipated 
into collective action. On these two aspects Popkin shows his contribution - the former 
by providing a narrow conception of rationality, the latter by collective organizational 
action ¢).67). But in a sense, as maintained by him later, this is a ‘narrow economic 
rationality' (Little, 1991, p.39). Albeit the advantage in its explanatory parsimony and 
power, ‘narrow economic rationality' is itself a ‘thin’ theory ofhuman action because it 
146 Here, one has to know that this is not a new idea as generated by Little. In the symposium as 
mentioned in footnote 143 of page 95 above, Brochex (1983) and Feeny (1983) have raised out 
similar arguments. Briefly put, Feeny stresses that the principles that Scott has emphasized, ‘safety 
first’ and 'reciprocity' alike, could well be understood by assumptions of the 'rational peasant' 
approach: the adoption of such principles are rational economic decisions of the peasants. In this 
sense, Feeny is maintaining there is an a priori level regarding human motivation toward action, a 
point raised out by Little that we will shortly come to. Brochex, on the other hand, argues in his article 
that both approaches must be used in conjunction with each other to produce an analysis that conforms 
with the historical context ofVietnam, as the political economy meshed with rather than overriding the 
moral economy there. 
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relies on a simple mode of reasoning - utility maximization - to explain human 
behavior (p.36). Easily then，substantivists would accuse it of neglecting the powerful 
influence of norms and values in social action, and interpretive social scientists would 
blame it for overlooking the notion of means-end rationality may be culturally specific 
in itself. 
Against this allegation, Little maintains that a less confining specification of 
rationality, what he terms as ‘b roadened practical rationality’"?, will tum the ‘rational 
choice approach'i48 into a 'thick' theory that can serve area studies better, and thus 
overcome less confining specification of rationality ¢).38). Little does not agree that the 
character of the individual's interests and beliefs can only be known with detailed 
ethnographic information, as he sees that there is always a core set ofhuman goals and 
beliefs, what he terms as ‘welfare,, that are not culturally specific, but species-specific 
¢).41; own emphases).i49 Even so, does ‘welfare, in itself, for instance, is working 
under certain normative frameworks where powerful traditional constraints are set 
against individual preferences (pA3)7 This shows the necessity, Little continues, to 
have a conception of rational action which permits the decision-maker to take account 
of commitments (pA4; own emphasis)/^^ But more fundamentally, is the claim that the 
147 By this 'broadened practical rationality', Little means agents are assumed to have a set of goals 
toward which their actions are oriented, a set of beliefs about the particular social and natural 
environment in which they find themselves, and a set of norms that play a role in deliberation about 
action; see Little, 1991, p.38. 
148 'Rational choice approach' is defined as an attempt to explain social outcomes as the aggregate 
result of large numbers of individuals acting on the basis of rational calculations (Little, 1991，p39). 
149 By ‘welfare,, Little (1991) refers to the individual's means of satisfying basic subsistence and 
consumption needs such as food, clothing, shelter and the like, and the conditions of security that 
permit one to rely on one's ability to continue to satisfy those needs (p.41). 
15° Here, Little (1991) admits that this is not a small problem for his concept of 'broadened 
practical rationality，to add into elements of moral constraints and commitments on top of goal-
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model of behavior driven by calculation of self-interest is itself a culturally specific 
mode ofbehavior that could be present in some cultures and absent in others ^).45)? If 
this is so, this would mean that individual rationality is a cultural construct. And 
without this awareness, the constructing of a rational choice analysis, with an attempt 
to apply it universally, is unavoidably an ethnocentric practice. Little sees that this 
challenge, associated chiefly with the paradigm of interpretive social s c i e n c e ^ , is 
throwing the whole means-end model of agency into doubt altogether. But Little insists 
that there are good theoretical grounds for supposing that instrumental rationality is a 
common human mode ofbehavior, and that there is enough prima facie support for the 
assumption of rationality across cultures to make this a viable research program 
0 .^47).152 
What is the fuss of showing this difficult 'give-and-take' process of Little in 
defending the rational choice approach? Here, we come across a basic concem on this 
kind of paradigmatic model. As Keyes (1983) contends, even though theories such as 
directed calculation, because the original ‘narrow economic rationality' is worth for its parsimony by 
reducing rational choice to a single dimension of deliberation - utility maximization (p.45). Yet, I 
maintain this is where the dilemma of Little lies: how the broadening of the concept of individual 
rationality will hamper the convenience given to the conception of individual rationality due to its 
parsimony. This sees the difficulty that Little drives himself into in order to insist on the possibility of 
universal application of the rational choice model. 
151 According to Little (1991), interpretive social science emphasizes on the importance of the 
cultural context and state of mind of the agent as keys to understand, explain or predict pattems of 
human behavior. In light of this, one should know that means-end rationality is at most only one 
possible model of human action which may constitute an interpretive framework within which to 
understand the agent's action (p.46). 
152 I want to make a cautious remark here. Little is trying to argue that means-end model is not a 
problem because there are good theoretical support and case studies to believe that it is a common 
human mode of behavior. In this way, this may be a tautological argument. For instance, what is the 
purpose of saying that rational choice approach is universally applicable because ‘free-rider problem' 
is detected everywhere when one is just casting doubt on the universality of the 'free-rider problem' in 
itself, or speaking of different meanings of'free-rider' in different cultures? 
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those of Scott and Popkin can shape significant questions, answers to those questions 
must take into account not only the objective conditions that constrain social action, let 
alone the historically situated ‘social space’ within which action actually occurs (p.754). 
Could one act in an instrumentally rational way with reference to moral premises, or 
vice versa (p.755; my emphases)? Rural peoples may be found to possess 
characteristics that permit us to use common explanations to understand some of their 
social actions, but one should be aware of the fact that they also live within particular 
social worlds with reference to particular cultural notions that bring their past into the 
present. To avoid positivistic reductionism or historical particularism, one, Keyes 
maintains, should employ an approach that is dialectical Qp.754). Of course, we have 
seen that Little (1991) is much more ambitious, but such an ambition also drives him to 
a point that he has to make himself vague in order to answer the accusation of 
ethnocentrism.i53 
Against this brief capturing of the 'rational choice approach', I think it is more 
meaningful for us to come back to assess the ground of the researchers we have 
discussed in this chapter in claiming that the rural Chinese are 'rational peasants'. I 
maintain that there is just not enough deep concerns before labeling the Chinese 
counterparts as such, and this is reflecting how some westem paradigmatic concerns 
have been adopted with little clarification on non-westem culture. My concem is, if the 
153 In the concluding remarks of his discussion, Little (1991) claims that “ ... there are some 
research topics that require the sort of hermeneutic, culturally specific investigation ... but there are 
many others that do not require this level of detail ... ”，and that, one should know “ ... the rational 
choice approach [is] a single perspective among several, ... not exhaustive. There are some research 
tasks for which this approach is well-suited, and others for which it is not. Formalism, substantivism, 
and interpretive social science are complementary approaches to social explanation ... [are] alternative 
perspectives ... pertinent to particular research questions" (p.49). Having said so, is he still claiming 
that 'rational choice approach', or even his 'broadened practical rationality', as universally applicable? 
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intellectual pursuit is one of trying to capture the socio-cultural life of rural Chinese 
under New China, and yet the researchers lack the sensitivity in articulating the 
meaning behind an action, will this not affect an arrest of the genuine dynamics 
between the state and the people as well as among the people themselves? One may 
argue that this was a matter of timing of research - the further away the conducting of 
the research activity took place from the reopening of China, and thus the accumulation 
of more on-the-spot insights from field study, the better would be the grasp. So, we 
should give more excuse to the limitations ofParish and Whyte (1978) as well as Shue 
(1980); and later studies such as that ofOi (1989) and Siu (1989) have already shown a 
great leap in their collection of data and depth of analysis.^ ^^ 
But this is exactly what I want to rebut in the subsequent chapter. I want to use 
two illustrations, the research on Chen Village and the study by Potter and Potter^^ ,^ to 
show how they have been more able in seizing the dynamics of the Chinese peasants of 
the period even the research activities were conducted in mid 1970s onwards and 
subsequent analyses published around mid and late 1980s. That they could do so, I 
154 In fact, this line of thoughts can be easily seen as a general comment given by American 
reviewers when they try to trace the development of China studies in America. For instance, 
Shambaugh (1993) describes that there was a growth and maturation of the field of China study 
between the 1970s and the 1980s (p.4); Harding (1993) maintains that American China watchers can 
justifiably celebrate what has been gained from the evolution of Chinese studies over the last thirty 
years (p.32); Gold (1993) concludes that access to China since 1979 has improved the American 
China watchers' knowledge of and ability to study Chinese society (p.56). I understand that these 
kinds of comments are used for an overall description, but they should show signs of caution when 
their writings are involving in an assessment of China studies, and that ethnocentrism has been such a 
concem in the field in the last two decades. This is where I am quite disappointed with. 
155 The two cases used are, firstly, the research project concerning the Chen Village, with major 
references to the work of Chan, Madsen and Unger (1992[1984]) and Madsen endeavor (1984); and 
secondly, the analysis of Potter and Potter (1990). For more information about the Chen Village 
project, refer to footnote 158 of page 105 of the next chapter; for the caution in treating the 
publication date of the study of Potter and Potter, refer to the clarification in footnote 40 of page 22 
above. 
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insist, was because of their consideration given to the cultural context of the research 
population. I maintain that the two upcoming cases have shown their concem to the 
following quests: what is being considered as important for a people? What do they 
bother and prefer? And how should such consideration be pursued? After all, the 
posting of these questions is itself reflecting a research attitude or orientation of the 
researchers in trying to minimize lots of predisposed ‘what, and 'how' assumptions on 
the values of the studied target. Li fact, this argument of mine is trying to provide an 
answer of the second question that I have raised out at the end of the previous section 
of this chapter: the way to articulate the cultural complexity of the Chinese peasants. 
The justification is also going to provide an answer of why I am arguing against those 
delegation reports in the first chapter. I believe that the attention given to the 
importance of research methodology, timing, as well as the availability or not of doing 
on-the-spot field research as keys to successful studies at the cost of overlooking the 
significance of deep understanding about the studied peasants may result in partial, if 
not total, misconception of understanding the rural Chinese. 
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Chapter Four 
Making Sense of the Lived Experience 
"What is a good society? What is a good person? ... Ordinary 
peasants in China - even illiterate ones - ask such questions and 
sometimes argue and fight about them passionately ... ” (Madsen, 
1984, p.l) 
“ ...anthropological understanding is based on the development of 
empathy with what is initially perceived as alien, rather than on 
taking an ethnocentric or adversarial position. The task is to 
understand the people [there] in their own terms，insofar as 
possible, and then to make those terms intelligible to outsiders ... ” 
(Potter and Potter, 1990, p.xiii) 
“ ...It is hard to believe that an ethnography such as Chen Village 
(1984) was written without any of the authors actually ever setting 
foot in their fieldsite ... Potter and Potter (1990) is the sort of solid 
comprehensive ethnography we ... have not had from mainland 
China since well before 1949 ... ” (Gold, 1993, pp.50-51). 
As a matter of fact, the restrictions of doing field research in China were not 
released until October 1978, when China and the United States announced an 
agreement to initiate substantive and long-term scholarly exchange (Thurston and 
Pastemak, 1983, p.3)/^^ Simply put, throughout the whole decade of 1970, if 
156 As a piece of reminder, the opening of scholarly exchange in 1978 soon faced a temporary 
'moratorium' by Chinese against foreign researchers in 1981 (Thurston and Pastemak, 1983, pp.7-9; 
Gold, 1993, p.47) after the incident of Mosher affair. Due to the controversy over the fleldwork 
practices of Steven Mosher in a Guangdong village between 1979-80, the Chinese officials announced 
a halt of all research activities for a period. The subsequent expulsion of Mosher by the Stanford 
University had led to a fierce debate within the American academic circle on the interference of 
professional activities by non-professional considerations, and this is what Madsen (1987) has been 
discussing about one of the strands of Sino-American scholarly exchange - the institutional strand 
(p.l92). In a sense, this is echoing with our discussion in Chapter Two concerning the politics and 
psychology of some China watchers upon facing the re-opening of China. A further elaboration of 
Madsen's articulation will be discussed in the final chapter. For an extensive discussion on the case of 
Mosher, see Pieke, 1986-87; for further information, one can also refer to the list of articles provided 
by Madsen, 1987，p.211, note 6. 
104 
American China watchers wanted to get a more direct impression of the social context 
ofthe research field, interviewing of emigres departing from China, legally or illegally, 
was an understandable and more and more treasurable methodological attempt.^^^ This 
characteristic was fully reflected in the work ofParish and Whyte (1978), Shue (1980), 
and one of the upcoming case studies, the 'Chen Village Project' s e r i e s . " 8 On the other 
hand, the work of Oi (1989), Siu (1989a), and another upcoming case study, Potter and 
Potter (1990), have highlighted the entering of the China study into another stage - the 
possibility of on-the-spot research. But as what I am going to stress below, what do 
count should not be so much of the research setting or research methodology per se. 
Listead, the research question of the researchers, and the extent to which the theoretical 
framework can take note of ethnocentric attitude, are far more important conditions for 
an empathetic understanding of the study target. After all, to construct the social history 
of a place, the sensitivity of the researchers is almost a basic prerequisite. The 
sensitivity here is far more than picking out bits and pieces of the information collected 
to produce a full picture, but also to understand why this portrait rather than another 
representation is a more comfortable explanation. The knowing of the changing fabric 
of the structure and the cultural orientation of the actors would definitely help clarify 
the above task. Here, a psychological preparation of, and the ability to, going into the 
living experience of the studied target are equally important. The shrewdness of 
157 For the recognition of this kind of research methodology - studying China from a distance - see 
for example Thurston and Pastemak, 1983，p. 11 ； for a description of such a research methodology, see 
Parish and Whyte, 1978, Appendix I; for an elaboration of the advantage and importance of this 
research methodology, see Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1992, pp.2-9; Walder, 1986, Appendix A. 
158 The 'Chen Village Project' is a combination of eight pieces of publications by the three 
involved researchers between 1982 to 1985. The publications are, namely, Chan, 1985; Chan and 
Unger, 1982; Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1984; Madsen, 1981; Madsen, 1983; Madsen, 1984; Unger, 
1984; and Unger, 1985 respectively. In 1992, the three authors published an expanded edition of the 
1984 version for the sake of adding a section to examine “ ... how the village fared under Deng [after 
1978]” (Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1992, p.l). 
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upholding a basic concem of both the people and the structure there, and a close 
follow-up ofthe changing circumstances influenced by and in tum also influencing that 
particular concem, will definitely help bringing the study into a multi-dimensional and 
worthwhile analysis. Yet, I have illustrated in the last chapter how the four case studies 
have experienced limitations of various kinds in articulating the state-peasant as well as 
relationship among peasants themselves. In this chapter, I am going to show how the 
awareness of some American China watchers could result in a much genuine capturing 
of the Chinese peasants of the time.^ ^^ I want to argue that their capability of doing so 
is mainly due to their higher degree of empathetic understanding given to the Chinese 
culture, and their illustrations can also reflect the constraints of using the ‘political 
economy' model to explain the values and behaviors of the Chinese peasants. 
The Story: Three Paradoxical Developments of Rural China 
Simply put, although the authors of the ‘Chen Village Project' are putting 
different emphases on different aspects of research topic in their papers^^ ,^ the basic 
159 Of these two cases, I will base more on the Chen Village Project as the skeleton of discussion. 
And I will use the rich ideas from Potter and Potter (1990) to support andAw further elaborate the 
articulation of the Chen Village Project. As a matter of fact, the book reviews surrounding the books 
of the Chen Village Project and Potter and Potter are plentiful. On Madsen (1984), we have Friedman 
(1989); on Chan, Madsen and Unger (1984), we have Diamond (1985), Mark (1985), Palmer (1988); 
on Chan, Madsen and Unger (1992)，we have Croll (1993)，Huang (1993), Pickowicz (1994); on 
Potter and Potter (1990), we have Croll (1991), Kipnis (1992), White (1993) and Woon (1993) 
respectively. For sure, the list is never bound to be exclusive, but it does demonstrate the concem 
given to these studies. 
160 For instance, Madsen's article in 1983 emphasizes the role played by the peasant youth in rural 
Chinese politics (Madsen, 1983, p.244). Chan's study in 1985 is to examine how and why some of 
China's sent-down urban youth became fervent political activists on the one hand, and yet divided into 
rival factions that battled each other in defense of the same person - Chairman Mao - on the other 
(Chan, 1985, p.l). As for Unger's two pieces of work in 1984 and 1985, his interest is to examine the 
formation and shifts in attitudes among the Chinese peasants toward a wide variety of remuneration 
schemes being tried out in rural China during the 1960s and 1970s on the one hand (Unger, 1985, 
p.ll7), and the political functions served by ‘class label', which could strongly influenced the life 
chances of the rural Chinese from the 1950s to the mid 1970s on the other (Unger, 1984，p.l21). But 
for the sake of focusing on the normative aspect of the peasants, not all the involved publications of 
the 'Chen Village Project' will be used in the same weight. Emphases will be given to Madsen's 
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research data is derived from the focus of “ ... how nationwide political movements 
have been generating impacts on a rural community" (Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1992, 
p.l).i6i From the outlook, this is quite a typical research project in trying to capture the 
social history of a particular China village (Madsen, 1981, p.l55); but its uniqueness 
comes from the ability of the researchers in going deep enough to tease out the 
relationship between moral discourse^^^, social predicament^^^, and the development of 
moral character among grass-root Chinese peasants in rural China. This competence, I 
would argue, is not solely due to the background of the informants^^^ in allowing the 
authors to construct a longitudinal time frame to capture the dynamos of social, 
political and economic change of the community (Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1992, p.2). 
Listead, the awareness as well as the ability of the authors themselves in bringing out 
the deep feels of the peasants from the perspective of the latter is equally important. I 
maintain that their comparative success, as against the previous discussed cases, in 
capturing the relationship between the peasants and the states as well as among peasant 
themselves is due to their vivid capturing of what I am going to coin as three 
(1984) work and the expanded edition (Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1992) of the original 1984 version 
(Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1984). 
161 The nationwide political movements under descriptions refer to the Four Cleanups Campaign, 
the Cultural Revolution, the Cleansing of the Class Ranks Campaign and the reopening of China 
respectively. 
162 ‘Moral discourse' is understood as an active social process of understanding, evaluating, and 
arguing about what is right or wrong in a given situation (Madsen, 1984, p.8). 
163 As will be shown shortly, social predicament here is meant to be the dilemma of life choice as 
experienced by the rural Chinese under the changing socio-political context, and this experience just 
brings about the sophistication of the interaction between moral discourse and social reality, and thus 
help determining the moral character of the Chinese peasants. 
164 Between 1974 to 1982，two dozen emigrants from Chen Village, including both peasants and 
urban-bom young people who had settled in the village as sent-down cadres, had been interviewed by 
the researchers in Hong Kong (Unger, 1985, p. l l8; see also Chan and Unger, 1982, p.453; Chan, 
1985, p.3; Madsen, 1984, p.xi). 
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paradoxical development of rural China of the time，namely, the “muddling up of 
revolutionary ideals and cultural heritage", the “coexistence of ‘moral values in 
politics，and ‘moral values in culture'", and the "discrepancy between state 
preference and peasant choice，，. 
The first merit of the Project is its ability to guide its readers to experience the 
internal contradictions committed by the state in the process of shaping the living 
conditions and ideological built-up of the peasants, and the impact of such 
contradictions on the latter. By internal contradictions, I am referring to how an anti-
traditional regime had been using traditional practices to uphold a revolutionary claim. 
Two examples may have well demonstrated such inconsistencies. Firstly，by granting a 
class label to each family, the social and political status of the family - in terms of the 
living standard, life chance, network support - in the remaining years was then 
determined (Unger, 1984, p.l21). The main concem here is that the classification of 
class status was mixed up with a very feudalistic nature of the Chinese culture -
patriarchal familism. The huai chengfen (bad elements) of a family unit would pass 
only through the patriline. Put it the other way, a child would not inherit the class origin 
of one's mother's origin, but a boy with a bad origin would always maintain the 
xuetong ofhis ancestral line Q).133, p.l31). I would argue that this sort of class labeling 
working under such a cultural frame of reference just signify how it was a hybrid 
product of muddling up revolutionary ideals with cultural heritage. Another crossbred 
example of such is being shown by the way of handling the membership of the Poor 
and Lower-Middle Peasants Association once the workteam arrived at the village. The 
sent-down youths could hardly search for peasants who were both poor and not the 
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existing members of the village cadres to be new members of the Association. In the 
end, those 'new' representatives were nothing more than weak whiners in the eyes of 
the normal peasants. To counterbalance this unsound representation, the workteam 
turned to Uncle Mumbler - the remaining living member of the most senior generation 
- to be a symbolic leader of the group (Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1992, pp.53-54). In 
these two examples, we could see that the statesmen were trying to build in a set of 
revolutionary ideals via a series of structural arrangements. But in the course of the 
action, the deep impact of Chinese cultural heritage hardly lost its form. This not only 
signified the subconscious limitations of the statesmen in shaking off the cultural 
burden; what was more, the local villagers could hardly articulate the revolutionary 
meaning of this class labeling exercise. Obviously then, the assertion to destroy the 
impact of lineage on the daily life of the villagers appeared to be a motto more than a 
practice. Or simply put，at the very start, the means to achieve the ends have already 
been quite a violation with the aims of the ends. In the end, rather than coming to terms 
with a revolutionary mission, class designation tumed out to be a means in their eyes to 
achieve various non-communist ends, including the extension of one's influence within 
the community, or the provision of security and honor for one's family (Madsen, 1984, 
pp.75-76). 
The sophisticated issue here is whether the rural Chinese were manipulating or 
misunderstanding the government policies. If the first scenario set in, it would mean 
that the peasants were making use of high orders for their own sake; as for the second 
scenario, it would imply whether the peasants had misinterpreted the state message into 
something else that what tumed up in the end were unintentional consequences that 
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were harmful to the original design. As far as the first issue is concerned, the degree of 
manipulation on the side of the peasants depended on where the origins of the order 
came from and what were the circumstances involved. For instance, during the high 
tide ofthe People's Commune, public canteens were set up to allow peasants to be fed 
according to one's need rather than one's work. The peasants knew about the utopian 
nature of this practice, but there was no way to challenge an idea that came from so 
high above at that time of the year (Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1992, pp.24-25). But in 
some other circumstances, state policy might hardly forbid the manipulation of the 
issue in the very front. A vivid example of such was how the Four Cleanups Campaign, 
which was supposed to transform the ideology, social mores, economy of the China 
village ¢).74), was being made use of as a power play by one village cadre (Qingfa) 
over one's rivalry (Longyong).^^^ Eventually, what should be counted had not been 
counted, as it was a straightforward example in showing how, in a close grouping as 
such, individual manipulation of a political campaign for the sake of settling a personal 
dispute would be like. Li this sense, the authors remind us a feasible hidden agenda of 
this kind of mass meeting, and the possible naiveness of any analyst if one regards such 
meetings were one of the sound proofs of a changing village culture. 
But the complicated side of the story lies elsewhere: the misinterpretation of the 
165 In the account of Madsen (1984)，he tries to capture how Qingfa made use ofhis power granted 
by this office title to narrow down the target group of cleansing up to the team-level cadres, and then 
dealt with nobody else but the most self-restrained Longyong (p.84). The irony was that, by all means, 
Longyong himself could have been a role model of a village cadre. If the aim of the Four Cleanups 
Campaign was to ‘clean up’ the corrupt practices of local rural officials, Longyong, comparing with 
his contemporaries, should be the last one to be condemned; if the intent was to boost up the peasants' 
morale after the catastrophes of the Great Leap Forward, Longyong's selfless working attitude should 
be a model for the rest to play tribute to; if the objective was to improve the workings of the rural 
economy, Longyong's physical strength should be ftilly utilized. But in a power play, these factors 
were unsurprisingly downplayed. 
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orientation of the state. This process has to be related with two concepts agitated by 
Madsen (1984) into the analysis, ‘ceremonies of innocence' and ‘rituals of struggle' 
respectively ¢).22). From an anthropological point of view, justification of one's 
existence and position in the world is a normal universal act, and it is via the successful 
performance of rituals^^^ that one can prove oneself as committing deeply within the 
community. The point held by Madsen is that, until the mid 1960s, what did count for 
was the 'ceremonies of innocence', which meant rituals that might integrate a wide 
range of different points of view into such an understanding that each performer would 
transform or misinterpret other views into one's own belief. However, Mao's teachings, 
representing the Communist rituals, were ‘rituals of struggle' - rituals that celebrated 
one narrow set of ideas and turned against anyone who did not hold them. The irony 
was that the monitoring power of the state was not aware of the fact that it was the 
presence of 'ceremonies of innocence' rather than the practicing of ‘rituals of struggle' 
which were living among the people! A situation to illustrate this complexity is perhaps 
necessary. The particularistic nature of the Chinese culture regards the caring of close 
kinship as an almost in-bom duty, and so the ‘small illicit prerequisites' (Chan, Madsen 
and Unger, 1992, p.38) as maintained by the village cadres derived from various 
official title was regarded merely as sensitivity-showing (Madsen, 1984，p.24) of 
fundamental responsibilities toward family members of their own.^ ^^  But this was in 
166 Madsen (1984) defines 'ritual' as a set of 'multivocal' symbolic actions that expressed in a 
condensed and dramatic way of some shared values of a bounded community (p.9). 
167 This was exactly why the daily behavior of Longyong had aroused a sort of mixed feeling 
among the peasants: his harshness as a village cadre made him widely respected and obeyed among 
the villagers, but not widely liked. The reason behind was that the Chens did want their social life to 
be characterized by humanity expressed in relationships involving 'the flavor of human feeling，(ren 
qing wei). This would mean that one should respect, cherish and be faithful to the ties that bind one to 
one's contemporaries by virtue of a common ancestry; but Longyong just fell short of such a 
character; see Madsen, 1984，p.49, p.61. 
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violation of Mao's unselfish motto, thus providing the predisposition of deep 
predicaments on both village leaders and ordinary peasants. Mao's teaching agitated 
something that theyjust did not understand why it should be so, but the obeying to the 
teaching gave something that they all desired - political success and security, ki the end, 
the state-sponsored Maoist morality underwent a kind of 'Confucian transformation' 
(p.27) in such a way that villagers just fused those teachings with strands of their 
traditional discourse about their responsibilities in the world (p.23). So, for instance, 
Mao's appeal to serve the people could easily resonate with the tradition-based sense of 
responsibility toward the community as a whole ¢).140). In this way, the villagers 
unnoticeably solved the predicaments they had to face because of the working of 
'ceremonies of innocence': the transforming of Mao's morality into Confucian 
morality. But this would also mean that the hidden tension had not been forced to the 
surface. 
All in all, the coexistence of these two incompatible atmospheres highlights two 
diversifying characteristics of both the peasants and the Maoist statesmen. On the one 
hand, the villagers were living in such a different mentality that they messed up what 
was lately desired with what they used to practice. On the other hand, the Maoist 
statesmen were not sensitive enough to detect this fundamental tension and mistook the 
psychology of the peasants ready for radicalizing revolutionary activities. In the end, 
when everything was pushed to an extreme to determine what was right or wrong, the 
consequence was a deep and true hurt to both parties. In this respect, I contend that the 
Chen's analysts have illustrated a deeper analysis than other previous studies as far as 
the dynamics between the traditional culture and the new political context are of our 
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concem. But this is just the beginning of their articulation; this capturing of the 
muddling up of revolutionary ideals and cultural heritage further leads its audience to 
the exposure of another paradoxical development. 
I argue that the above muddling up is intermingled with two contradictory levels 
of value, what I coin as ‘moral values in polities' against 'moral values in culture'. By 
this, I mean the coexistence of two value systems that have different demands to those 
people involved: the former asking the people to think for the sake of the nation, 
whereas the latter requiring the people to consider the livelihood of the kins group. The 
point is that the muddling up of revolutionary ideals and cultural heritage has blurred 
up the conflicting demands of these two value systems, and thus, in an unnoticeable 
manner, delayed the potential clashes to the last minute when the only consequence 
was the collapse of both. A case in point of this argument is the struggle session on 
Qingfa in the high tide of the Four Cleanups Campaign. At the surface, he was 
criticized for losing his class stand by ‘drinking and eating big，. But in essence, his 
guilt was, in the eyes of the villagers, more in relation to his obedience toward his party 
superior at the village's expense (Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1992, pp.63-64)/^^ The 
bone of contention here is the role a Chen should play. As a Chen, one should always 
try to strive for the benefit of the collective Chens first. Thus, there was always a 
possible conflict of whether a local village cadre should put the village community or 
the official political indoctrination as the primary concem of one's action whenever the 
168 The event was one concerning Qingfa's selfish act of acceding to the superior request on the 
Chen Village and surrendered three square miles of terrain to the commercial forest of the state just 
located behind the village. So the villagers were willing to 'get' him in the Four Cleanups Campaign; 
see Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1992, p.64. 
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two forces struggled for the same pool of resources. Yet, such a misconduct of Qingfa 
was a praiseworthy behavior in the eyes of the workteam which adopted the ‘moral 
values of polities'. Li light of the then political atmosphere, the peasants had better 
attacked him via some other legitimate reasoning of the day - his losing of his class 
stand. In this case, we can sense that Qingfa was being put in a Catch-22 position, and 
the basic dilemma of this difficulty was a tug of war between political morality and 
cultural morality. We should bear in mind that the goal of the Four Cleanups, also 
known as the Socialist Education Campaign, was not only demanding the peasants to 
understand about Mao's thought, but to be morally and emotionally committed to them 
¢).74). This subjective desire from the state emphasized on the marriage between 
morality and political goals. In this way, one who adopted this line of thought should 
not be simply regarded as implementing a political order, but rather be seen as 
performing a modeling effect of what was politically moral and right. So any violation 
would not only be a breach of the mandate, but also a rupture of the moral life of that 
sense. Now, the strength of this argument depends on whether moral life of oneself is 
simply derived from the political sphere alone, and at once a sharp contrast of the 
commitment to this conceptual way of thinking could be discovered between the sent-
down youths, who represented the state's mission of emphasizing the ‘moral values of 
polities', and the rural peasants, who have been living under the shadow of ‘moral 
values of culture'. 
During the Cultural Revolution, Mao's maxims required a good revolutionary to 
be hard working and living an abstemious life. As the sent-down youths had little life 
opportunities in the city because of their poor class origin and low education standard 
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(p.ll), the prospect of sending down to the countryside immediately showed an 
idealistic and a careerist side - devoting one's life in service to the Chinese people as a 
noble mission on the one hand, and the moving into the position of leadership as a 
consequence of such devotion on the other (pp.9-10, pp.104-5). After all, when one 
sensed that the fulfillment of such moral expectation was implying a good 
revolutionary, and that identity would link up with the prospect of a party membership, 
such a mixture of life goal with life chance could generate enormous spontaneity. 
Obviously then，such a living atmosphere could hardly allow for any sign of weakening 
of willpower that could be detected by others. So an internal competition within the 
sent-down youths to out-perform others of the same category soon trapped all of them 
in an upward spiral of effort: each wanted to live as difficult as, and sometimes more 
difficult than, the poor and lower-middle peasants.^ ^^ Madsen (1984) contends that the 
sent-down youths were later suffered from a tremendous moral tension when they were 
found or accused of not up to standard to live a moral life that they were preaching to 
others ¢).129). Thus, when the situation was allowed, the only way to rescue the 
endangered dignity of the lagging behind ones was to become rebels (p.l62). But I 
would like to stress an even more complicated psychology here. When the living 
context was one of which where the life goal and life chance were so closely 
intermingled with one another, a moral crisis would also mean a crisis of future life 
prospect. How much the price would be when one was being told of not up to a 
revolutionary standard only after living a difficult life in the village for such a 
169 Madsen (1984) provides a lively demonstration of how the sent-down youths digest Mao's 
maxims and competed against one another. In fulfilling one of the Five Goods - enthusiasm for 
physical labor - as a basis for considering a membership into the League, they involved themselves in 
a hostile match: they tried to get suntanned, none of them wore shoes in the field, and everyone put on 
the most ragged clothing possible (pp.112-3). The whole process sounds ridiculous, but it also 
revealed the distorted psychology of those involved. 
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period?i70 It simply meant that one had no more chance of getting ahead. With such an 
understanding, we may be more comfortable to understand why the less successful 
peers (such as Li, Gao, Overseas Deng and Stocky Wang) were so willing to be 
insurrectionists during the heyday of the Cultural Revolution^^^ and claimed that the 
successful ones (Ao Meihua and Red Cheng) only succeeded at the price of not being 
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genuine followers of Chairman Mao ¢).123). Consequently, the effort of the state to 
build up a holistic moral life, and the fervent dedication of the sent-down youths to put 
this idea into practice, opened up the potential of a very destructive threat - whenever 
that holistic belief was shaken, the preachers themselves and the preaching would 
experience a total collapse. For sure, this is a tragedy, but both the youths themselves 
and the country did pay a price in the end. 
But the above capturing of ‘moral values of politics, comes to an even 
sophisticated scene with the coming up of the ‘moral values of culture' as generated 
from the side of the peasants. As we have briefly outlined in the first chapter, the life of 
the traditional Chinese is largely determined by a person's concrete obligations toward 
concrete people, whether living or dead, in the form of qing (affection), yi 
17° By saying that the lacking behind group was not up to standard, it might be caused by sickness, 
a relative lack of intelligence and personal drive, or other personal handicaps that precluded their 
playing a leading role within the village; see Madsen, 1984, p.l23. 
171 One of the messages of Mao at the peak of the Cultural Revolution was that the orthodox 
interpretation of Marxism was wrong. Based on this, rebellion against established political institutions 
was justified, as they were perverted by those who had taken the 'capitalist road'. According to this 
logic then, it could mean that it was not the so-called lacking behind sent-down youths were not good 
enough, but just the system was unworthy of them. At once, the image of a good communist shifted 
from a disciplined soldier committed to defending the established institutions to that of a rebel viewing 
disruption and chaos as a prelude to some purer national order; see Madsen, 1984，p.l24, p.l60. 
� 2 For a more detailed description of the profiles, hopes and frustrations among the few most 
fervent sent-down youths, see Chan, Madsen and Unger, Chapter 4; Madsen, 1984，pp.125-129. 
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(righteousness), bie (distinction), xu (order) and cheng (sincerity) (King, 1985, p.58). 
This Madsen (1981) terms as living in and very much of the world (p.l53; own 
emphases). But the ‘world，here is a narrow, local world of family and friends rather 
than the larger world of Chinese outside the village, and thus form a particularistic 
morality (Madsen, 1984, p.54). This is especially the case for the villagers, as temporal 
and spatial constraints fiuther hamper their conception of and interest in the outside 
world. One's experience is one of living a relatively self-contained life, with kinship tie 
as the chief yardstick for measurement of appropriateness and righteousness. But for a 
single-lineage community like that of the Chen Village, some Chens are, of course, 
closer kin than others (Madsen, 1981, p.l62). Particularistic it may be, under such a 
context, there is a cha-hsu (differential association) applying among the Chens of the 
same lineage. The closer the hsu, the less space for the idea of reciprocity - one is 
fulfilling one's obligation. The farther away from the center, the more room for 
maneuvering - one is constructing an interdependent relationship of the patronage and 
1 D 
client type. It is here that we may have a better understanding of the two chief 
authority figures in the village _ Qingfa and Longyong. 
As a member of the Lotus branch of the Chen lineage, Qingfa tried to make use of 
his title to side with his kinsmen by putting them in one single team. Even though the 
quality of each piece of land was not that different, he still assigned to them the best 
piece of land for production (Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1992, p.31). This considerable 
173 On an analysis of the relative autonomy of a Chinese in deciding the relationship with kins, see 
King, 1985, p.63; Madsen, 1984, p.56. In fact, a more thorough discussion on the importance of this 
issue in relation with the understanding of the values and behaviors of the rural Chinese will be dealt 
with in the final chapter. 
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gesture would be enough to generate the reciprocal act of the receiver. And in fact, 
Qingfa did not pass up opportunities to receive small gifts of poultry and other 
foodstuffs from patronage - existing or potential ones. The important point was, when 
one was regarding Qingfa as committing a political evil of power abuse and corruption, 
the village culture was measuring with a different yardstick: he was showing sensitivity 
towards his family members or close kins according to the Confucian moral logic. Yet, 
a good communist should devote one's life to 'serve the people, rather than all 
‘natural’ obligations to family, associates, and friends (Madsen, 1981, pp.153-4). One 
worked for 'revolutionary glory, rather than ‘family glory’，and the moral discourse in 
this sense was much more universalistic than the kins-centered focus. Each individual, 
after all, should be supported by one's own revolutionary character rather than by 
ongoing social relations based on personal affection (Madsen, 1984，p.75). When the 
revolutionary dignity should be one of da gong wu si, Qingfa had violated the basis of 
the official doctrine. But by the standard of the Chen villagers as a whole, even a ‘local 
emperor, as such was fairly good, so the issue left behind was how the villagers could 
passionately condemn the cadres and did mean it (Madsen, 1984, p.91). And as I have 
discussed above, they did condemn Qingfa, and mean it, not because he had violated 
the 'moral values in polities' by "drinking or eating big", but because he had violated 
the 'moral values in culture' of putting the party before the village.^ ^^ 
The case is even more telling when we move to a deep analysis provided by 
174 On the accusation of Qingfa by the villagers of his ‘drinking and eating big', refer back to 
discussion in footnote 168 above. In fact, this is why I have been saying in the last chapter that one has 
to go behind the so-called interest-maximizing Communist clientelist strategy and study the guanxi 
and renqin between the team leaders and peasants, which are the cultural threads of constructing their 
daily activities; see the discussions in footnote 126 of page 84 and footnote 139 of page 91. 
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Madsen on the differences in character between Qingfa and Longyong. In the word of 
Madsen (1984), whereas Qingfa was a 'patronage politician', Longyong was a ‘local 
patriah,.i75 Madsen holds that such diversification reflects how a Confucian tradition of 
what a good society is may have different 'dialects' - the two leaders selected a 
particular part of morality of Confucian moral tradition to guide and justify their public 
action (p.245). However, what I would like to stress here is that I see Longyong as even 
more familistic than Qingfa. Here, I mean that Longyong would include more people 
into his frame of reference to have a moral responsibility to take care of against that of 
Qingfa. Yet, this consideration of Longyong should never be mistaken as equivalent to 
the ‘universal moral discourse' of the Communist doctrine. The 'universal sense’ of 
Longyong was a contextual one - the Chen Village was the universe. He wanted to 
build up a good village where there should be no expression of personal sympathies, 
but only the collective expression of zeal ¢).185). Albeit his character was assimilated 
with a Communist, his communal desire was not in a communist mood. He was rigidly 
incorrupt, but such abhorrence of corruption stopped at the boundaries of the village -
to secure hard-to-get supplies for the village, he was willing to engage in corruption 
with cadres outside of the village ¢).39). Obviously then, when Qingfa was being 
accused of undermining the importance of class struggle and achievement of equality, 
Longyong was far from a person either stressing the importance of collective decision 
or upholding the idea of mass line. Yet, the reason that Longyong could still win over 
� 5 By 'patronage politician', it implies one who sees the society as a federation of small families 
bound together by attenuated networks of overarching kinship ties, and should be managed through 
the giving of patronage and the receiving of loyalty. By ‘local patriah', it is defined as one who sees 
the whole community as a single big family bound together by common duties to perform 
complementary roles under a powerful head with righteous authority. For a full capturing of this view, 
see Madsen, 1984, p.l75, p.245, p.55. In another occasion, the term 'village chauvinist' was used to 
describe Longyong. He was described as always desiring the Chen Village to develop better and 
quicker than all the other villages around, and he was quick to take personal offense whenever he saw 
the village as a whole was being taken advantage of; see Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1992, p.l01. 
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as the best alternative in the later period was due to the fact that his abstemious lifestyle 
as well as his harsh and impartial leadership style just fit the surface criteria of a 
r e v o l u t i o n a r y ! i 7 6 From the very start, he was not that much of concem of the nation's 
goal than the glory of the village, and his former bitter experience could precisely bring 
him the insight of how to manipulate political campaigns as much as possible for the 
working out of his own grand plan. Of course, in a communist sense, this just shows 
how serious an ‘ideological problem，has been rooted in the culture of the whole 
village. Yet, this is exactly how the ‘moral values of culture', in either the case of 
Qingfa or Longyong, is different from the ‘moral values of polities' in the view of the 
state. 
With the muddling up of revolutionary ideals and cultural heritage, thus allowing 
the space for the coexistence of ‘moral values in polities' and ‘moral values in culture', 
the discrepancy between state preference and peasant choice became inevitable. A 
crucial point to understand this divergence is the capturing of a feeling of the peasants: 
the peasants live poorly because they have to, rather than they want to, be so ¢).118; 
my emphases). In other words, the ideal life per se was not so much of a way of life 
that the peasants were by then living under. The validity of this claim can be revealed 
by the analysis on the hidden economy of rural China by two of the researchers (Chan 
and Unger, 1982). Comparing with three other nearby villages which, due to their 
176 Another example of the matching of Longyong's character with the revolutionary ideal of the 
Communist doctrine could be seen during the high tide of the Cleansing Class Rank Campaign. At the 
climax ofthe period, land ownership and the accounting of wages were removed from the hands of the 
team over to the brigade level. Longyong was almost alone among the cadres that seemed to be 
genuinely happy about this combination, as this would be a realization of his desire of seeing the 
brigade becoming a ‘single beehive，. On this discussion, see Chan, Madsen and Unger, 1992，pp.l72-
3. 
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poverty, had to commit in a lot of cheating ac t iv i t i e s"? against the state, the Chen 
Village was not so poor. Yet, her production team was concerned to resist the urgings 
from higher-level officials to sell more of the teams' above-quota grain to the state 
(p.455). Here, I see that an important transformation has to be taken note of. The 
villagers had to accept socialism in all sense by the 1960s. The impact of socialism was 
an egalitarian way oflife for all, but this all, if possible, should be referred to the Chens 
only. All Chens hope to get rid of living under a bitter life in the village, and if this 
could be achieved via a socialist mode of production within the community, and then 
its members sharing the fruit of it, it somehow could be of a worth-maintaining practice. 
hi light of such, it would not be difficult to understand why Qingfa and Longyong were 
not behaving like a revolutionary cadre in the official Communist sense. Communist 
doctrine might be high-sounding something, but they were just illiterate peasants that 
would rather take serious of the people of the village, including the common memories, 
interests, resentments, and hopes among the Chens, than anything else (Madsen, 1984, 
p.53). So, from another angle, both would rather work for a prosperous and proud 
village brigade (p.54). 
Seen from this perspective, the acceptance of socialism became a distorted 
capitulation entirely for the sake of a minimal protection. The best situation was 
maximization of income, but the baseline was a minimization of risk - collective 
agriculture in this sense could shoulder up a cushioning effect (Unger, 1985, p.l21). 
� 7 The cheating involved keeping secret the locations of some of the village's mountain fields, 
providing false report of good grains being spoiled, handing in wet grains in the place of dry, and 
keeping two separate account books - the real one for revenue sharing, the false one for reporting to 
the superior line. As both researchers point out, such cheating have to be done collectively, and thus 
must involve not the peasants alone, but also the local party cadres and village leaders in the process ； 
see Chan and Unger, 1982, p.454. 
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This explained why, once the depression receded, the baochan dao hu contract system 
comprised in 1961 for the purpose of overcoming the trauma of the Great Leap 
Forward became undesirable for both the poorer households and the better-off families. 
The reason behind was simple but interesting: the system itself of course was 
unfavorable to those families that were dominated by weak and sick members. Yet, it 
was equally threatening to the better-off families, because their better-off was just in a 
relative sense, and there was an ever-present risk on survival if unexpected bad luck 
arrived ^pp.l20-121). But the fatal issue here was that the state could not capture such a 
mixed feeling of the peasants, and mistook the picture of disliking of the baochan dao 
hu contract system as an act of demonstrating the peasants' favoritism towards 
collectivization, and led to the pushing forward of the Dazhai system • 
Under the Dazhai method, the workpoint ratings were supposed to be a dependent 
variable of the community's judgment on each person's moral attainments. At once 
two concerns set in, social status as gained via the recognition of others to one's 
contribution, and material reward as obtained from one's effort. Accordingly, even a 
weak person could be, and had to be, given credit once the person was regarded as 
trying out the best of one's potential ¢).124), because the attitude - and it alone -
became the sole criteria ofjudgment for reward. When the attitude of a peasant towards 
the production counted so much, a lower appraisal would imply a lower status ¢).128). 
To retain social standing and earnings, fierce arguments concerning the workpoint one 
should receive became a somewhat life-and-death matter. And once the team cadres 
tried to get rid of the dispute by unofficially converting the Dazhai method into a 
simple system of fixed salaries, this implied a granting of workpoints regardless of 
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work performance, and thus giving up the mechanism of differentiating the best from 
the worst ¢).131). In good days, the dispute could be muddled through when all 
experienced a rising standard of living. But once the village's economy tumed sour by 
1970 and resources were scarce, the toleration on disproportionate arrangement would 
be more and more costly. The best solution would simply be avoiding hard work in the 
public plots for fear ofbeing taken advantage of on the one hand; and reserving energy 
for their private plots on the other (p.l32). The consequence was a destroying of the 
climate of trust and the spirit of commitment to common endeavor of the village 
(Madsen, 1984, p.205). For sure, the state always wanted to introduce a new moral 
standard to the peasantry, and all the nationwide political campaigns running through 
the 1960s were attempts to introduce new moral yardstick based on a set of 
authoritative norms. Like it or not, the struggle sessions derived from these campaigns 
1 o^ 
became objective facts that the peasants could hardly withdraw themselves from. 
But when the situation became more and more extreme, and the space left for the 
functioning of ‘ceremonies of innocence' was filled up by ‘rituals of struggle', the best 
solution was to provide symbolic response on the one hand, and vote by withdrawal 
from public duties and activities on the other.^ ^^ Once the drastic fall of production 
reached an unbearable stage, the Hobson,s choice of the state was to release the rural 
community from economic and ideological doctrines. The very day when the new work 
team announced that the true task of a good revolutionary was to increase agricultural 
production, that the former wrongdoers were only involved in nonantagonistic 
178 As Madsen (1984) vividly puts, the peasants might never understand nor believe, but they could 
not forget nor ignore these struggle sessions (p.90). 
179 On a description of the symbolic response of the peasants at the heyday of the pledge to the 
‘three loyalties', see Chan Madsen and Unger, 1992, pp.169-170; for an outline of the resistance from 
below, see p.l74. 
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contradictions, or a matter of ‘good people making mistakes' (p.l81), the Maoist 
morality was informally sentenced to death. And after such a confusion and emotional 
exhaustion, a new era marked by a rapid decay in public morality was, and in fact, 
inevitable and reasonable. After all, when people could no longer trust one another the 
very day when the ‘rituals of struggle' destroyed the 'ceremonies of innocence', the 
guidelines by which villagers could leam to be prudent, and thus to be moral, collapsed 
(p.26), and no basis but only self-interest for action could be a driving force. In light of 
this, the dominance of utilitarianism in the political and social life of the post-Mao 
period in rural China was not so much a pragmatic desire and design of the highest 
level of the country, but a scenario of no other viable basis to keep the economy and 
polity on the run ¢).205). 
The Attention: What and How One Thinks 
The study of the Chen Village opens up a few interesting points of discussion in 
light of the studies that we have gone through in the last chapter. The Chen researchers 
in general, and Madsen in particular, are sensitive to the importance of knowing the 
moral self of the Chinese as a prerequisite to understand their values and behaviors 
under a society which had experienced drastic changes. After all, if we want to 
examine a person, is it very basic of knowing not only what, but also how, one thinks? 
Inevitably, the notion of moral philosophy becomes the very flmdamental aspect where 
one may trace certain attitudinal and behavioral patterns of a person. It is here that 
Madsen sees the deficiencies of the 'rational peasant' paradigm of Popkin, as his 
insistence on the utilitarian individualistic rationality of peasants, or 'utilitarian 
individualism', is just a predominant paradigm for discourse about social morality in 
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modem Westem society ¢).10). Assuming that individual human beings, thus including 
peasants, are essentially interest-maximizing individuals always acting in their own 
self-interest, and so will only work for the public good if they can see this as a means to 
achieve the ends of ultimate maximization of such. How can then, Madsen asks, there 
be a peasant leader, even under a very loose definition, be expected to refrain from 
cheating as long as he can get away with it (p.7)? And if so, how can there be even any 
sort of collective action to take place? Thus, Popkin has to show how collective action 
can and does occur among peasants where individualistic calculations of self-interest 
1 o^  
are embedded in compelling moral codes. But in this case, Madsen continues his 
question, where is the origin of such moral codes and what are the reasons that leaders 
would be compelled by them (ibid)? 
The reality is that, as reflected from the case in Chen village, there are just 
different paradigms for moral discourse (p.lO). The peasants of Chen village tend to 
use a different kind of moral reasoning than Popkin speaks of in The Rational Peasant 
(p.l4). It is a Confucian moral reasoning which sees that the relationship between self 
and society is one of potential harmony {he). This harmony can only be achieved when 
a person is cognitively and affectionately be aware of the responsibility that different 
social relationships place upon oneself (p.l3), or what I have discussed in Chapter One 
-the relational nature of the Chinese/^^ Thus, to do what is right or wrong in a given 
situation, one must gain both an understanding of and a feel for one's total situation. 
180 See Popkin, 1979, p . l l5 . 
181 On the notion of the Chinese as a 'relational being', see King and Bond, 1985; King, 1985. 
More on this will be elaborated in the fmal chapter. 
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Only with this insight, it is not surprising to see one shows favor on one's relatives over 
wider groups in one time, but endangers the welfare of one's family for the good of 
one's village, or province, or even empire in another ¢).14). Why is it so? This is 
because, in the Confucian tradition, one's moral obligations to others were defined by 
their positions within one's network of personal affiliations (p.54). After all, relations 
to kin, albeit the most morally significant of all, were by no means the only significant 
relationship ^).56; my emphasis).^^^ Whether one should sacrifice the narrow, 'private' 
interests of one's immediate families and closest neighbors for the good of a larger 
public group, or to sacrifice of the larger group to the smaller, is debatable, or relational, 
but just not simply an instrumental logic that would calculate the best means to 
advance the long-term interests of oneself or one's family (p.l4). For sure, this can 
produce bitter controversy because there are no clear-cut rules to define when a person 
should do what for the sake of a narrow social circle or a wider group. But this is the 
reality of the Chinese context. When the CCP designed the Maoist moral paradigm -
with the highest good of devoting one's life selfIessly to 'serve the people’ - in the hope 
of replacing the Confucian moral paradigm, such a coherent moral requirement needed 
very strong authoritative teaching (p.l6). But when the Cultural Revolution continued 
to drive on, and the moral authority of the central government demolished accordingly, 
it became possible for different groups, as I have captured above when discussing the 
happenings of the sent-down youths and the peasants alike, to advance their own 
interpretation ofMao's teaching, causing tremendous political and moral chaos. 
182 It is here that the influence of Xiao-tong Fei on Madsen (1984) in the analysis of the Chinese is 
seen. Calling Fei as ‘great Chinese anthropologist', Madsen shows signs of delight in coming across 
with the discussion by Fei (p.54, footnote 8). For the application ofFei 's idea in analyzing the Chen 
villagers, see pp.54-57. A more detail discussion on Fei's idea will be provided in the fmal Chapter. 
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The articulation of divergent moral paradigms within a rural village, and the 
association of such a formation with the conflicting interest of the state and the people, 
thus open up a back-and-forth investigation of the dynamics between the people and 
the state. Simply put, at the start, different moral discourses happened to come together 
as a consequence of historical trend (Confucian tradition of China) and political 
development (Communist doctrine took up as the official ideology). Their 
incompatible nature was blurred by the 'ceremonies of innocence' in such a way that 
both paradigms would not feel they were maintaining an antagonizing position. This 
misunderstanding lay down the wrong perception of the state to further pushing its 
Utopian ideal , and inevitably comered the 'ceremonies of innocence' to such an extent 
that an atmosphere of exclusion in the form of ‘rituals of struggle' replaced the 
misplaced harmony. It was this misplaced harmony that could sustain a rapid rural 
transformation at the start, and this misunderstanding was beautiful enough to allow for 
a heavy dosage of socialism on a native setting to take place (Chan, Madsen and Unger, 
1992, p.270). But once the political atmosphere was pushed to the extreme in the 1960s, 
more and more the peasants could recognize the traditional cultural morality was in 
conflict with the state mechanism, and the statesmen were brought to light that the 
revolutionary zeal they hoped to create had been distorted by the people. Li front of 
such a frustration, a new way of life as adopted by the peasants was a withdrawal from 
any involvement in showing moral stands, and the giving up of the quest of what a 
good society should be. Against this brief background, one could easily discover that if 
scholars could not decode, firstly, what sort of moral discourse the rural Chinese adopt; 
and secondly, how the rural Chinese and the Maoist statesmen had been wrongly 
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defining one another, thus resulting the latter in trying to mold the former into a 
revolutionary generation and the former in regarding the revolutionary means might 
achieve familistic ends, the analysis would bound to be incomplete. 
Now, let us look back to the case studies that we have gone through in the last 
chapter. Whereas the two pieces of work by Whyte and Parish (1978) and Shue (1980) 
try to tell us about the transforming process of the traditional rural China into a socialist 
collective, the analyses of Oi (1989) and Siu (1989) intend to show us the formation 
and changes of clientelist strategies. Yet, they have shortfalls in articulating how the 
concerns of familistic ends and kins tie have been working behind to influence the 
values and behaviors of the peasants, areas of which the Chen Village researchers have 
been seriously involved in for a better comprehension of rural China. Obviously then, 
the 'ceremonies of ignorance' provides an important clue to understand the deep 
structure of the peasant mentality of the time. Li the Chen village analysis, we still 
come across mentioning of the government policies and political campaigns, the 
patron-client relationship between the rural cadres and the peasants, the conflicts 
between the peasants and the state; but we are being guided to see the interplay 
between two conflicting value systems, and that how these two value systems influence 
the actions of the peasants, thus leading to the social ups and downs of rural China. In 
this respect, the teasing out of the impact on the cultural threads of the rural society in 
the process of a drastic political change becomes a significant breakthrough as well as 
an essential prerequisite for the researchers to go into the understanding of the Chinese 
society. That the Chinese culture is not viewed as either a positive or a negative input, 
but just as a shaping factor, for the social development of rural China, successfully 
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allows the readers the space to see the communication between culture and politics, 
and to understand how a process of stnicturation was formed and developed which hurt 
both parties in the end. 
The Reflection: Importance of Cultural Empathy 
It is against this backdrop that we can tum to the contribution of Potter and Potter 
1 QO 
(1990) so as to shed more light on the importance of empathetic understanding on 
Chinese culture for a genuine capturing of events there. Li their award-winning 
1 Qzl 
chapter , the main theme of the authors is to articulate how emotion has been viewed 
differently between their own referential framework - the American cultural context -
with that of their studied area, the Chinese peasants of the Zengbu village. Simply put, 
American frame of reference tends to assume that the form and meaning of social 
experience are directly derived from the emotions of a person having the experience, 
and that social relationships are appropriately formed, perpetuated, or dissolved, on the 
basis of personal emotion ¢).180). In this way, the expression of feeling becomes the 
medium of communication between the self and the social order (p.l81). This cultural 
belief demands her believers to have a continuous and pervasive attention to 
183 This study is based on personal accounts by the villagers of Zengbu and the direct fieldwork 
there by the two authors in 1979-80 and retum field trips in 1981, 1983，1984 and 1985 respectively 
(Potter and Potter, p.xi). Although the whole book consists of seventeen chapters concerning various 
aspects of the Zengbu community, they can all be read separately. Throughout this discussion, I will 
concentrate on two of them, see the successive footnote for details. 
184 As I have mentioned earlier, an emphasis on the work of Potter and Potter will be given to the 
ninth chapter titles "The Cultural Construction of Emotion in Rural Chinese Social Life" first. In fact, 
this piece of work was written by S.H. Potter which brought her the prize of Honorable Mention for 
the Stirling Award in 1986 (Potter and Potter, 1990, p.xiii). As will be seen shortly, the argument of 
this chapter sharply pinpoints the problematic of ethnocentrism and the importance of empathetic 
understanding. But another breath-taking chapter is the twelfth chapter of the book titles "Lineage and 
Collective: structure and praxis". The discussion is going to cast doubt on those views which regarded 
the Communist state has successfully transformed the rural China into a socialist collective. 
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psychological process such as defining, explaining, expressing, and analyzing the 
social life on the one hand, and because of so, the social order has to be reaffirmed 
from within myriad individuals on the other (p.l82). Under this framework, the 
relationship between inner experience and social life, and the understanding of the 
social meaning of emotion, becomes the core of attention. 
But what would it be like when people would not assume that the emotional life 
of individuals should be utilized in the service of the social order (p. 180)? Based on 
their understanding of the Chinese populace, Potter and Potter tag the Chinese as 
having the "Image of Irrelevant Affect" (p.l83) as far as the expression of emotion is 
concemed.i85 Li the Chinese cultural framework, emotion is irrelevant either to the 
creation or to the perpetuation of social institutions of any kind. Social relationship as 
well as social order can exist without the affirmation of the inner emotional response, 
and emotional experience may not formally lead to social consequences of any kind. 
The complexity here is that expression of emotion is possible and allowed, but the 
Chinese just would not expect emotional expressiveness could help in achieving an end 
¢).185). One, however, should not regard that there is a constraint against expression of 
emotion, as the authors have provided a series of examples to show how different kinds 
of emotions have been openly expressed in village daily life Qpp. 184-5). So what is the 
185 This tagging by the two authors is not without basis. In the preface of the book, we are told that 
the two authors have been trying to locate a research site in Mainland China with general 
characteristics of the villages of Ping Shan in New Territories of Hong Kong, a site where they had 
conducted fieldwork in the 1960s. In this way, they could make comparisons between the two spots as 
much as possible (Potter and Potter, p.xii). In the end, the Zengbu Village in Dongguan has been 
chosen for investigation. Here, I see that there is an intention of the two authors to understand the 
Chinese people with a more cross-referencing basis. In fact, in the course of discussing the cultural 
construction of emotion, the two authors try to compare the emotional behavior of the villagers in 
Zengbu with that ofHong Kong; for instance, see pp.183. 
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undulying issue? 
Traditionally speaking, the Chinese cultural framework has always been 
downplaying emotion as a function of expressing one's inner feels. That marriage in 
traditional China was an event of which the young people had to obey their parents in 
the choice of a partner just reflected how emotion was seen as an invalid basis for the 
formation of social relationships (p.l97; my emphasis). The matter is how much this 
sort of traditional cultural design could maintain its survival in the liberated China after 
1949. As the two authors maintain, even though the Marriage Law of 1950 was 
designed to assign the right of marriage partners to reject a marriage that they did not 
themselves agree to, still, the marriage reform was never an intention to produce a 
process resembling westem courtship - it just guaranteed that a marriage was a 
legitimate agreement without coercion, and would not suppose that there should be a 
process of developing emotional intimacy ^>p.l97-8). This is a sign ofhow traditional 
impact has on policy design. The sharp analysis of the two authors is to articulate the 
chemical reaction between the strong impact of traditional culture and the absolute 
demand of the political atmosphere. When there was a demand from the state on its 
people that what one understand should be in congruence with what was defined as 
valid ¢).185, my emphases), the irrelevance of emotional expression in normal daily 
activities at once became a buffer between the emotional expression of the people and 
the political desire of the state. A case in point could be seen from the treatment on 
those who expressed anger against authority figures of the village when policy was 
unpopular. Anger, as an expression of emotion per se, would not be regarded as a threat 
to legitimacy, as it would mean only an inappropriate emotion caused by 
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misunderstanding, and could be solved by clarification and/or re-education. The 
assumption here implied that, once the clarification was provided, people would be 
brought to an understanding that would be in congruent with the state's interpretation. 
It was only with such an understanding that one could comprehend the meaning behind 
a commonly heard response of “How I feel doesn't matter" when the Zengbu villagers 
were being asked about emotional experience of their own ¢). 183). In this analysis, I 
believe that the two authors have reflected how misleading it can be by just capturing 
the Chinese behaviors at the surface. At once, we can sense the complexity involved if 
one wants to claim that the Chinese peasants are rational thinkers - it is no longer a 
question ofknowing what they think, but a question of whether observing what they do 
does imply knowing what they think first. 
The insight of this study does not stop here. Lineage structure, which has always 
1 n r 
been understood as an important feature of feudalistic China , has been fully replaced 
by collectives of all forms soon after the country tumed red. This replacement is crucial 
because the existence of lineage structure as an observable social construct witnesses 
an exploitative practice based on the control of property by a group of minority and the 
subjugation of women and the slave caste. The elimination of this structure and the 
substitution of it by a loyalty to the collective is an important political victory, at least 
as a sense of gesture. But Potter and Potter raise out the important distinction of 
separating the surface changes, or ‘shallow structures', of the old kinship institutions 
from the more fimdamental deep structures of the old society (p.256). Lmnediately, the 
186 That existence of lineage was being criticized as feudalistic was because the structure allowed 
the control of property by a few, the subjugation of women by men, and the rich and powerful 
dominating the weak and the helpless (Potter and Potter, p.255). 
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latter concem asks for a deep analysis of the hidden agenda of social actions. It is true 
that a lot of surface features of the old lineage system were changed since 1949, but the 
two authors use various observable phenomena in the village to outline the striking 
continuity in form and essence between the old lineage and the new collective. Firstly, 
there is the relationship between the people and the property. As they contend, 
whatever the form of the collective - whether team, brigade, higher-level cooperative, 
commune before 1978, or the lineage village since 1980s - at its core is a guarantee that 
collective property should be owned by groups of patrilineally related men residing in 
the same community ¢).261).^ ^^ Secondly, this relationship between the people and the 
property is further narrowed down to the patrilineal line as reflected by close 
association between the old lineage genealogies and the new household registers. As 
the two authors stress, the legal documents that legitimize the membership and 
property rights of the men of the brigade is the household registers, and only those who 
are bona fide members of a lineage by birth or adoption will have their names included, 
and thus the rights to the collective property (pp.263-4). Unsurprisingly then, the third 
phenomenon is the witnessing of the persistence of the male-headed household, and 
not the individual, as the basic social unit ¢).264). Workpoint earning has a particular 
meaningful implication here. As the two authors contend, even though workpoints are 
earned by women in their own right and the amount earned is openly publicized, the 
187 Here, Potter and Potter borrow the views from the famous anthropologist Edmund Leach's work 
of 1961 in writing about the people of Ceylon, Pul Eliya: A Village in Ceylon. In this work, Leach 
maintains that “ ... Kinship is not 'a thing in itself. The concepts of descent and affinity are 
expressions of property relations which endure through time ..." (Leach in ibid, p.262). Potter and 
Potter (1990) pinpoint that the resemblance of the lowest administrative and accounting economic 
units and the traditional patrilineal kin groups not only witnesses how the deep structure of the old 
lineages of Zengbu was perpetuated, they even argue that such lineage solidarity was actually 
reinforced during the Maoist collectivist period, because it strengthened the group as a whole at the 
expense of separate segments; see p.262. 
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actual earnings of all family members are given to the heads of household at the year-
round calculation, who are mostly men (ibid). In this way, the social position, status 
and authority of the male household head have been maintained even under the 
collective system, and thus implicitly sustained the deep structure of the lineage 
system. 
Against this backdrop, to contrast this analysis of Potter and Potter with that of 
Siu is even more meaningful. As noted in the last chapter, Siu argues that popular 
rituals today reminds us ‘‘ ... not so much of what has been retained, but of how much 
rural society has been transformed ... ” (Siu, 1989a, p.ll). But let us respond by the 
account recorded by Potter and Potter (1990) on the reholding of the dragon-boat races 
in 1984 on the Hanxi River between Zengbu and Chashan after its termination for 
thirty-five years (p.260). Here, the two authors compare the races with the Balinese 
cockfights as recorded by Geertz, and borrow the term ‘deep cultural play，from 
him.i88 As they contend, dragon boats with appropriate crafts are in fact representing 
the strength, potency and power of the men of each lineage, and a winning boat means 
that the men of a lineage can take pride in the open display of their strength and 
discipline. Naturally then, the boat-racing event developed with great intensity because 
of its symbolic meaning.^ ^^ In fact, the exclusive male-preserved nature of this kind 
188 In one of his chapters of renowned work The Interpretation of Cultures (1973), Geertz tries to 
capture how cockfights in a Balinese village, which was seen in the eyes of the elite of the Republic of 
Indonesia as 'primitive', ‘backward’ and 'unprogressive' (p.414), it was actually the men involved, 
rather than apparently the cocks, that were fighting against one another. For details, see the section 'Of 
Cocks and Men,; Geertz, pp.417-421. 
189 Potter and Potter (1990) use the conflict and controversy as derived from the result of a race 
between two villages, thus leading to fighting between their members and fmal intervention of district 
cadres to calm down both parties, as an illustration of the importance of the cultural meaning of this 
ritual event to the villagers; see pp.260-1. 
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of activity is sustaining the importance of lineage structure and recapitulating the 
inferior and separate nature of the women (ibid). Nevertheless, in light of this 
reappearance of lineage rivalry, the local cadres soon become the ones who take the 
initiative in financing, organizing and racing the boats, and by so doing, the cadres 
seem to assert the party's control over the re-emergent traditional cultural ritual forms 
(p.261). In this way, the presence of party officials imports certain symbolic meaning 
into the ritual activity, so that both the party and traditional cultural forms can be 
affirmed in the event (ibid). Here, I want to expand the argument of Potter and Potter a 
bit. Firstly, I would like to maintain that the dynamics behind this boat-racing activity 
just reflect the limitations of the discretionary intervention of the state as raised by Siu 
(1989a, p.ll). Li this case, rather than seeing the ‘social tissues'- cultural understanding 
behind the practices ¢).289) - has changed, can it not be a case of how the state 
apparatus tries to assure that it will still have a role to play in light of a series of cultural 
revivals? The argument here is whether the state can do whatever she wants at her 
discretion, or to continuously upkeep her image in a drastically changing context that 
she no longer can claim that sort of absolute control. Siu's stand thus is subject to much 
judgment. This reservation at once unfolds another latent issue - whether the 
worldviews of the rural Chinese, peasants and cadres alike, may be rightly understood. 
Obviously, this brings us back to the discussion of Madsen on the moral discourse of 
the Chinese, and it is the articulation or not of this inner aspect of the Chinese mind 
that may facilitate or check a comparatively genuine capturing of their values and 
behaviors. 
The above illustration seems to be strong evidence in showing how these two 
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research projects can provide more insightful grasps to the rural Chinese. The reflection 
on the interplay between culture and politics, and the capturing of the deep meaning 
within the culture, have given the analysis of state-society relationship and patron-
client connection the exact kind of fresh and blood that is required by cross-cultural 
studies of this type. Madsen has deepened the understanding of the Chinese peasants by 
articulating their moral discourses, and from there figured out the constraints of 
adopting 'utilitarian individualism', an essence of the 'rational peasant' model, in 
providing sweeping comments to peoples of different cultural tradition. Similarly, 
Potter and Potter bring out the importance of cultural construction of behaviors and 
attitudes. This awareness at once exposes the weight of another fundamental issue in 
empathetic understanding: the comprehending of overt behaviors demands a 
clarification of a lot of cultural threads in behind. If so, will the debate of whether there 
is a revival or not of pre-liberated cultural traditions a more meaningful one when one 
appreciates that conflicting value systems have been existing in rural China since 
1949? 
hi the final analysis, the prerequisite of coming to terms with a people is to make 
sense of their lived experience - what and why they think, and how they pursue what 
they think. Americans have been spending enormous efforts to come to terms with the 
Chinese; but how can this process not be distorted if the sort of ethnocentrism as 
mentioned by Cohen is reflecting in the basic assumptions of the researchers on 
understanding the people?^^^ As mentioned in the start of this whole discussion, 
190 Here, I mean the attitude that Cohen (1984) has summarized as equating “ ... modern with 
Western and Western with important ... “ (p.2; own emphases), or what I have tried to further 
elaborate the deeper meaning of his critic: Westem as American and American as important; see the 
introductory paragraph of Chapter One. I maintain that the paradigmatic disputes in general, and the 
136 
everyone is 'culture bound, in a sense. The matter is the ability to have a critical 
reflection as well as an empathetic spirit in the course of committing in this sort of 
knowing about an other-culture exercise. Obviously then, some researchers are able to 
do so, and they maintain that the cultural nexus of the Chinese is different from that of 
the West. What sort of cultural and theoretical evidences are available to enunciate the 
Chinese cultural mentality for the purpose of getting to know the Chinese? And what 
sort of insights from this quest can be brought forward to understand the westem 
assumption on society in general, and people in particular? This brings us to the 
hindmost tasks of this discussion - examining the difference between the Chinese and 
the Americans, and exploring the root of such American mentality; and from there, the 
implication of these two levels of appreciation to future attempts of similar sort. 
categorization of the Chinese peasants as utilitarian individuals in some of the sociological and 
anthropological studies in particular, are reflecting how this problematic is in work. 
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Chapter Five 
Concluding Remarks: Between Americans and Chinese 
It is perhaps the right time to retum to a broader perception on how to handle the 
issue of ethnocentrism as set against the above discussion. To recapitulate what we 
have done so far, our basic concem is on how ethnocentrism may affect an 
understanding of another society, with reference to such an experience as endured by 
America on its comprehension of China. The annotation is that we are all 'culture 
bound，in one sense, but the problem is not here. The important issue is whether there 
is an awareness of such a constraint, and with such an awareness, how to overcome it 
in a process of reaching out to another culture. For America, in a political sense, the 
losing of China by 1949 was an issue that cried for an explanation. From 1949 until the 
reopening of China in late 1970s, the inquiring process in trying to explain the facts 
and norms of China had undergone different paradigmatic claims - totalitarian, impact-
response, modernization, and revolutionary. Each claim was supposed to be a more 
inner analysis of its predecessor, because the understanding of China, with the elapse of 
time, was believed to be more complete and genuine. Yet, the revelation of lots of 
information from China after the Cultural Revolution did embarrass the late 
revolutionary paradigm, which was supposed to be the most reflective and informative 
attempt to tease out the development of the Chinese society. But with the reopening of 
China and the launching of a series of internal critiques against early paradigmatic 
disputes, together with the possibility of conducting field research on the Chinese soil, 
a more fruitful capturing of the values and behaviors of the Chinese, and thus a better 
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understanding of the Chinese society on the whole, became a logical expectation. 
In this way, I maintain, the 'culture bound' cognizance has been ignored 
unnoticingly, or with little concrete reactions after notification, by most of the 
American China watchers. As shown by some studies on Chinese peasants, the 
researchers have lost no time to provide different analyses on the socio-political and 
socio-cultural situations as encountered by the rural Chinese, and traced out the 
changing impact on them as time befallen. Regardless of the timing to start off their 
research activities, they have assumed certain conception of individuals derived from 
their own cultural background as universally applicable for understanding different 
peoples. Based on such conception, the researchers have been interpreting not only the 
values and behaviors, but also the state-society relationship in China and interpersonal 
relationship among the Chinese, with an a priori attitude. This is far more than a kind 
of categorical dispute as reflected by paradigms of various types. It is a manner of 
understanding another people (in this case, the Chinese) derived from certain 
predisposed assumptions on human agents of a people (in this case, the Americans).^^^ 
Both, the paradigmatic disputes and certain perception of individuals, are the sorts of 
ethnocentric attitude that Cohen (1984) has been trying to accuse of in his study under 
the formula ‘modem as westem and westem as important’，and my flirther articulation 
ofhis meaning: 'westem as American and American as important'. 
How legitimate is such an allegation? I have picked up two researches on Chinese 
191 Here again, I would like to echo with what I have mentioned in footnote 3 of page 3 - it does not 
need to be an American to have American beliefs, as this is not a matter of nationality, but a matter of 
a perception and a way oflife, a point which will be further elaborated below. 
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peasants that were conducted in a period somewhat fallen in between the research 
timing of the first set of case studies, and used the two researches as counter examples 
to launch my argument. The researchers of these two projects have considered 
seriously about the constraints that 'culture bound, attitudes might have created in the 
process of knowing a people, and demonstrated the achievements that empathetic 
understanding could bring about in capturing the cultural threads of the people there. 
Their capability of doing so at once illustrates the dangerous conclusion one may 
commit in when one assumes the ‘time factor, (the latter the better) and the 
'availability of field opportunity' (on-the-spot fieldwork must be more successful) as 
matters of primary concem. They are important, but only secondary to the fundamental 
issue of conducting this kind of cross-cultural studies - the importance of the deep 
understanding onthe values and social fabrics of the studied culture. Until now, what 
then, has affected the Americans in coming to terms with the Chinese? 
Understanding Americans 
Perhaps we start with a very basic question: what does it mean to be a people, 
American or Chinese alike? What are the ideals and interests of each society, and how 
should these be pursued? These are for sure moral questions in a broader sense, but one 
does not need to be a philosopher in order to answer these questions. As Madsen (1995) 
contends, we orient ourselves around common hopes and aspirations. Americans of 
course have their hopes and aspirations, which is widely known around the world as 
the 'American Dream’ - a dream about individualistic independence in a world of 
opportunity, a world of open doors ^p.x, p.87). The existence of such a kind of ‘dream, 
is important for any society - be it American and Chinese, for it provides a common 
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reference point for an ongoing public conversation about what should be done to make 
that society a good society (p.xi; my emphases). In the final analysis, there is an 
underlying assumption on ‘what should be done, and ‘what is good’. What really 
matters is to what extent a people would like their underlying assumptions to be shared 
by others, and if so, how far these assumptions may go when being applied on 
understanding other societies. Here, three clarification arrives: the essence of the 
American ideal, the reason for Americans to apply this ideal especially on China, and 
the possibility of doing so. 
The central theme of the American dream is ‘freedom,, or ‘liberalism,, which 
generally means independence, illustrated by elements like individual autonomy, 
privacy, the right to be left alone, and being able to do whatever one wants as long as 
one does not restrict the ability of others to do whatever they want (p.7, p.92). Such 
assumptions about human nature and social value are closely echoing with the 
American Constitution which, based on a Lockean political philosophy, presumes the 
existence of certain universal political rights that is good for all people everywhere 
(p.l6). In this way, ‘freedom，or ‘liberalism, becomes not only the master narrative of 
America, but also the basis of where understanding of other societies starts. Naturally 
then, this master narrative of America enters into the fabrics of different American 
institutions, which have the moral duties to realize as well as to maintain such ideals 
^).xvii)]92 As a matter of fact, the moral desire to help China was further strengthened 
192 The meaning of 'institution' here is actually applying the brilliant discussion provided by the 
renowned study by Bellah et.al. (1991) on an inquiry about the struggle of the American souls, of 
which Madsen is also a member of the research team. In their analysis of American society, the 
researchers outline that an institution is somewhat like a moral enterprise, which has a set of 
sanctioned norms that gives us the direction to the way of living. It can thus be the education system, 
the market economy, religion, diplomacy, the family - any unit which has a normative pattem for 
carrying out certain kinds of activities, and will reward and punish those who comply or deviate 
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by the strong religious foundation (p.29) laid down by early missionary activities 
there.i93 Yet, China just wanted to 'act otherwise' by 1949. Against this scenario, 
Madsen argues, a liberal myth of ‘China as a troubled modemizer' gradually produced 
-China tried to modernize herself in a way other than individual advance in a 
competitive market economy based on the adoption of instrumental reasoning and 
respect of individual autonomy (p.28; my emphases). This was a pity; but before the 
Chinese could leam how to appreciate the American dream, as Americans, they should 
be patient to allow her to catch up, and whenever necessary, instead of isolating her 
from the rest of the world, they should involve in her process of modernization so as to 
boost up her speed. Here, Madsen is echoing strongly the views of Cohen (1984), who 
claims that all paradigms are “ ... burdened by Western-inspired assumptions about 
how history should go and built-in questions ... about why it does not go as it should 
¢).5; own emphasis).i94 That is to say, there is always a framework in the mind of the 
Americans whenever they want to know, and try to explain, why China has been so 
behaving. The various paradigms are different from one another only in manner of 
approaching, but not in essence. This is where my stress has been lying: how a 'culture 
accordingly; see pp.10-12, and its Appendix, "Institutions in Sociology and Public Philosophy", 
pp.287-306. The extension here is how the American values have penetrated into various important 
institutions, of which the academia is definitely one of those. What follows then is how this kind of 
values towards the society and people are being upheld by American China watchers when they 
approach the Chinese society, thus limiting their ability to grasp what is happening in there. In a sense, 
the case studies of Chapter Three are trying to articulate this issue in a concrete manner. 
193 In Madsen's view (1995), the history of missionary activity by American Protestant churches in 
China helped making any debate about her more emotional and more charged with moral concem than 
any other places that Americans would involve. The impact was not only on those directly involved in 
missionary effort, but also the general American public, who were taught by their churches on how to 
care about China (p.31; own emphasis). For a recapitulation of American missionary activities in 
China, refer back to the section "The Weight of the American China-Watchers" in Chapter One, and 
in particular footnote 8 and 11 in page 5-6. 
194 On this discussion provided by Cohen in analyzing the various paradigms, refer to footnote 77 
of page 47. 
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bound’ way of thinking, once not sensitively articulated, will penetrate into the 
conceptual as well as methodological framework of the scholars concerned in their 
attempts to understand another society. In this way, the scholars have not been trying to 
know the story of China, but only been believing the story about China. That is why 
Madsen succinctly puts that this 'trouble modemizer story, about China, as setting 
against two other stories on China of the day - 'China as Red menace, and 'China as 
revolutionary redeemer'^^^ - were all narratives about progress, about development, and 
actually about America itself ¢).52). 
Provided that the challenge of China to America was not simply a matter of a 
political rivalry, but a threat of the basic American ideal of ‘what is good’，it was thus 
understandable that the visit to China in 1972 by the then American President, Richard 
Nixon, was such a spectacular event.^ ^^ Under wide television coverage, Nixon and 
Kissinger became Marco Polos of the twentieth century ¢).71). After almost a quarter 
of the century, the Americans interpreted the event as a positive response of China 
195 'China as Red menace’ is simply a view of seeing China as a nation that could not be edged 
toward the path of modernization, but had to be fought in a protracted cold war; 'China as 
revolutionary redeemer' is a view of regarding China as representing a noble experiment that gave 
hope to all people in the world (Madsen, 1995, p.29). Setting this discussion against the one we have 
in Chapter Two, it is not difficult to distinguish that the former is somewhat resembling the 
'totalitarian' paradigm and the latter the 'revolutionary' paradigm. As for the liberal myth of 'China as 
troubled modemizer', it is somewhat a capturing of the combined version of the ‘impact-response’ and 
'modernization' paradigms, of which the idea of the latter was somewhat an amplification of the 
former; see my discussion in pp.29-30 of Chapter Two. 
196 Here, I regard such an analysis of Madsen as a continuous discussion of the American academic 
response toward the reopening of China as outlined in Chapter Two. As our discussion in there has 
shown, a series of critiques have been launched by the tum of 1970s against the paradigmatic debates 
from late 1940s to mid 1970s. Footnote 4 of Chapter One has provided a list of non-exclusive 
publications which tried to evaluate the attitudes of American scholars on China studies. But this study 
of Madsen (1995) is the latest recorded in the form of an independent study, which enables him to 
include the general trend of development from late 1970s onwards into the frame of discussion. By 
doing so, he articulates an important point: the liberal myth of China has mastered the public 
atmosphere of the day, and this mastery thus continued to affect the general attitude of Americans, 
including most of the American China watchers, on China. 
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toward the American Government. As one of the important institutions, the American 
academia in general, and social scientists in particular, could lose no time to enjoy this 
new ray of hope. The hope had multiple meanings - the opportunity to experience 
China personally was important not only for one's career, but also for one's sense of 
self-worth. It was a chance to make a little history, to do something important, and 
above all, to perform the moral duties of their institutions ¢).89, p.93, pp.97-8) so as to 
confirm the American dream: progress of a people would be made if that people could 
follow the laws of economic and political development based on individual 
advancement under free competition, or in the simplest term, corresponding to what the 
Americans had advanced. If the American society believes that it has commitments to 
China, that she has the ideal of what is good, and that she wants to help China to 
achieve what she thinks is good, the result - at least reflected in the American academia 
- i s somewhat the snapshots that we have taken in Chapter Two and Three. After all, 
the ideal of living formulates the way of thinking, the way of thinking determines the 
assumptions of understanding, and the assumptions shape the adoption of certain 
paradigmatic orientations and methodological concerns - these are the threads of the 
two chapters. The discussions concerning the scholars in disputes throughout the 1960s 
and the 1970s in the second chapter, as well as the assumptions applied on the study of 
Chinese peasants as recorded in the case studies of the third chapter, all but reflect the 
extent to which the American academia has committed itself in a mythical 
understanding of China based on the story it desired to believe, rather than on the fact 
that it could know. 
In the last resort, the core concem is the ideal assumptions about human nature 
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and social value. Now, the distinctive feature of American culture is individualism, 
encouraged by the opportunities that American society offers for individual mobility 
and grounded in a dominant Protestant tradition that stresses the direct relation of each 
individual to God (Madsen, 1993, p.l67). This individualism leads to an emphasis on 
the value and potential, the dignity, and indeed the sacredness, of each individual. As 
1 Q 7 
another study on researching the American culture has figured out , anything that 
would violate the rights of the Americans to think for themselves, judge for themselves, 
make their own decisions, live their lives as they see fit, is not only morally wrong, but 
sacrilegious (Bellah et.al., 1985，p.l42). Thus, the American talk of ‘freedom’ or 
‘liberalism, ultimately rests on the stress of individual autonomy, which, in concrete 
terms, would mean the importance of free will, the right of a person to talk about what 
one wants, to voice out how one feels, and to perform what one desires when all such 
do not intrude the same rights of others. The picture is clear: this implies an emphasis 
on personal affection or feeling as a basis of living in a society, and a respect of such 
basis among individuals of that society. But how universal is this kind of understanding? 
How can one account for the scenario when the deeds of an individual does not 
represent what one feels, or vice versa? Here, we come back to the awareness brought 
forward by Potter and Potter, and the unfolding of an important question: is it possible 
to have another alternate set of assumptions about human nature and social value that is 
different from that of the Americans? This finally brings us back to our mentioning of 
Fei and Hsu in the first chapter - their articulation of the values and behaviors of 
197 Here, I am talking about another important piece of work concerning American life by Bellah 
et.al. (1985), with Madsen included in the author list again. Although they could only limit their 
interviews on white, middle-class Americans, their attempts to figure out a path of how Americans 
preserved or created a morally coherent life was well received, making the publication the national 
bestseller ofthe year. For detailed discussions on their analysis of American individualism, see Bellah 




hi his renowned study Xiangtu Zhongguo, Fei (1992[English version of 1947]) 
tries to depict how the Chinese society is formed. In a sense, this is a Chinese version 
of discussing the ideals, values and norms of the society as we have come across in the 
previous section. Fei is able to articulate that there is a difference between the west and 
the Chinese in the formation of their own society, and thus resulting in the behavioral 
difference of the two people. Whereas individuals in the West establish their society by 
applying a tuantigeju^^^ (organizational mode of association) (jp.62) embedded in the 
Christian tradition, people of China organize their society by adopting a chaxugeju^ 
(p.68) based on Confucian ethics. 
In the westem world, the far-reaching impact of the concept of God has led to two 
important corollaries - everyone is equal before God, and God treats everyone with 
equal justice (p.72). As God is not of this world, the important point is to practice His 
spirit. As a result, there emerges a kind of social relationship among human beings 
which can symbolizes this spirit. Fei argues that the pattem of personal relationships in 
social life which can reflect the essence of the spirit of God - namely, justice, 
198 Tuantigeju is a description of the western society as one of which her people organize 
themselves in such a unambiguous manner that they have clear membership in the organizations they 
are involved - everyone knows who is and who is not a member, and thus the rights and duties of 
members are clearly delineated (Hamilton and Wang, 1992, p.20). 
199 Chaxugeju is a description of the Chinese society as one of which the relationship of the people 
is like the ripples flowing out from the splash of a rock thrown into water. This is just another logic of 
organization: the society is composed not of discrete organizations, but of overlapping networks of 
people linked together through differentially categorized social relationships (Hamilton and Wang, 
1992, p.20). 
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impartiality, and love ^).73) - is the tuantigeju. The tuanti (organization) here cannot 
be the private possession of any individual, and every member within the tuanti is 
bound to be equivalent with one another (p.65), just as we are all equal in front of God. 
An individual in the Westem society is thus a soul-bearing self, a unique entity which 
is permanently and intrinsically linked to no human, only to God (Hamilton and Wang, 
1992, pp.25-26). Li this way, Fei (1992[1947]) drives his readers into an important 
significance: religious piety and beliefs are not only the source of Westem morality, but 
also the force that supports Westem behavioral norms (p.72). Eventually, a protection 
of individual right, a respect of personal autonomy, and a mutual recognition of one's 
social boundary are inherited into the morality of the Westem mode oforganization. So, 
adult children who still lives with their parents will usually pay for their room and 
board (p.65), families are understood as organizations with distinct boundaries (p.62)-
this is a way of living based on a way of understanding what life is. But an autonomous 
self must anchor ‘itself in a social world; thus, one must create one's own life 
experience through willed emotional attachments and voluntary organizational 
memberships, and so answering the question of the meaning oflife (Fei, 1992, p.91). 
In the Chinese society, social relationship among people is just of another kind. 
The this-worldly concem of the people requires one to think of how to live with other 
people. To achieve the highest goal of Confucianism, he, one should act in a proper 
way, and this brings out the idea of li. Eventually, lun becomes the core element ofthe 
Confucian idea, which stresses the importance of d i f f e r e n t i a t i o n � � � ^ > . 6 5 ) . Against this 
200 In the original Chinese version, Fei uses the word ‘bie,, which could mean distinction or 
differentiation in English language; see Fei, 1992[1947], p.29. 
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backdrop, the important step for a Chinese is to know how to tui (pushing or extending 
out) (p.66), just as ripples expanding out from the center of the splash when a stone is 
thrown into the water. This is not simply a metaphor, but the capturing of the essence 
of the Chinese way of interaction in the form of chaxgeju: the self, who is embedded in 
social relationships and is emotionally tied to personal obligations as defined by those 
relationships, acts out with the required li according to that relationship. Here, we see 
that there is an understanding behind: treating a person not as a person per se (that is, as 
an individual in equal terms), but according to the relationship of that person with 
oneself. This is why the renowned Confucian scholar Liang Shu-ming (1987[1949]) 
concludes the chief characteristic of the Chinese society as lunli benwei (ethics-based), 
which means that the focus of the social system of China is placed on the particular 
nature of the relationship between those interacting individuals ^)p.77-80). This makes 
a normal Chinese, in King's term (1985), a 'relational being，¢).63).^ ^^ Interpersonal 
relationship must then be measured, and this measuring in tum sets the ethical standard 
one has to take up in dealing with the concerned other. Obviously then, particularism -
that is, treating people differently, instead of universalism _ that is, treating people 
equally, becomes one of the sharp distinction between the people of the East and West. 
Meed, the fascinating aspect of Madsen in his 1984 study is that he has related the 
behaviors as derived from the world views of the Chen villagers with the socio-
political context, especially in capturing the particularistic morality of the Chinese 
peasants (p.54)?^^ The likes and dislikes of the villagers against the village cadres were 
201 In fact, King has provided a very condense analysis ofhow the Chinese relate with one another; 
see particular the section "Relational Orientation of the Individual" (King, 1985，pp.63-66). 
202 Indeed, in the introduction ofFei 's Xiangtu Zhongguo, Hamilton and Wang (1992) do mention 
that Madsen's Morality and Power in a Chinese Village is “ ... an excellent case study of morality in 
action, and one that makes good use of Fei's theory of morality in Xiangtu Zhongguo ...，，(p.24, 
footnote 47). 
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not simply a matter of material gain and loss, but also of an assessment of whether the 
cadres, who were supposed to behave accordingly, did or did not so behave in the 
end.203 
Li fact, the outline ofFei on the essence of Chinese values and behaviors has been 
closely sustained by the views of Hsu in a series of his discussion (1971a[1948], 
1981[1953], 1968, 1979)?^^ What is the characteristic behind the attachment to family 
and kin of the Chinese? By analyzing the culture of a community, West Town in 
southwestern China between 1941 and 1943, Hsu (1971a) uses the figurative phrase, 
‘the ancestor's shadow’，to capture the core of such behavioral pattem (p.8). As Hsu 
(1968) later maintains, the Chinese kinship system is dominated by the father-son dyad 
(^.5 83)205, which has four attributes: continuity, inclusiveness, authority and asexuality 
(see also Hsu, 1979, pp.260-62). As he contends, the father-son identification and the 
big-family ideal together are responsible for a social system which deprives the 
younger generation of any feeling of independence on the one hand, and enables them 
to share whatever wealth or glory of their immediate or remote ancestors on the other 
203 For details of this discussion, refer to page 113-120 of Chapter 4. 
204 As a matter of fact, this series of discussion by Hsu only reflects a portion of his writings 
concerning kinship and culture. Indeed, the large number of materials written by Hsu in contrast with 
Fei over the same period is one of the best proofs of how social scientists in China have been 
suffocated from academic pursuits over those years; refer particularly to footnote 24 and 32 ofpage 10 
and page 17 respectively for a discussion on the fate of social scientists and development of sociology 
in China after 1949. 
205 Hsu first uses the term ‘father-son identification' in his The Ancestor's Shadow (1971a[1948], 
p.8). By 'dyad', it is a condition that reflects the most primary basis linking up two persons. Thus, for 
instance, in a nuclear family, there are eight basic dyads: husband-wife, father-son, mother-son, father-
daughter, mother-daughter, brother-brother, brother-sister, and sister-sister. If there is a dyad, there 
must be 'attributes' which represent the logical or typical mode of behavior and attitude intrinsic to 
that dyad (Hsu, 1971b, p.8). 
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(Hsu, 1971a，p.8). This highlights the attribute of continuity in Chinese culture, and this 
continuity in tum makes any discarding of first role position in the kinship base less 
likely when comparing with Westerners. For instance, when a man becomes a husband, 
his husbandly role is simply added to his role as son (Hsu, 1979, p.260), and thus 
brings out the second characteristic of Chinese kinship, inclusiveness - the longer the 
first role lasts, the more other roles will be added into the frame of reference. 
Inclusiveness thus is a function of continuity and is a kind of continuity itself (p.261). 
This is of a direct contrast with the clear boundary of the westem society, where 
Americans are encouraged to replace their kinship ties with other ties as a sign of 
‘maturity, (Hsu, 1968, p.585). On the other hand, these two attributes are tend to be 
practiced even beyond kinship ties by Chinese, as reflected by a quite popular 
phenomenon in Chinese business circle: employees often make themselves 'dry sons' 
irv/^  
or ‘nephews, of their employers (ibid). Authority as the third attribute derives not so 
much from power and charisma, but from tradition, in the Chinese society, which is 
commensurate with continuity: authority based on tradition is less likely to be 
challengeable, discontinuous ¢).587). Finally, the attribute of asexuality is talking about 
the custom of assigning sex to a restricted place, mainly for the purpose of 
reproduction.207 This is another significant cultural contrast with the West. In fact, the 
close association of sex with love, and the expression of love as a normal emotional 
206 Here, we see the practice of tui from kin members to non-kin figures under the loose definition 
of ‘zijia ren,; for the practice of tui, see discussion in page 147 above; for the issue of 'zijia ren\ see 
the critiques on Siu in page 92. 
207 In his research in West Town, Hsu (1971a) comes across cases in which the mothers died as a 
result of abortion attempts undertaken because their daughters-in-law had already given birth to male 
children (see Section Three of the book). As Hsu maintains later (1968), when the primary function of 
the continuity of the family line has been taken up by the younger woman, there is no reason for the 
older woman to still engaging in sex (p.587). 
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utterance of the Westem individuals, is exactly a representation of the 'expressive 
project of the self of them. The pattem of interaction of the Chinese does not require a 
person so much to create one's own life experience through emotional attachments, as 
the attachment is by default fully webbed, and is expected to be continued, throughout 
one's life. 
ki another setting, the above capturing of the Chinese ways of life in contrast with 
that of the Americans has been reduced by Hsu (1981[1953]) himself to two sets of 
contrast: 
“ ...the American way of life ... is placed upon the predilections of 
the individuals, a characteristic we shall call ‘ individual-centered'. 
This is in contrast to the emphasis the Chinese put upon an 
individual's appropriate place and behavior among his fellowmen, 
a characteristic we shall call ‘situation-centered"” ¢).12; own 
emphases). 
Why can a Chinese parent act on behalf of one's children? How can an American 
son who is in conflict with his father not be a bad son? The answer to the former is that 
this is the ‘Chinese way of life，，and the latter the 'American way of life, (p.6). The 
• • 2 0 8 
fascinating aspect of Hsu is his using of familiar aspects of life such as painting , 
literature209, pattem of conduct between the sexes^^ ,^ arrangement and pattem of 
208 In Westem art the focus is on man or woman as an individual; in Chinese art the important thing 
is the individual's place in the external scheme of things (Hsu, 1981, p.20). 
209 Traditional Chinese novels usually concentrate on what the characters do in their roles as 
emperors or common men, while American novels are much more concerned with what the characters 
do, think and feel as individuals (p.29). 
210 In a culture in which individual predilections are accorded the highest value and emotionality is 
given a free hand, Americans can fall in love without, in theory at least, rhyme or reason. This kind of 
romantic love, with emphasis on chance attachment, exclusive possession of the loved object, and 
complete ecstasy, is much in harmony with the individual-centered approach to life. In the Chinese 
society, even the term lien ai (romantic love) is strictly a modem linguistic creation, and love at most 
only occupies a place among other considerations, especially one's obligations to one's parents. The 
difference is much reflected by a different question posed by an American and a Chinese when in love: 
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behavior in home�"’ way of schooling^^^, to tease out the two different passages ofthe 
two people, thus explaining why he sees the attributes of the American kinship system 
are discontinuity, exclusiveness, volition and sexuality (Hsu, 1968, p.584), as 
contrasted with the four attributes of the Chinese as mentioned above. The 
particularistic orientation of the Chinese towards those who have relationship with 
oneself means that not every single person is assessed in an universal manner on the 
one hand, and naturally, not every single person have to be treated similarly on the 
other. It is not a matter of whether 'individual-centered' of the West is of a higher order 
or not over the ‘situation-centered’ nature of the Chinese; it is just that the two people 
are different. Li the west, the formation, maintenance and the breaking up of a society 
is derived from the emotion of the individuals - personal emotion is a legitimate basis 
for linking up the relationship between the person and the society. So, for instance, if 
there is no more love existing between a couple, there is a basis for the termination of 
the relationship. But the sociocentric nature of the Chinese culture makes the part 
played by individual emotion in formulating an act or a decision as less important, if 
not quite insignificant, at all. If we recall the work of Potter and Potter here again 
the former may ask "How does my heart feel?" whereas the latter may wonder "What will other 
people say?" (pp.49-51, pp.58-60). 
211 The American emphasis within the home is on privacy. Space and possessions are 
individualized, limiting even the liberty of parents in the room of their children, and vice versa. On the 
contrary, privacy hardly exists at all within the Chinese home except between members of opposite 
sexes who are not spouses. A symmetric development is that Americans are very verbal about their 
children's rights, whereas Chinese parents have a completely free hand with their children. It is a 
difference between what American parents should do for their children, and what the Chinese children 
should do for their parents (pp.78-80; pp.85-87). In the end, an American child leams to see the world 
strictly on an individual basis, and expects his environment to be sensitive to him (p.88; own 
emphases); whereas the Chinese child leams to see the world in terms of a network of relationships, 
and obliged to be sensitive to his environment (ibid, own emphases). 
212 In brief, American schools foster a desire and a skill for self-expression, mostly in a way of 
encouraging children even in nursery settings to stand up individually to tell the rest ofthe class about 
something one knows; the Chinese lack of emphasis on self-expression leads the children to develop a 
greater consciousness of the status quo rather than an adventurous character (pp.92-94). 
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(1990), their 'cultural construction of emotion，is exactly a recognition of such a 
difference. 
Perhaps it is the right time to round off the entire discussion. Even though Fei has 
a very different life experience than that ofHsu after 1949, both of them have been able 
to articulate the difference between the two peoples within their frames of observation 
and understanding. For sure, they are Chinese, but they could describe the Americans 
in a manner, which, in general, is quite in line with the analysis of the Americans by 
American scholars themselves (Bellah, et.al., 1985, 1992; Madsen, 1995). Why could 
Fei and Hsu be able to do so? This was because they did not think of the Americans in 
terms of their own culture, and accepted that there was another set of underlying values 
and assumptions of which the Americans would believe and reflect in their own day-to-
day activities. If American behaviors have to be understood with reference to their 
cultural threads, so have to be for the Chinese. Fei and Hsu of course have produced a 
fascinating plateau for understanding Chinese, but it does not mean that only Chinese 
can understand Chinese. As shown in the fourth Chapter, both Madsen (1984) and 
Potter and Potter (1990) have been handling the matter in a nice and neat manner. In 
this way, we may conclude that an important key to success in this kind of cross-
cultural study is empathetic understanding. If the attentions are driven to the nationality 
of the researchers, the timing of launching the research, and the availability or not of 
on-the-spot fieldwork, then the concerns are somewhat misplaced. Unfortunately, the 
effort of Fei and Hsu in depicting the implication of cultural values on behavioral and 
attitudinal patterns of Chinese has not been, on the whole, much alerted by most 
American China watchers who would like to study the values and behaviors of the 
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Chinese running down from 1960 onwards.^^^ In a sense, the later group of people 
could not deny themselves as more or less overlooking the relevancy and insight that 
could be given by Fei and Hsu's work. This, in tum, just demonstrates how the concem 
of the disputes among them have misplaced from evaluating their own assumptions of 
human understanding to what is ‘believed, to be of the Chinese. Why can this happen? 
This is because most of the American China watchers have overlooked that the claims 
of what is good, what is important, what is rational, what is preferred and what is 
reasonable, are not so much universally agreed as these scholars have assumed them to 
be. With such a mentality, there sets in an implicit optimism that the truth of China 
would be clarified with the chance of stepping into China. In this way, their perceptions 
of understanding a people of another culture has been taken for granted by most of 
them. The examples of Madsen (1984) as well as the two Potters (1990) have shown 
the American academia could go much deeper in the grasp; but unfortunately though, 
most have not done so. 
But there is a more important intellectual concem here that I have to raise out in 
the last manner.2i4 What have we leamt from the American dream as outlined by 
Madsen (1995)? The Americans have their ideal assumptions about human nature, 
about what is valuable, and thus what is reasonable to think and act. What have we 
213 In a board sense, I do agree with Hamilton and Wang (1992) that Fei's Xiangtu Zhongguo is “... 
virtually unknown ... “ (p.4) to the English-speaking world before a full English version is available 
until 1992. But Hsu's work as listed above, in particular his ideas of the father-son dyad and the 
attributes of this dyad, is hardly being seen as even part of the theoretical review by American China 
watchers in studying the values and behaviors of rural Chinese. 
214 The following discussion is much indebted to the insights shared to me by Dr. Sun-pong Yuen in 
his forthcoming publication (in Chinese) by the end of 1997, Theory and Practice: Towards the 
Construction of a Critical Hermeneutic Framework for Social Inquiry and Social Work Practice 
QSfew Jersey: Global Publication). 
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leamt from the 'chaxu, order of Fei (1992) and 'relational-centered' nature of Hsu 
(1981[1953])? The Chinese have a set of values to guide them on appropriate actions 
toward oneself and others. A striking similarity of these two examinations is that, we 
witness a set of moral norms/value judgment that is being sustained by the people there 
which is not only reflected in their social life, but is also a very important point for one 
to enter into the understanding of the social life of a place. Now, moral judgment, 
Westem or Chinese alike, has to be relied on human agents/individuals to perform. 
Here, with theoretical insights and concrete examples, the work of Fei, Hsu, Madsen, 
and the two Potters have told us how westerners are inclined to refer more on personal 
emotion as the basis of the judgment, whereas the Chinese are more to a relational self 
in deciding the dos and don 'ts. What people think and do will construct observable 
social life, but when one reduces such social facts into a certain universal framework of 
understanding for an explanation, is this an act of oversimplifying the value judgment 
of a people as reflected through their activities there? My point of argument is that 
when one applies a framework (such as the 'rational choice approach') to understand 
individual behaviors in general terms rather than relating the individuals to their living 
context and understand how they behave, then the comprehension is bound to be 
distorted. I maintain that individual consideration in day-to-day activities is a necessary 
condition that one should not downplay when one is trying to understand that society in 
a more genuine manner. In the end, any consideration must involve a judgment, and a 
judgment must rely on a cluster of moral values, and thus one has to pay attention to 
the cultural threads that have generated such a cluster. The deeds of Madsen and the 
two Potters over other researchers that I have gone through in the third chapter are that, 
besides the provision of the socio-economic and socio-political facts of Mainland 
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China, they also consider seriously to the judgmental side of the Chinese when doing 
an analysis on them. Their sensitivity to the relationship between value judgment of a 
people and the cultural threads in help formulating such judgment of this people 
enables them to look behind the attitudinal and behavioral pattem of the Chinese in a 
way other than applying universal theory to explain the phenomena as seen. This kind 
of respect they have given to the Chinese peasants in the end provides the required 
flesh and blood to show how and what the Chinese think. By setting their actions 
against their cultural backdrop, the attitudinal and behavioral pattems of the Chinese 
peasants are more succinctly upheld by these three researchers, and so their analyses 
more rewarding in echoing with the deep capturing of the relationship between 
behavioral pattems and moral values of the Chinese as done by Fei and Hsu. After all, 
values and norms must be something particular to the involved person, and it is here 
that the value of, and the necessity to, continue launching indigenizing attempts in 
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